On the ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency on the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Home / RLA / On the ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency on the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

On the ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency on the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated February 19, 2007 No. 229

To ratify the Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency on the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed in Vienna on February 6, 2004.

President of the Republic of Kazakhstan

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY ON THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN CONNECTION WITH THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

WHEREAS the Republic of Kazakhstan (hereinafter referred to as "Kazakhstan") and the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the "Agency") are parties to the Agreement on the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter referred to as the "Safeguards Agreement"), which entered into force on August 11 1995; CONSIDERING the desire of the international community to further strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime by increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system; RECALLING that the Agency, when implementing safeguards, should take into account the need to: avoid creating obstacles to the economic and technological development of Kazakhstan or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities; comply with applicable health, safety, physical protection regulations, as well as other applicable safety requirements and the rights of individuals; and take all measures to protect commercial, technological and industrial secrets, as well as other confidential information that becomes known to him; BEARING IN MIND that the frequency and intensity of the activities specified in this Protocol will be maintained at a minimum level consistent with the objective of increasing the effectiveness and effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards; Kazakhstan and the Agency HEREBY agreed as follows:

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THIS PROTOCOL AND THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT

Article 1

The provisions of the Safeguards Agreement shall apply to this Protocol to the extent that they comply with and are compatible with the provisions of this Protocol. In the event of a conflict between the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement and the provisions of this Protocol, the provisions of this Protocol shall apply.

PROVISION OF INFORMATION

Article 2

a. Kazakhstan provides the Agency with a statement containing: i) A general description and information indicating the location of research and development activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle, not related to nuclear material, carried out elsewhere, which are funded, specifically authorized, or supervised or carried out on behalf of Kazakhstan. (ii) Information determined by the Agency on the basis of expected improvements in efficiency or effectiveness and agreed with Kazakhstan regarding the guarantee of operational activities at facilities and locations outside facilities where nuclear material is commonly used. iii) A general description of each building on each site, including its use, and, if that's not enough, a description of its contents. This description includes a map of such an area. (iv) A description of the scale of operations for each location relevant to the activities listed in Annex I to this Protocol. (v) Information indicating the location, operational status and estimated annual production capacity of uranium mines and processing plants and thorium processing plants and the existing annual production volume of such mines and processing plants for Kazakhstan as a whole. Kazakhstan provides, upon request of the Agency, data on the existing annual production volume of an individual mine or processing plant. Providing this information does not require detailed accounting of nuclear material. (vi) Information on the source material that has not reached the composition and purity that make it suitable for fuel fabrication or isotopic enrichment, including: (a) The quantity, chemical composition, use or intended use of such material, regardless of its nuclear or non-nuclear use, for each location in Kazakhstan in which such material is present in quantities exceeding ten metric tons of uranium and (or) twenty metric tons of thorium, and for other locations with quantities exceeding one metric ton - the total amount for Kazakhstan as a whole, if this total amount exceeds ten metric tons of uranium or twenty metric tons of thorium. Providing this information does not require detailed accounting of nuclear material.; (b) The quantities, chemical composition and destination of each export shipment from Kazakhstan of such material for specific non-nuclear purposes in quantities exceeding: 1) ten metric tons of uranium, or for consecutive exports of uranium from Kazakhstan to the same State, each of which is less than ten metric tons, but the amount of which exceeds ten metric tons during the year; 2) twenty metric tons of thorium, or for consecutive thorium exports from Kazakhstan to the same country, each of which is less than twenty metric tons, but the amount of which exceeds twenty metric tons during the year; (c) The quantities, chemical composition, current location and use or intended use of each import of such material to Kazakhstan for specific non-nuclear purposes in quantities exceeding: 1) ten metric tons of uranium, or for consecutive imports of uranium to Kazakhstan, each of which is less than ten metric tons, but the amount of which is exceeds ten metric tons during the year; 2) twenty metric tons of thorium, or for successive imports of thorium to Kazakhstan, each of which is less than twenty metric tons, but the amount of which exceeds twenty metric tons during the year; on the understanding that the provision of information on such material intended for non-nuclear use, after it reaches the final form of its non-nuclear usage is not required. (vii) (a) Information on the quantities, uses and locations of nuclear material exempt from safeguards in accordance with article 36 of the Safeguards Agreement; (b) Information on quantities (which may take the form of estimates) and uses at each location of nuclear material exempt from safeguards in accordance with article 35 (b) A safeguards agreement, but not yet in final form for non-nuclear use, in quantities exceeding those specified in article 36 of the Safeguards Agreement. Providing this information does not require detailed accounting of nuclear material. (viii) Information on the location or further processing of medium- or high-activity wastes containing plutonium, highly enriched uranium or uranium-233, for which safeguards have been discontinued in accordance with article 11 of the Safeguards Agreement. For the purpose of this paragraph, "further processing" does not include the repackaging of waste or its further conditioning, which does not involve separation of elements, for storage or burial. (ix) The following information regarding the agreed equipment and non-nuclear material listed in Annex II: (a) For each export shipment from Kazakhstan of such equipment and material: identification, quantity, place of intended use in the recipient State and date or, where appropriate, expected date of export; (b) at the Agency's specific request, confirmation by Kazakhstan as the importing State of information provided to the Agency by another State in relation to the export of such equipment and material to Kazakhstan. x) General plans for the upcoming ten-year period related to the development of the nuclear fuel cycle (including planned research and development activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle), when they are approved by the relevant competent authorities in Kazakhstan. b. Kazakhstan shall make every reasonable effort to provide the Agency with the following information: (i) A general description and information indicating the location of non-nuclear material research and development activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle that specifically relate to enrichment, reprocessing of nuclear fuel or to the treatment of medium or high-grade waste activities containing plutonium, highly enriched uranium, or uranium-233 carried out anywhere in Kazakhstan, but which are not funded, They have not received a specific permit or are not controlled by Kazakhstan or are not carried out on behalf of Kazakhstan. For the purpose of this paragraph, "treatment" of medium- or high-activity waste does not include the repackaging of waste or its conditioning, which does not involve separation of elements, for storage or burial. ii) a general description of the activities and information about the person or organization carrying out such activities in the locations designated by the Agency off-site, which, in the opinion of the Agency, could be functionally related to the activities on this site. The provision of such information is the subject of a specific request from the Agency. It is provided in consultation with the Agency and in a timely manner. with. At the request of the Agency, Kazakhstan provides clarifications or clarifications of any information provided in accordance with this article, to the extent that it is relevant to the purpose of the guarantees.

Article 3

a. Kazakhstan shall provide the Agency, within 180 days after the entry into force of this Protocol, with the information referred to in article 2.a. i), iii), iv), v), vi) a), vii) and x) and in article 2.b.i). b. Kazakhstan provides the Agency with the updated information referred to in paragraph a by May 15 of each year. above, for the period covering the previous calendar year. If the previously provided information remains unchanged, Kazakhstan notifies about it. c. Kazakhstan provides the Agency with the information specified in the article by May 15 of each year. 2.a.vi (b) and (c), for the period covering the preceding calendar year. d. Kazakhstan provides the Agency with the information specified in article 2.a.ix (a) on a quarterly basis. This information is provided within sixty days after the end of each quarter. e. Kazakhstan provides the Agency with the information specified in Article 2.a.viii) 180 days prior to further processing, and by May 15 of each year, information on changes in locations for the period covering the previous calendar year. f. Kazakhstan and the Agency shall agree on the time and frequency of providing the information specified in article 2.a.ii). g. Kazakhstan shall provide the Agency with the information specified in article 2.a.ix) (b) within sixty days of receipt of the request from the Agency.

ADDITIONAL ACCESS

Article 4

The following applies in connection with the implementation of additional access in accordance with Article 5 of this Protocol: a. The Agency does not aim to mechanically or systematically verify the information referred to in Article 2, but the Agency has access to: (i) any location referred to in Article 5.a. i) or ii) on a selective basis in order to ensure the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities; ii) any location referred to in article 5.b. or c., in order to resolve a matter related to the correctness and completeness of the information provided in accordance with Article 2 or to eliminate inconsistencies related to that information; (iii) to any location referred to in Article 5. (a) (iii) to the extent necessary for the Agency to confirm For the purposes of safeguards, Kazakhstan's statements on the status of the facility or location outside facilities where nuclear material was previously commonly used as decommissioned. b. (i) With the exception of the cases specified in paragraph (ii) below, the Agency shall provide Kazakhstan with at least 24 hours' advance notice of access; (ii) with respect to access to any location on the site that is requested in conjunction with visits to verify information about the structure or with inspections for special purposes or routine inspections on that site. The time limit for prior notification, if the Agency requests it, is at least two hours, but in exceptional circumstances, it may be less than two hours. c. The preliminary notification is sent in writing and it specifically specifies the reasons for access and the activities that should be carried out during such access. d. In case of a question or nonconformity, the Agency provides Kazakhstan with an opportunity to provide clarification and facilitate the resolution of this issue or the elimination of this nonconformity. Such an opportunity will be provided prior to submitting an access request, unless the Agency considers that a delay in granting access may prejudice the purpose for which the access is requested. In any case, the Agency does not draw any conclusions regarding the issue or the discrepancy until Kazakhstan is given the opportunity to do so. e. Unless otherwise agreed with Kazakhstan, access is provided only during the regular business day. f. Kazakhstan has the right to be accompanied by Agency inspectors during access by representatives of Kazakhstan, provided that this does not delay the inspectors from performing their functions or otherwise prevent them from doing so.

Article 5

Kazakhstan shall provide the Agency with access to: (a) i) any location on the site; (ii) any location designated by Kazakhstan in accordance with article 2.(a.v) to (viii); (iii) any decommissioned facility or decommissioned location outside facilities where nuclear material was previously commonly used. b. any location designated by Kazakhstan in accordance with article 2.a.i), article 2.a.iv), article 2.a.ix)(b) or article 2.b., other than those referred to in paragraph (a.i) above, provided that, if Kazakhstan is unable to provide such access, Kazakhstan makes all reasonable efforts to promptly meet the Agency's requirements by other means. c. any location designated by the Agency other than those referred to in paragraphs a. and b. above, for the purpose of sampling the environment at a specific location, provided that, if Kazakhstan is unable to provide such access, Kazakhstan makes all reasonable efforts to promptly meet the Agency's requirements at the adjacent locations or by other means.

Article 6

In implementing article 5, the Agency may carry out the following activities: a. With regard to access in accordance with Article 5.a.i) or iii): visual observation, environmental sampling; use of radiation detection and measurement devices; sealing and use of other identifying and interference-indicating devices defined in Additional Provisions; and the application of other objective measures, the technical feasibility of which has been confirmed and the use of which has been agreed upon by the Board of Governors (hereinafter referred to as the "Council") and after consultations between the Agency and Kazakhstan. b. With regard to access in accordance with Article 5.a.ii): visual observation; counting of accounting units of nuclear material; non-destructive measurements and sampling; use of devices for detecting and measuring radiation; examination of accounting documents relating to the quantity, origin and placement of material; sampling of the environment; and the application of other objective measures, the technical feasibility of which has been confirmed and the use of which has been agreed upon by the Council and after consultations between the Agency and Kazakhstan. c. With regard to access in accordance with Article 5.b.: visual observation; environmental sampling; use of radiation detection and measurement devices; examination of production and shipping records related to guarantees; and the application of other objective measures, the technical feasibility of which has been confirmed and the use of which has been agreed upon by the Council and after consultations between the Agency and Kazakhstan. d. With regard to access in accordance with Article 5.c: sampling of the environment and, if the results do not resolve the issue or eliminate the discrepancy at the location designated by the Agency in accordance with Article 5.c., the use of visual surveillance, radiation detection and measurement devices at that location, and the application of to coordinate other objective measures between Kazakhstan and the Agency.

Article 7

a. At the request of Kazakhstan, the Agency and Kazakhstan shall agree on regulated access under this Protocol in order to prevent the disclosure of nuclear proliferation-sensitive information, to meet security or physical protection requirements, or to ensure the protection of privately owned or commercially sensitive information. Such arrangements shall not prevent the Agency from carrying out activities that are necessary to provide convincing assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities at the relevant location, including resolving any issue related to the correctness and completeness of the information referred to in Article 2, or eliminating inconsistencies related to that information. b. Kazakhstan may, when providing the information referred to in article 2, inform the Agency of locations on the site or location where regulated access may be applied. c. Prior to the entry into force of any necessary Additional Provisions, Kazakhstan may resort to access regulation in accordance with the provisions of paragraph a. higher.

Article 8

Nothing in this Protocol prevents Kazakhstan from providing the Agency with access to locations in addition to those referred to in articles 5 and 9, or from requesting the Agency to conduct verification activities at a specific location. The Agency shall immediately make all reasonable efforts to act in accordance with such a request.

Article 9

Kazakhstan grants the Agency access to locations designated by the Agency for environmental sampling in a wide area, provided that if Kazakhstan is unable to provide such access, Kazakhstan makes all reasonable efforts to meet the Agency's requirements at alternative locations. The Agency does not request such access until environmental sampling in a wide area and the procedural measures for its implementation have been approved by the Council and consultations have been held between the Agency and Kazakhstan.

Article 10

The Agency informs Kazakhstan about: a. Activities carried out under this Protocol, including activities in relation to any issues or inconsistencies that the Agency has brought to the attention of Kazakhstan, within sixty days after the Agency carries out these activities. b. Any issues or inconsistencies that the Agency has brought to the attention of Kazakhstan as soon as possible, but in any case within thirty days after the Agency receives these results. c. Conclusions that it has reached as a result of its activities in accordance with this Protocol. Such conclusions are provided annually.

APPOINTMENT OF AGENCY INSPECTORS

Article 11

a. i) The Director General shall notify Kazakhstan of the approval by the Council of any Agency official as a safeguards inspector. If Kazakhstan does not notify the Director General of its rejection of such an official as an inspector for Kazakhstan within three months of receiving the notification of approval by the Council, the inspector thus notified to Kazakhstan is considered to have been appointed to Kazakhstan.; (ii) The Director General, acting upon a request from Kazakhstan or on his own initiative, shall immediately inform Kazakhstan of the withdrawal of the appointment of any official as an inspector for Kazakhstan. b. The notification referred to in paragraph a. above, it is considered to have been received by Kazakhstan seven days after the date on which the Agency sent such notification to Kazakhstan by registered mail.

VISAS

Article 12

Kazakhstan, within one month after receiving the request, shall, if necessary, provide the designated inspector with the appropriate multiple entry/exit and/or transit visas, which are required to enable the inspector to enter and stay in Kazakhstan in order to perform his/her functions. Any requested visas are valid for at least one year and, if necessary, are renewed during the period of the inspector's appointment to Kazakhstan.

ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS

Article 13

a. In cases where Kazakhstan or the Agency indicate the need to specify in Additional Provisions how the measures set out in this Protocol should be applied, Kazakhstan and the Agency shall agree on such Additional Provisions within ninety days after the entry into force of this Protocol or, in cases where the need for such Additional Provisions is indicated after the entry into force of this Protocol. by virtue of this Protocol, - within ninety days after the date of such indication. b. Pending the entry into force of any necessary Additional Provisions, the Agency has the right to apply the measures set out in this Protocol.

COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

Article 14

but. Kazakhstan authorizes the Agency to freely use for official purposes communication systems between the Agency's inspectors in Kazakhstan and the Agency's Headquarters and/or Regional Bureaus, including the transmission in a non-autonomous or offline mode of information coming from devices installed by the Agency for the purpose of preservation and/or monitoring or measurement, and ensures the protection of such communication. The Agency, after consultations with Kazakhstan, has the right to use internationally established direct communication systems, including satellite systems and other types of long-range communications not used in Kazakhstan. At the request of Kazakhstan or the Agency, details regarding the implementation of this paragraph regarding the transmission in a non-autonomous or offline mode of information received from storage and/or monitoring or measurement devices installed by the Agency are defined in Additional Provisions. b. When establishing communication and transmitting information, as provided for in paragraph a. Above, due consideration is given to the need to ensure the protection of privately owned or commercially sensitive information or information about a structure that Kazakhstan considers particularly sensitive.

PROTECTING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

Article 15

a. The Agency maintains a strict regime to ensure effective protection against disclosure of commercial, technological and industrial secrets and other confidential information that becomes known to it, including such information that becomes known to the Agency during the implementation of this Protocol. b. The regime referred to in paragraph A. above, it includes, in particular, provisions related to: i) general principles and related measures for the treatment of confidential information; (ii) Conditions of employment for the protection of confidential information; (iii) Procedures in the event of breaches or alleged breaches of confidentiality. c. The regime referred to in paragraph A. above, approved and reviewed periodically by the Council.

applications

Article 16

a. The annexes to this Protocol are an integral part of it. Except for the purposes of amending Annexes, the term "Protocol", as used in this document, means the Protocol and Annexes taken together. b. The list of activities listed in Annex I and the list of equipment and materials listed in Annex II may be amended by the Council on the recommendation of an open-ended expert working group established by the Council. Any such amendment shall enter into force four months after its adoption by the Council.

ENTRY INTO FORCE

Article 17

a. This Protocol shall enter into force on the day when the Agency receives a written notification from Kazakhstan that the legislative and/or constitutional requirements of Kazakhstan necessary for entry into force have been fulfilled. b. Kazakhstan may, at any time before this Protocol enters into force, declare that Kazakhstan will apply this Protocol on a temporary basis. c. The Director General shall immediately inform all Member States of the Agency of any declaration on the provisional application of this Protocol and of its entry into force.

DEFINITIONS

Article 18

For the purposes of this Protocol: a. Research and development activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle mean activities that specifically relate to any aspect of the development of a process or system of any of the following: - conversion of nuclear material, - enrichment of nuclear material, - manufacture of nuclear fuel, - reactors, - critical assemblies, - reprocessing of nuclear fuel, - processing (not including repackaging or conditioning, which does not involve separation of elements, for storage or burial) of waste of medium or high activity levels containing plutonium, highly enriched uranium or uranium-233, but does not include activities related to theoretical or fundamental scientific research or to research and development work for industrial applications radioisotopes, medical, hydrological and agricultural applications, to study the effects on health and the environment and to improve maintenance. b. Site means the territory whose boundaries are defined by Kazakhstan in the relevant information on the design of the facility, including the shut down facility, as well as in the relevant information on the location outside facilities where nuclear material is commonly used, including a closed location outside facilities where nuclear material was commonly used (which are limited to locations where there are hot chambers or carried out activities related to the conversion, enrichment, manufacture or processing of fuel). The site also includes all facilities co-located with the above-mentioned facility or location for the purpose of providing or using substantial facilities, including: hot chambers for processing irradiated materials that do not contain nuclear material; facilities for processing, storing and dumping waste; as well as buildings related to coordinated activities identified by Kazakhstan in the in accordance with article 2.a.iv) above. with. A decommissioned facility or a decommissioned location outside the facilities means a facility or location where the remaining structures and equipment important for its use have been dismantled or rendered unusable, so that it is not used for storing nuclear material and cannot continue to be used for handling nuclear the material, its processing or use. d. A shut-down facility or a closed location outside facilities means an object or location that has been discontinued and from which nuclear material has been removed, but which has not been decommissioned. e. Highly enriched uranium means uranium with an enrichment of 20% or higher in the isotope uranium-235. f. Environmental sampling at a specific location means sampling the environment (e.g., air, water, vegetation, soil, pollution) at and in the immediate vicinity of an Agency-designated location in order to assist the Agency in drawing conclusions about the absence of undeclared nuclear material or nuclear activities at that designated location. g. Environmental sampling in a wide area means sampling the environment (for example, air, water, vegetation, soil, pollution) in a number of locations designated by the Agency in order to assist the Agency in drawing conclusions about the absence of undeclared nuclear material or nuclear activities in a wide area. h. Nuclear material, as defined in Article XX of the Charter, means any source material or any special fissionable material. The term "source material" should not be interpreted as applying to ore or ore waste. Any definition given by the Council in accordance with Article XX of the Agency's Statute after the entry into force of this Protocol, which expands the list of materials considered to be source material or special fissionable material, shall enter into force under this Protocol only after acceptance by Kazakhstan. i. Installation means: i) reactor, critical assembly, conversion plant, fabrication plant, reprocessing plant, isotope separation plant, or separate storage facility; or ii) any location where nuclear material in quantities exceeding one effective kilogram is commonly used. j. Location outside installations means any facility or any location that is not an installation and where nuclear material in quantities equal to one effective kilogram or less is commonly used.

DONE in Vienna on the 06th day of February 2004 in two copies in the Russian and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

for THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN: for THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY :

ANNEX I LIST OF ACTIVITIES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 2.a.iv) OF THIS PROTOCOL

i) Manufacture of rotary tubes for centrifuges or assembly of gas centrifuges. Rotary tubes for centrifuges are thin-walled cylinders described in section 5.1.1 (b) of Annex II. Gas centrifuges means centrifuges described in the introductory note to section 5.1 of Annex II. ii) Manufacture of diffusion barriers. Diffusion barriers are thin porous filters described in section 5.3.1 (a) of Annex II. iii) Manufacture or assembly of systems using lasers. Laser-based systems means systems that include those items described in section 5.7 of Annex II. iv) Manufacture or assembly of electromagnetic isotope separators. Electromagnetic isotope separators mean those items referred to in section 5.9.1 of Annex II that contain ion sources described in section 5.9.1 (a) of Annex II. v) Manufacture or assembly of columns or extraction equipment. Columns or extraction equipment means those items described in the sections 5.6.1, 5.6.2, 5.6.3, 5.6.5, 5.6.6, 5.6.7 and 5.6.8 of Appendix II. (vi) Manufacture of separation nozzles or vortex tubes for aerodynamic enrichment. Separation nozzles or vortex tubes for aerodynamic enrichment means separation nozzles and vortex tubes described in sections 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 of Annex II, respectively. vii) Manufacture or assembly of uranium plasma generation systems. Uranium plasma generation systems means systems for the generation of uranium plasma, described in section 5.8.3 of Annex II. viii) Manufacture of zirconium pipes. Zirconium pipes means pipes described in section 1.6 of Annex II. ix) Production or improvement of the quality of heavy water or deuterium. Heavy water or deuterium means deuterium, heavy water (deuterium oxide) and any other deuterium compound in which the ratio of the number of deuterium atoms to the number of hydrogen atoms exceeds 1:5000. x) Manufacture of nuclear purity graphite. Nuclear purity graphite means graphite with a purity level higher than 5 millionths of boron equivalent and a density exceeding 1.50 g/cm3. (xi) Manufacture of containers for irradiated fuels. An irradiated fuel container means a container for the transportation and/or storage of irradiated fuel, providing chemical, thermal and radiation protection, as well as heat dissipation during transportation, transportation and storage. xii) Manufacture of reactor control rods. Reactor control rods means rods described in section 1.4 of Annex II. xiii) Manufacture of tanks and reservoirs that are safe from the point of view of criticality. Critically safe tanks and reservoirs are those items described in sections 3.2 and 3.4 of Annex II. xiv) Manufacture of machines for cutting irradiated fuel cells. Irradiated fuel cell cutting machines means the equipment described in section 3.1 of Annex II. xv) Construction of hot cells. Hot chambers means a chamber or interconnected chambers with a total volume of at least 6 m3, equipped with protection equal to or exceeding the equivalent of 0.5 m of concrete with a density of 3.2 g/cm3 or more, equipped with equipment for operations using remote control.

ANNEX II LIST OF AGREED EQUIPMENT AND NON-NUCLEAR MATERIAL FOR EXPORT AND IMPORT REPORTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 2.a.ix)

1. Reactors and reactor equipment

1.1. Complete nuclear reactors

Nuclear reactors capable of operating in a controlled self-sustaining fission chain reaction, excluding zero-power reactors, which are defined as reactors with a design maximum level of plutonium production not exceeding 100 grams per year.

The EXPLANATORY NOTE "Nuclear reactor" generally includes components located inside or directly adjacent to the reactor vessel, equipment that controls the power level in the core, and components that typically contain or directly contact or control the coolant from the primary circuit of the reactor core. It is not intended to exclude reactors that could be appropriately modified to produce significantly more than 100 grams of plutonium per year. Reactors designed for long-term operation at significant power levels, regardless of the degree of their plutonium production capabilities, are not considered "zero-power reactors".

1.2. High-pressure reactor vessels

Assembled metal housings or their main parts are factory-made, which are specially designed or prepared to accommodate the core of nuclear reactors in them, as defined in paragraph 1.1. above, and capable of withstanding the operating pressure of the primary circuit coolant.

EXPLANATORY NOTE The upper plate of the reactor pressure vessel is covered by paragraph 1.2 as the main, factory-made part of the high-pressure vessel. The internal parts of the reactor (for example, supporting columns and plates of the core and other internal parts of the body, guide pipes for control rods, heat shields, partitions, tube grids of the core, diffuser plates, etc.) are usually supplied by the reactor supplier. In some cases, certain internal support components are included in the manufacture of the high-pressure housing. These items are important enough from the point of view of safety and reliability of reactor operation (and therefore from the point of view of warranty obligations and responsibility of the reactor supplier) that their delivery outside the framework of the basic agreement on the supply of the reactor itself would not become common practice. Therefore, although a separate delivery of these unique, specially designed and prepared, important, large and expensive items will not necessarily be considered out of the scope of interest, such a delivery method is considered unlikely.

1.3. Machines for loading and unloading reactor fuel

Manipulator equipment specially designed or prepared for loading or extracting fuel from nuclear reactors, as defined in paragraph 1.1. above, which can be used when the reactor is under load, or has the technical capabilities for precise positioning or orientation, allowing complex fuel reloading operations to be carried out on a shut-down reactor, which are usually impossible. direct surveillance or direct access to fuel.

1.4. Reactor control rods

Rods specially designed or prepared for controlling the reaction rate in nuclear reactors, as defined in paragraph 1.1. above.

EXPLANATORY NOTE This also includes, in addition to the neutron-absorbing part, its supporting and suspended structures, if the supply is carried out separately.

1.5. High-pressure reactor pipes

Pipes that are specially designed or prepared to accommodate fuel cells and primary circuit coolant in reactors, as defined in paragraph 1.1. above, at an operating pressure exceeding 5.1 MPa (740 lb/sq. inches).

1.6. Zirconium pipes

Pipes or pipe assemblies made of zirconium metal or its alloys, weighing more than 500 kg during any 12-month period, which are specially designed or prepared for use in reactors as defined in paragraph 1.1. above, and in which the weight ratio of hafnium to zirconium is less than 1:500.

1.7. Pumps of the primary coolant circuit

Pumps specially designed or prepared to maintain the circulation of the coolant of the primary circuit of nuclear reactors, as defined in paragraph 1.1. above.

EXPLANATORY NOTE Specially designed or prepared pumps may include complex, sealed or repeatedly sealed systems to prevent leakage of the primary circuit coolant, sealed pumps and pumps with inertial mass systems. This definition applies to pumps certified according to Class NC-1 or equivalent standards.

2. Non-nuclear materials for reactors

2.1. Deuterium and heavy water

Deuterium, heavy water (deuterium oxide) and any other deuterium compound in which the ratio of deuterium to hydrogen atoms exceeds 1:5000, intended for use in nuclear reactors, as defined in paragraph 1.1. above, in quantities exceeding 200 kg of deuterium atoms for any one recipient country for any 12 months-a monthly period.

2.2. Nuclear-pure graphite

Graphite having a purity level above 5 millionths of boron equivalent, with a density greater than 1.50 g/cm3, intended for use in nuclear reactors, as defined in paragraph 1.1 above, in quantities exceeding 3 × 104 kg (30 metric tons) for any one recipient country for any 12 monthsa monthly period.

note

For export control purposes, the Government determines whether export shipments of graphite conforming to the above characteristics will be used in nuclear reactors.

3. Installations for processing irradiated fuel cells and equipment specially designed or prepared for this purpose

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

During the processing of irradiated nuclear fuel, plutonium and uranium are separated from highly active fission products and other transuranic elements. Various technological processes can be used for such separation. However, over time, the Purex process has become the most common and acceptable. This process involves the dissolution of irradiated nuclear fuel in nitric acid, followed by the separation of uranium, plutonium, and fission products by solvent extraction using tributyl phosphate in an organic diluent. The technological processes at various Purex plants are similar and include: shredding of irradiated fuel cells, fuel dissolution, solvent extraction and storage of process fluid. There may also be equipment for thermal denitration of uranium nitrate, conversion of plutonium nitrate into oxide or metal, as well as for processing liquid waste containing fission products to obtain a form suitable for long-term storage or burial. However, the specific types and configurations of equipment performing these functions may vary at different Purex installations for several reasons, including the types and amount of irradiated nuclear fuel to be reprocessed, and the intended process of deposition of recoverable materials, as well as the safety and maintenance principles inherent in the design of the environment. The "irradiated fuel cell reprocessing facility" includes equipment and components that are usually in direct contact with, and directly control, the irradiated fuel and the main technological flows of nuclear material and fission products. These processes, including complete systems for the conversion of plutonium and the production of metallic plutonium, can be identified by measures taken to prevent hazards related to criticality (e.g., geometry-related measures), irradiation (e.g., radiation protection), and toxicity (e.g., containment measures). Items of equipment that are considered to be covered by the meaning of the phrase "and equipment specifically designed or prepared" for processing irradiated fuel cells include:

3.1. Machines for cutting irradiated fuel cells

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

This equipment is used to open the fuel shell in order to subsequently dissolve the irradiated nuclear material. As a rule, specially designed devices designed for cutting metal are used, although more advanced equipment, such as lasers, can also be used. Remotely controlled equipment specially designed or prepared for use in a reprocessing facility, as defined above, for cutting, chopping or slicing assemblies, bundles or rods of irradiated nuclear fuel.

3.2. Dissolvers

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The dissolvers usually receive crushed spent fuel. In these critically safe tanks, the irradiated nuclear material is dissolved in nitric acid, and the remaining shell fragments are removed from the process stream. Critically safe tanks (for example, small diameter, annular or rectangular tanks) specially designed or prepared for use in a reprocessing facility, as defined above, for dissolving irradiated nuclear fuel, which are capable of withstanding hot, highly corrosive liquid and can be remotely loaded and serviced.

3.3. Extractors and solvent extraction equipment

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Solvent extractors receive both a solution of irradiated fuel from the dissolvers and an organic solution used to separate uranium, plutonium and fission products. Solvent extraction equipment is usually designed to meet stringent operational requirements, such as long service life without maintenance or easy replacement, ease of operation and management, and flexibility to change process parameters. Specially designed or prepared solvent extractors, such as nozzle or pulsation columns, mixing and settling devices or centrifugal contact devices for use in an irradiated fuel treatment plant. Solvent extractors must be resistant to the corrosive effects of nitric acid. Solvent extractors are usually manufactured to meet extremely high requirements (including the use of special welding methods, inspections, quality assurance and control) from low-carbon stainless steels, titanium, zirconium or other high-quality materials.

3.4. Chemical tanks for holding or storage

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

At the solvent extraction stage, three main technological liquid flows are formed. Holding or storage tanks are used in the further processing of all three streams as follows: a) a solution of pure uranium nitrate is concentrated by evaporation and a denitration process occurs, where it is converted into uranium oxide. This oxide is reused in the nuclear fuel cycle; b) The solution of highly active fission products is usually concentrated by evaporation and stored as a concentrated liquid. This concentrate can subsequently be evaporated or converted into a form suitable for storage or burial; c) a solution of pure plutonium nitrate is concentrated and stored until it enters further stages of the technological process. In particular, tanks for holding or storing plutonium solutions are designed in such a way as to avoid criticality-related problems resulting from changes in the concentration or shape of a given stream. Specially designed or prepared tanks for holding or storage for use in an irradiated fuel processing plant. Tanks for holding or storage must be resistant to the corrosive effects of nitric acid. Holding or storage tanks are usually made of materials such as low-carbon stainless steels, titanium or zirconium, or other high-quality materials. Holding or storage tanks can be designed in such a way that their operation and maintenance are carried out remotely, and may have the following features in terms of nuclear criticality control: 1) the boron equivalent of the walls or internal structures is at least 2%, or 2) cylindrical tanks have a maximum diameter of 175 mm (7 inches), or 3) a rectangular or annular tank has a maximum width of 75 mm (3 inches).

3.5. Plutonium nitrate to oxide conversion system

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

In most reprocessing plants, this final process involves the conversion of a solution of plutonium nitrate to plutonium dioxide. The main operations of this process include: storage and adjustment of the initial technological material, precipitation and separation of the solid and liquid phases, calcination, product handling, ventilation, waste management and process control. Closed-loop systems specially designed or prepared for the conversion of plutonium nitrate into plutonium oxide, in particular, equipped in such a way as to avoid criticality and radiation effects, as well as minimize the hazards associated with toxicity.

3.6. The system of conversion of plutonium oxide into metal

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

This process, which may be associated with a reprocessing plant, involves the fluorination of plutonium dioxide, usually using highly active hydrogen fluoride, to produce plutonium fluoride, which is subsequently reduced with high-purity calcium metal to produce metallic plutonium and calcium fluoride in the form of slag. The main operations of this process include: fluorination (for example, using equipment containing precious metals or coated with them), metal recovery (for example, using ceramic crucibles), slag recovery, product handling, ventilation, waste management and process management. Closed-loop systems specially designed or prepared for the production of metallic plutonium, in particular, equipped in such a way as to avoid criticality and radiation effects, as well as minimize the hazards associated with toxicity.

4. Installations for the manufacture of fuel cells

A "fuel cell fabrication facility" includes equipment: (a) that is normally in direct contact with, or directly processes, or controls the flow of nuclear material, or (b) that seals nuclear material inside a shell.

5. Installations for the separation of uranium isotopes and equipment, other than analytical instruments, specially designed or prepared for this purpose

Items of equipment that are considered to be covered by the meaning of the phrase "equipment other than analytical instruments specially designed or prepared" for the separation of uranium isotopes include:

5.1. Gas centrifuges and assemblies and components specially designed or prepared for use in gas centrifuges

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

A gas centrifuge typically consists of a thin-walled cylinder(s) with a diameter of 75 mm (3 in) to 400 mm (16 in) with a vertical central axis, which is positioned(s) in vacuum and rotates at a high circumferential velocity of about 300 m/s or more. To achieve high speed, the structural materials of the rotating components must have a high strength-to-density ratio, and the rotary assembly and, consequently, its individual components must be manufactured with a high degree of precision so that the imbalance is minimal. Unlike other centrifuges, the gas centrifuge for uranium enrichment has a rotating disk-shaped partition(s) inside the rotor chamber and a fixed UF6 gas supply and discharge system consisting of at least three separate channels, two of which are connected to blades extending from the rotor axis to the peripheral part of the rotor chamber. There are also a number of important non-rotating elements in the vacuum, which, although they have a special design, are not difficult to manufacture and are not made from unique materials. A centrifuge plant, however, requires a large number of these components, so their number can serve as an important indicator of end-use.

5.1.1. Rotating components

a) Complete rotary assemblies: Thin-walled cylinders or a series of interconnected thin-walled cylinders made of one or more materials with a high strength-to-density ratio specified in the EXPLANATORY NOTE to this section. The cylinders are connected to each other using flexible bellows or rings described in part 5.1.1. c) below. The assembled rotor has an internal baffle(s) and end assemblies described in parts 5.1.1.d) and e) below. However, the complete assembly can be delivered to the customer in partially assembled form. (b) Rotary tubes: Specially designed or prepared thin-walled cylinders with a wall thickness of 12 mm (0.50 in) or less, with a diameter of 75 mm (3 in) to 400 mm (16 in), made of one or more materials having a high strength-to-density ratio specified in the EXPLANATORY NOTE to this the section. c) Rings or bellows: Components specifically designed or prepared to create a local support for a rotary tube or connect a number of rotary tubes. Bellows are short cylinders with a wall thickness of 3 mm (0.125 inches) or less, with a diameter of 75 mm (3 inches) to 400 mm (16 inches), having a single corrugation and made of one of the materials having a high strength-to-density ratio specified in the EXPLANATORY NOTE to this section. d) Partitions: Disc-shaped components with a diameter of 75 mm to 400 mm (3 to 16 inches), specially designed or prepared for installation inside the rotary tube of the centrifuge in order to isolate the exhaust chamber from the main separation chamber and in some cases to improve the circulation of UF6 gas inside the main separation chamber of the rotary tube and made of one of the materials, having a high strength-to-density ratio, indicated in the EXPLANATORY NOTE to this section. f) Upper/lower covers: Disc-shaped components ranging in diameter from 75 mm (3 in) to 400 mm (16 in), specially designed or prepared to precisely match the diameter of the ends of the rotor tube and thereby hold UF6 inside it. These components are used to support, hold, or contain as an integral part the elements of the upper bearing (upper cover) or serve as a bearing part of the rotating elements of the electric motor and the elements of the lower bearing (lower cover), and are made of one of the materials having a high strength-to-density ratio specified in the EXPLANATORY NOTES to this section.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The following materials are used for rotating centrifuge components: a) martensitic steels having a maximum tensile strength of 2.05 x 109 N/m2 (300,000 lb/sq. inches) or more; (b) Aluminum alloys having a maximum tensile strength of 0.46 x 109 N/m2 (67,000 psi inches) or more; c) fibrous (thread-like) materials suitable for use in composite structures and having a specific modulus of elasticity of 12.3 x 106 m or more and a maximum specific tensile strength of 0.3 x 106 m or more and a maximum specific tensile strength of 0.3 x 106 m or more ("specific modulus of elasticity" - this is the Young's modulus in N/m2 divided by the specific gravity in N/m3 ; "maximum specific tensile strength" is the maximum tensile strength in N/m2 divided by the specific gravity in N/m3 .

5.1.2. Static components

a) Magnetic suspension bearings: Specially designed or prepared bearing assemblies consisting of an annular magnet suspended in a cage containing a damping medium. The cage is made of a material resistant to UF 6 (see the EXPLANATORY NOTE to section 5.2.). The magnet is connected to a pole tip or a second magnet mounted on the top cover described in section 5.1.1. e). The magnet can have the shape of a ring with a ratio between the outer and inner diameters less than or equal to 1.6:1. The magnet may have a shape providing an initial permeability of 0.15 Gn/m (120,000 GHS units) or more, or a residual magnetization of 98.5% or more, or the product of induction by a maximum field strength of more than 80KJ/m3 (107 Gs). In addition to the usual material properties, a prerequisite is to limit the magnetic axes to very small tolerances (less than 0.1 mm or 0.004 inches), deviations from geometric axes, or to ensure special homogeneity of the magnet material.

b) Bearings/dampers: Specially designed or prepared bearings containing an axle/O-ring assembly mounted on a damper. The axle is usually a shaft made of hardened steel with one end in the shape of a hemisphere, and with the means of connecting to the bottom cover described in section 5.1.1. e) on the other. The shaft, however, can be connected to a hydrodynamic bearing. The ring has the shape of a tablet with a hemispherical depression on one surface. These components are often supplied separately from the damper.

c) Molecular pumps: Specially designed or prepared cylinders with spiral grooves cut or pressed inside and with holes drilled inside. Typical dimensions are as follows: inner diameter from 75 mm (3 inches) to 400 mm (16 inches), wall thickness of 10 mm (0.4 inches) or more, with a length equal to or greater than the diameter. The grooves usually have a rectangular cross-section and a depth of 2 mm (0.08 in) or more.

d) Motor stators: Specially designed or prepared ring-shaped stators for high-speed multiphase hysteresis (or reactive) AC electric motors for synchronous operation in vacuum conditions in the frequency range of 600-2000 Hz and in the power range of 50-1000 VA. Stators consist of multiphase windings on a low-loss multilayer iron core consisting of thin plates, typically 2.0 mm (0.08 in) thick or less.

e) Centrifuge housings/receivers Components specially designed or prepared to accommodate the rotor tube assembly of a gas centrifuge. The housing consists of a rigid cylinder with a wall thickness of up to 30 mm (1.2 in) with precision machined ends for mounting bearings and with one or more flanges for mounting. The machined ends are parallel to each other and perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the cylinder within 0.05 degrees or less. The housing may also be a cellular type structure for accommodating several rotary tubes in it. The housings are made of materials that are corrosion resistant to UF 6, or are protected by a coating of such materials.

f) Traps: Specially designed or prepared tubes with an internal diameter of up to 12 mm (0.5 in) for extracting UF 6 gas from a rotary tube using the Pitot tube method (i.e. with an opening directed to the circular flow of gas in the rotary tube, for example, by bending the end of a radially positioned tube), which can be attached to the central gas extraction system. The tubes are made of materials that are corrosion resistant to UF6, or are protected by a coating of such materials.

5.2. Specially designed or prepared auxiliary systems, equipment and components for use in a gas centrifuge enrichment facility

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Auxiliary systems, equipment, and components of a gas centrifuge enrichment plant are installation systems necessary to supply UF 6 to centrifuges, to connect individual centrifuges to each other in order to form cascades (or steps) to achieve higher enrichment and extract the "product" and "tailings" of UF 6 from centrifuges, as well as equipment required to power the centrifuges or to control the plant. Typically, UF 6 evaporates from solids placed inside heated autoclaves and is supplied in gaseous form to centrifuges through a cascade collector pipeline system. The "product" and "tailings" of UF 6 coming from centrifuges in the form of gaseous streams also pass through the cascade collector pipeline system to cold traps (operating at a temperature of about 203 0 K (-70 0 C)), where they are condensed and then placed in appropriate containers for transportation or storage. Since the enrichment plant consists of many thousands of centrifuges assembled in cascades, multi-kilometer collector pipelines of cascades with thousands of welds are created, and the scheme of the main part of their connections is repeated many times. The equipment, components and piping systems are manufactured in compliance with high requirements for vacuum density and purity of processing.

5.2.1. Feeding/discharge systems for "product" and "tailings"

Specially designed or prepared process systems, including: feeding autoclaves (or stations) used to supply UF 6 to centrifuge cascades at pressures up to 100 kPa (15 lb/sq. inches) and at a speed of 1 kg/h or more; desublimators (or cold traps) used to remove UF 6 from cascades at pressures up to 3 kPa (0.5 psiinches). Desublimators are capable of cooling to 203 0 K (-70 0 C) and heating to 343 0 K (70 0 C); "product" and "tailings" stations used to move UF 6 into containers. This installation, equipment and pipelines are completely made of UF-6 resistant materials or are protected by a coating of them (see the EXPLANATORY NOTE to this section) in compliance with high requirements for vacuum density and purity of processing.

5.2.2. Machine systems of collector pipelines

Specially designed or prepared piping and collector systems for holding UF 6 inside centrifuge cascades. This pipeline network is usually a triple collector system, and each centrifuge is connected to each of the collectors. Consequently, the scheme of the main part of their connection is repeated many times. It is completely made of UF-6 resistant materials (see the EXPLANATORY NOTE to this section) in compliance with high requirements for vacuum density and purity of processing.

5.2.3. Mass spectrometers/ion sources for UF 6

Specially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole mass spectrometers capable of directly sampling the supplied mass, "product" or "tails" from UF 6 gas streams and having a full set of the following characteristics: 1. specific mass resolution over 320; 2. contain ion sources made of nichrome or monel or protected by a coating of them, or nickel-plated; 3. contain ionization sources with electron bombardment; 4. contain a collector system suitable for isotope analysis.

5.2.4. Frequency converters

Frequency converters (also known as converters or inverters) specially designed or prepared to power the stators of the motors defined in subparagraph 5.1.2. d), or parts, components and subassemblies of such frequency converters having a full set of the following characteristics: 1. Multiphase output in the range from 600 to 2000 Hz; 2. High stability (with frequency stabilization better than 0.1%); 3. Low nonlinear distortion (less than 2%); 4. Efficiency over 80%.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The above equipment comes into direct contact with the UF 6 process gas or directly controls the operation of centrifuges and the passage of gas from centrifuge to centrifuge and from cascade to cascade. Materials resistant to UF 6 include stainless steel, aluminum, aluminum alloys, nickel, or alloys containing 60% or more nickel.

5.3. Specially designed or prepared assemblies and components for use in gas diffusion enrichment

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

In the gas diffusion method of uranium isotope separation, the main technological assembly is a special porous gas diffusion barrier, a heat exchanger for cooling the gas (which heats up during compression), sealing valves and control valves, as well as pipelines. Since uranium hexafluoride (UF 6) is used in gas diffusion technology, all equipment, pipelines, and measuring instrument surfaces (which come into contact with the gas) must be made of materials that remain stable in contact with UF 6. A gas diffusion plant consists of a number of such assemblies, so their number can be an important indicator of the final destination.

5.3.1. Gas diffusion barriers

a) Specially designed or prepared thin, porous filters with a pore size of 100-1000-A (angstrom), a thickness of 5 mm (0.2 in) or less, and for tubular molds with a diameter of 25 mm (1 in) or less, made of metal, polymer or ceramic materials corrosion resistant to UF 6, and b) specially prepared compounds or powders for the manufacture of such filters. Such compounds and powders include nickel or alloys containing 60% or more nickel, aluminum oxide, or UF6-resistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers with a purity of 99.9% or more, particle size of less than 10 microns, and high particle size uniformity, which are specially prepared for the manufacture of gas diffusion barriers.

5.3.2. Diffuser chambers

Specially designed or prepared sealed cylindrical vessels with a diameter of more than 300 mm (12 inches) and a length of more than 900 mm (35 inches), or rectangular vessels of comparable dimensions having one inlet and two outlet pipes, each with a diameter of more than 50 mm (2 inches), for placing gas diffusion barriers in them, made of resistant to UF 6 materials or protected by a coating of them, and designed for installation in a horizontal or vertical position.

5.3.3. Compressors and gas blowers

Specially designed or prepared axial, centrifugal or volumetric compressors, or gas blowers with a suction capacity of 1 m3/min or more UF 6 and with an outlet pressure of up to several hundred kPa (100 lb/sq. inches), designed for long-term operation in a UF 6 environment with or without an electric motor of appropriate power, as well as individual assemblies of such compressors and blowers. These compressors and blowers have a pressure drop from 2:1 to 6:1 and are made of or coated with UF-6 resistant materials.

5.3.4. Seals of rotating shafts

Specially designed or prepared vacuum seals installed on the supply and outlet sides to seal the shaft connecting the compressor or blower rotor to the drive motor in order to provide reliable sealing preventing air from flowing into the inner chamber of the compressor or blower, which is filled with UF 6. Such seals are usually designed for a buffer gas flow rate of less than 1000 cm3/min (60 in3/min).

5.3.5. Heat exchangers for cooling UF 6

Specially designed or prepared heat exchangers made of or coated with UF6-resistant materials (except stainless steel), or copper, or any combination of these metals, and designed for a rate of change in leakage-determining pressure of less than 10 Pa (0.0015 lb/sq. inches) per hour at a pressure drop of 100 kPa (15 psi inches).

5.4. Specially designed or prepared auxiliary systems, equipment and components for use in gas diffusion enrichment

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Auxiliary systems, equipment and components for gas diffusion enrichment plants are the plant systems necessary to supply UF 6 to the gas diffusion assembly, to connect individual assemblies to each other and form cascades (or steps) in order to gradually achieve higher enrichment and extract the "product" and "tailings" of UF 6 from the diffusion cascades. Due to the high-inertia characteristics of diffusion cascades, any interruption of their operation, especially their shutdown, leads to serious consequences. Therefore, strict and constant vacuum maintenance in all technological systems, automatic protection against accidents and precise automatic control of the gas flow are important in a gas diffusion plant. All this leads to the need to equip the installation with a large number of special measuring, regulating and control systems. Typically, UF 6 evaporates from cylinders placed inside autoclaves and is supplied in gaseous form to the inlet points through a cascade collector pipeline system. The "product" and "tailings" of UF 6 coming from the outlet points in the form of gaseous streams pass through the cascade collector pipeline system either to cold traps or to compressor stations, where the gaseous stream of UF 6 is liquefied and then placed in appropriate containers for transportation or storage. Since the gas diffusion enrichment plant has a large number of gas diffusion assemblies assembled in cascades, multi-kilometer collector pipelines of cascades with thousands of welds are created, and the scheme of the main part of their connections is repeated many times. The equipment, components and piping systems are manufactured in compliance with high requirements for vacuum density and purity of processing.

5.4.1. Feeding/discharge systems for "product" and "tailings"

Specially designed or prepared process systems capable of operating at a pressure of 300 Pa (45 psi inches) or less, including: feeding autoclaves (or systems) used to supply UF 6 to gas diffusion cascades; desublimators (or cold traps) used to remove UF 6 from gas diffusion cascades; liquefaction stations where UF 6 in gaseous form from the cascade is compressed and cooled to a liquid state; "product" stations" or "tails" used to move the UF 6 into containers.

5.4.2. Collector pipeline systems

Specially designed or prepared piping systems and collector systems for holding UF 6 inside gas diffusion cascades. This pipeline network is usually a system with a "double" collector, where each cell is connected to each of the collectors.

5.4.3. Vacuum systems

(a) Specially designed or prepared large vacuum lines, vacuum collectors and vacuum pumps with a capacity of 5 m3/min (175 ft3/min) or more. b) Vacuum pumps specially designed for operation in a UF6-containing atmosphere and made of aluminum, nickel or alloys containing or coated with more than 60% nickel. These pumps can be either rotary or reciprocating, they can have displacement and fluorocarbon seals, and special working fluids may be present in them.

5.4.4. Special locking and control valves

Specially designed or prepared manual or automatic bellows type locking and control valves made of UF-6 resistant materials with diameters from 40 to 1,500 mm (1.5 to 59 inches) for installation in the main and auxiliary systems of gas diffusion enrichment plants.

5.4.5. Mass spectrometers/ion sources for UF 6

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The above equipment comes into direct contact with the process gas UF 6, or directly regulates the flow within the cascade. All surfaces that come into contact with the process gas are entirely made of or coated with UF6-resistant materials. For the purposes of sections related to gas diffusion devices, materials resistant to UF 6 include stainless steel, aluminum, aluminum alloys, aluminum oxide, nickel, or alloys containing 60% or more nickel, as well as UF 6-resistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers.

5.5. Specially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in aerodynamic enrichment plants.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

In the processes of aerodynamic enrichment, a mixture of gaseous UF6 and light gas (hydrogen or helium) is compressed and then passed through separating elements in which isotopic separation is completed by obtaining large centrifugal forces according to the geometry of the curved wall. Two processes of this type have been successfully developed: the nozzle separation process and the vortex tube process. For both processes, the main components of the separation cascade are cylindrical housings, which house special separation elements (nozzles or vortex tubes), gas compressors and heat exchangers to remove heat generated by compression. Aerodynamic installations require a number of such cascades, so their number can serve as an important indicator of end-use. Since UF 6 is used in the aerodynamic process, the surfaces of all equipment, pipelines and measuring instruments (which come into contact with gas) must be made of materials that remain stable in contact with UF 6.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The elements listed in this section come into direct contact with the process gas UF 6 or directly regulate the flow within the cascade. All surfaces that come into contact with the process gas are made entirely of UF-6 resistant materials or are protected by a coating of such materials. For the purposes of the section on aerodynamic enrichment elements, materials resistant to UF 6 include copper, stainless steel, aluminum, aluminum alloys, nickel or alloys containing 60% or more nickel, as well as UF 6-resistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers.

5.5.1. Separation nozzles

Specially designed or prepared separation nozzles and their assemblies. Separation nozzles consist of slit-shaped curved channels with a bending radius of less than 1 mm (usually from 0.1 to 0.05 mm), corrosion-resistant to UF 6, and having an internal cutting edge that separates the gas flowing through the nozzle into two fractions.

5.5.2. Vortex tubes

Specially designed or prepared vortex tubes and their assemblies. Vortex tubes have a cylindrical or conical shape, are made of corrosion-resistant to UF 6 materials or are protected by a coating of such materials and have a diameter of 0.5 cm to 4 cm with a length-to-diameter ratio of 20:1 or less, as well as one or more tangential inlet. The tubes can be equipped with nozzle-type taps at one or both ends.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The feed gas enters the vortex tube tangentially from one end or through swirling blades or through numerous tangential inlet openings along the tube.

5.5.3. Compressors and gas blowers

Specially designed or prepared axial, centrifuge or volumetric compressors or gas blowers made of corrosion-resistant materials to UF 6, or protected by a coating of such materials, with an inlet capacity of 2 m3 /min or more of a mixture of UF 6 and a carrier gas (hydrogen or helium).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Such compressors and blowers usually have a pressure drop from 1.2:1 to 6:1.

5.5.4. Seals of rotating shafts

Specially designed or prepared rotating shaft seals installed on the supply side and on the outlet side to seal the shaft connecting the compressor rotor or the blower rotor to the drive motor in order to provide reliable sealing preventing the escape of process gas or the flow of air or sealing gas into the inner chamber of the compressor or blower, which is filled with a mixture of UF 6 and carrier gas.

5.5.5. Heat exchangers for gas cooling

Specially designed or prepared heat exchangers made of corrosion-resistant materials to UF 6 or protected by a coating of such materials.

5.5.6 . Housings of separating elements

Specially designed or prepared enclosures for separating elements, made of materials corrosion-resistant to UF 6 or protected by a coating of such materials, for placing vortex tubes or separation nozzles in them.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These casings can be cylindrical chambers with a diameter of more than 300 mm and a length of more than 900 mm or rectangular chambers of comparable dimensions and can be designed for installation in a horizontal or vertical position.

5.5.7. Feeding/discharge systems for "product" and "tailings"

Specially designed or prepared processing systems or equipment for enrichment plants made of corrosion-resistant to UF 6 materials or protected by a coating of such materials, including: a) feeding autoclaves, furnaces or systems used to supply UF 6 for the enrichment process; b) desublimators (or cold traps) used to remove heated UF 6 from the enrichment process for subsequent transfer; (c) Curing or liquefaction stations used to remove UF 6 from the enrichment process by compressing and converting UF 6 into liquid or solid form; (d) "product" or "tailings" stations used to move UF 6 into containers.

5.5.8. Collector pipeline systems

Specially designed or prepared collector piping systems made of corrosion-resistant to UF 6 materials or protected by a coating of such materials to hold UF 6 inside aerodynamic cascades. This pipeline network is usually a system with a "double" collector, where each cascade or group of cascades is connected to each of the collectors.

5.5.9. Vacuum systems and pumps

a) Specially designed or prepared vacuum systems with an inlet capacity of 5 m3/min or more, consisting of vacuum lines, vacuum collectors and vacuum pumps, and designed to operate in UF6-containing gas environments. b) Vacuum pumps specially designed or prepared for operation in gas environments containing UF 6 and made of materials resistant to corrosion to UF 6 or protected by a coating of such materials. Carbon fluoride seals and special working fluids can be used in these pumps.

5.5.10. Special locking and control valves

Special designed or prepared manual or automatic bellows type locking and control valves, made of corrosion-resistant to UF 6 materials or protected by a coating of such materials, with a diameter from 40 to 1500 mm for installation in the main and auxiliary systems of aerodynamic enrichment plants.

5.5.11. Mass spectrometers/ion sources for UF 6

5.5.12. UF 6 separation systems from carrier gas

Specially designed or prepared technological systems for separating UF 6 from the carrier gas (hydrogen or helium).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These systems are designed to reduce the UF6 content in the carrier gas to one part per million or less and may include equipment such as: a) cryogenic heat exchangers and cryoseparators capable of producing temperatures of -120 °C or less, or b) cryogenic cooling units capable of producing temperatures of -120 °C or less, or c) blocks of separation nozzles or vortex tubes for separating UF 6 from the carrier gas, or d) UF 6 cold traps capable of producing temperatures of -20 °C or less.

5.6. Specially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in chemical exchange or ion exchange enrichment plants

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

A slight difference in the mass of uranium isotopes leads to small changes in the equilibrium of chemical reactions, which can be used as a basis for isotope separation. Two processes have been successfully developed: liquid-liquid chemical exchange and solid-liquid ion exchange. In the process of liquid-liquid chemical exchange, immiscible liquid phases (aqueous or organic) interact in the counterflow, which leads to the cascading effect of thousands of separation stages. The aqueous phase consists of uranium chloride in hydrochloric acid solution; The organic phase consists of an extractant containing uranium chloride in an organic solvent. The contact filters in the separation cascade can be liquid-liquid exchange columns (such as pulse columns with mesh plates) or liquid centrifuge contact filters. Chemical transformations (oxidation and reduction) are required at both ends of the separation cascade in order to ensure reflux at each end. The main objective of the design is to prevent contamination of process streams with certain metal ions. In this regard, plastic-coated (including the use of fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers) and/or glass-coated columns and pipelines are used. In the solid-liquid ion exchange process, enrichment is achieved by adsorption/desorption of uranium on a special, very fast-acting ion exchange resin or adsorbent. A solution of uranium in hydrochloric acid and other chemical reagents are passed through cylindrical enrichment columns containing compacted layers of adsorbent. To maintain the continuity of the process, a reflux system is needed to release the uranium from the adsorbent back into the liquid stream so that the "product" and "tailings" can be collected. This is achieved by using suitable reduction/oxidation chemicals that are fully regenerated in separate external loops and that can be partially regenerated in the isotope separation columns themselves. The presence of hot concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions in the process requires that the equipment be made of special corrosion-resistant materials or protected by a coating of such materials.

5.6.1. Liquid-liquid exchange columns (chemical exchange)

Countercurrent liquid-liquid exchange columns having a mechanical power input (i.e., pulse columns with mesh plates, columns with reciprocating plates, and columns with internal turbine mixers) specially designed or prepared for uranium enrichment using a chemical exchange process. For corrosion resistance to concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions, these columns and their internal components are made of suitable plastic materials (such as fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers) or glass, or are protected by a coating of such materials. The columns are designed for a short (30 seconds or less) cascade time.

5.6.2. Centrifuge liquid-liquid contact filters (chemical exchange)

Centrifuge liquid-liquid contact filters specially designed or prepared for uranium enrichment using a chemical exchange process. Such contact filters use rotation to produce organic and liquid flows, and then centrifugal force to separate the phases. For corrosion resistance to concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions, contact filters are made of appropriate plastic materials (such as fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers) or coated with them or glass. Centrifuge contact filters are designed for a short (30 seconds or less) cascade time.

5.6.3. Systems and equipment for uranium recovery (chemical exchange)

a) Specially designed or prepared electrochemical reduction cells for the reduction of uranium from one valence state to another in order to enrich uranium using a chemical exchange process. Cell materials in contact with process solutions must be corrosion resistant to concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The cathode compartment of the cell must be designed in such a way as to prevent the re-oxidation of uranium to a higher valence state. To contain uranium in the cathode compartment, the cell may have an impermeable diaphragm membrane made of a special cation exchange material. The cathode consists of a corresponding solid conductor, such as graphite. b) Specially designed or prepared systems for extracting U +4 from the organic stream, regulating acid concentration and for filling electrochemical reduction cells at the production output of the cascade.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These systems consist of solvent extraction equipment for distilling U+4 from the organic stream into a liquid solution, evaporation equipment and/or other equipment for achieving hydrogen index adjustment and control, as well as pumps or other transfer devices for filling electrochemical reduction cells. The main objective of the design is to avoid contamination of the liquid stream with ions of certain metals. Consequently, those parts of the system equipment that are in contact with the process flow are made of appropriate materials (such as glass, fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers, polyphenyl sulfate, polyester sulfone, and resin-impregnated graphite). or protected by a coating of such materials.

5.6.4. Nutrition preparation systems (chemical exchange)

Specially designed or prepared systems for the production of nutrient solutions of high purity uranium chloride for plants for the separation of uranium isotopes by chemical exchange.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These systems consist of equipment for dissolution, solvent extraction and/or ion exchange equipment for purification, as well as electrolytic cells for the reduction of U +6 or U +4 to U +3. These systems produce solutions of uranium chloride, which contain only a few parts per million of metallic inclusions such as chromium, iron, vanadium, molybdenum and other divalent cations or cations with higher valence. Structural materials for the elements of the system in which high purity U +3 is processed include glass, fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers, graphite coated with polyvinyl sulfate or polyester sulfone plastic and impregnated with resin.

5.6.5. Uranium oxidation systems (chemical exchange)

Specially designed or prepared systems for the oxidation of U +3 to U +4 to return to the uranium isotope separation cascade during chemical exchange enrichment.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These systems may include elements such as: a) equipment for contacting chlorine and oxygen with aqueous effluents from isotope separation equipment and extraction of the formed U +4 into a depleted organic stream returning from the cascade's production outlet; b) equipment that separates water from hydrochloric acid so that water and concentrated hydrochloric acid can be reintroduced into the process in the right places.

5.6.6. Rapidly reacting ion exchange resins/adsorbents (ion exchange)

Rapidly reacting ion exchange resins or adsorbents specifically designed or prepared for uranium enrichment using an ion exchange process, including porous resins of a macro-lattice structure and/or membrane structures in which active chemical exchange groups are limited by coating on the surface of an inactive porous auxiliary structure, and other composite structures in any acceptable form, including fiber particles. These ion exchange resins/adsorbents have diameters of 0.2 mm or less and must be chemically resistant to concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions, as well as physically strong enough so that their properties do not deteriorate in the exchange columns. Resins/adsorbents are specially designed to produce the kinetics of very rapid exchange of uranium isotopes (the half-exchange duration is less than 10 seconds) and are capable of operating at temperatures ranging from 100 ° C to 200 ° C.

5.6.7. Ion exchange columns (ion exchange)

Cylindrical columns with a diameter of more than 1000 mm for holding and maintaining filled layers of ion exchange resins/adsorbents, specially designed or prepared for uranium enrichment using an ion exchange process. These columns are made of materials (such as titanium or fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers) that are resistant to corrosion caused by concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions, or are coated with such materials and are capable of operating at temperatures ranging from 100 °C to 200 °C and pressures above 0.7 MPa (102 psi inches).

5.6.8. Ion exchange reflux systems (ion exchange)

a) Specially designed or prepared chemical or electrochemical reduction systems for the regeneration of chemical reduction reagent(s) used in ion exchange uranium enrichment cascades. b) Specially designed or prepared chemical or electrochemical oxidation systems for the regeneration of chemical oxidation reagent(s) used in ion exchange uranium enrichment cascades.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

In the process of ion exchange enrichment, for example, trivalent titanium (Ti +3 ) can be used as a reducing cation, in which case the reducing system will produce Ti +3 by reducing Ti +4. In the process, for example, trivalent iron (Fe +3 ) can be used as an oxidizer, in which case the oxidation system will produce Fe +3 through oxidation of Fe +2.

5.7. Specially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in laser processing plants

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Existing systems for enrichment processes using lasers are divided into two categories: those in which atomic uranium vapors are the working medium, and those in which uranium compound vapors are the working medium. Common names for such processes are: the first category is laser isotope separation by atomic vapor method (AVLIS or SILVA); the second category is molecular laser isotope separation method (MLIS or MOLIS) and chemical reaction by isotope selective laser activation (CRISLA). Systems, equipment and components for laser enrichment plants include: a) devices for supplying vapors of metallic uranium (for selective photoionization) or devices for supplying vapors of uranium compounds (for photo dissociation or chemical activation); b) devices for collecting enriched and depleted metallic uranium as a "product" and "tailings" in the first category and devices for collecting decomposed or released from the reaction compounds as a "product" and raw materials as "tailings" in the second category; (c) Working laser systems for the selective excitation of uranium-235 isotopes; and (d) equipment for the preparation of feed and conversion of the product. Due to the complexity of spectroscopy of uranium atoms and compounds, it may be necessary to use any of a number of available laser technologies.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Many of the components listed in this section come into direct contact with vapors of uranium metal or with a liquid, or with a process gas consisting of UF 6 or a mixture of UF 6 and other gases. All surfaces that come into contact with uranium or UF 6 are completely made of corrosion-resistant materials or protected by a coating of such materials. For the purposes of the section related to components of laser enrichment equipment, materials resistant to corrosion caused by vapors or liquids containing metallic uranium or uranium alloys include graphite and tantalum coated with yttrium oxide; and materials resistant to corrosion caused by UF 6 include copper, stainless steel, aluminum, aluminum alloys, nickel or alloys containing 60% nickel or more, and UF6-resistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers.

5.7.1. Uranium Evaporation Systems (AVLIS)

Specially designed or prepared uranium evaporation systems that contain high-power strip or raster electron beam guns with a transmitted power of more than 2.5 kW/cm to the target.

5.7.2. Systems for processing liquid metallic uranium (AVLIS)

Specially designed or prepared liquid metal processing systems for molten uranium or uranium alloys, consisting of crucibles and cooling equipment for crucibles.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The crucibles and other components of this system that come into contact with molten uranium or uranium alloys are made of corrosion-resistant and heat-resistant materials or protected by a coating of such materials. Acceptable materials include tantalum, graphite coated with yttrium oxide, graphite coated with oxides of other rare earth elements or mixtures thereof.

5.7.3. Aggregates for collecting "product" and "tailings" of metallic uranium (AVLIS)

Specially designed or prepared aggregates for collecting the "product" and "tailings" of metallic uranium in liquid or solid form.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The components of these units are made of materials resistant to heat and corrosion caused by vapors of metallic uranium or liquid, or are protected by a coating of such materials (such as graphite or tantalum coated with yttrium oxide) and may include pipelines, valves, fittings, "gutters", inlets, heat exchangers and collector plates for magnetic, electrostatic or other separation methods.

5.7.4. Separation module housings (AVLIS)

Specially designed or prepared cylindrical or rectangular chambers for placing in them a source of vapors of metallic uranium, an electron beam cannon and collectors of "product" and "tails".

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These enclosures have multiple inlet openings for power and water supply, windows for laser beams, connections for vacuum pumps, as well as for diagnostics and monitoring of instrumentation. They have devices for opening and closing to ensure the maintenance of internal components.

5.7.5. Supersonic Expansion Nozzles (MLIS)

Specially designed or prepared supersonic expansion nozzles for cooling mixtures of UF 6 and carrier gas to 150 0 K or lower and corrosion resistant to UF 6.

5 . 7.6. Collectors of uranium pentafluoride product (MLIS)

Specially designed or prepared collectors of the solid product of uranium pentafluoride (UF 5), consisting of a filter, shock or cyclone type collectors or combinations thereof and corrosion resistant to the environment of UF 5 / UF 6 .

5.7.7. UF 6 / Carrier Gas Compressors (MLIS)

Specially designed or prepared compressors for mixtures of UF 6 and carrier gas for long-term operation in a UF 6 environment. The components of these compressors that come into contact with the carrier gas are made of corrosion-resistant materials to UF 6 or are protected by a coating of such materials.

5.7.8. Rotary Shaft Seals (MLIS)

Specially designed or prepared rotating shaft seals installed on the supply side and on the outlet side to seal the shaft connecting the compressor rotor to the drive motor in order to provide reliable sealing preventing the escape of process gas or the flow of air or sealing gas into the inner chamber of the compressor, which is filled with a mixture of UF 6 and carrier gas.

5.7.9. Fluorination Systems (MLIS)

Specially designed or prepared systems for fluoridation of UF 5 (in solid state) into UF 6 (gas).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These systems are designed to fluoridate the collected UF 5 powder into UF 6 for subsequent collection in product containers or for feeding to MLIS units for additional enrichment. With one approach, the fluorination reaction can be completed within the isotope separation system, where the reaction and direct extraction of the "product" from the collectors take place. Using another approach, the UF 5 powder can be extracted/transported from the "product" collectors to a suitable reactor (for example, a reactor with a fluidized bed of a catalyst, a helical reactor or a fire tower) for fluorination purposes. In both cases, equipment is used to store and transfer fluorine (or other acceptable fluorinating reagents) and to collect and transfer UF 6.

5.7.10. Mass spectrometers/UF6 ion sources (MLIS)

5.7.11. Feeding/discharge systems for "product" and "tailings" (MLIS)

Specially designed or prepared processing systems or equipment for enrichment plants made of materials resistant to corrosion to UF 6, or protected by a coating of such materials, including: a) feeding autoclaves, furnaces or systems used to supply UF 6 for the enrichment process; b) desublimators (or cold traps) used to remove heated UF 6 from the enrichment process for subsequent transfer; (c) Curing or liquefaction stations used to remove UF 6 from the enrichment process by compressing and converting UF 6 into liquid or solid form; (d) "product" or "tailings" stations used to move UF 6 into containers.

5.7.12. UF 6 separation systems from carrier gas (MLIS)

Specially designed or prepared process systems for separating UF 6 from the carrier gas. The carrier gas may be nitrogen, argon, or another gas.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These systems may include equipment such as:

a) cryogenic heat exchangers or cryoseparators capable of producing temperatures of -120 °C or less, or b) cryogenic cooling units capable of producing temperatures of -120 °C or less, or c) UF 6 cold traps capable of producing temperatures of -20 °C or less.

5.7.13. Laser systems (AVLIS, MLIS and CRISLA)

Lasers or laser systems specially designed or prepared for the separation of uranium isotopes.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The AVLIS process laser system usually consists of two lasers: a copper vapor laser and a dye laser. The laser system for MLIS usually consists of a CO2 laser or an excimer laser and a multi-pass optical cell with rotating mirrors on both sides. For lasers or laser systems, both processes require a spectrum frequency stabilizer to operate for long periods of time.

5.8. Specially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in plasma separation processing plants

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

During the plasma separation process, plasma consisting of uranium ions passes through an electric field tuned to the ion resonance frequency U 235, so that they primarily absorb energy and increase the diameter of their corkscrew orbits. Ions passing through a larger diameter are trapped to form a product enriched in U 235. The plasma, which is formed by ionizing uranium vapor, is contained in a vacuum chamber with a high-intensity magnetic field formed using a superconducting magnet. The main technological systems of the process include a uranium plasma generation system, a separation module with a superconducting magnet, and metal extraction systems for collecting "product" and "tailings".

5.8.1. Microwave energy sources and antennas

Specially designed or prepared microwave energy sources and antennas for ion generation or acceleration and having the following characteristics: a frequency above 30 GHz and an average output power for ion generation of more than 50 kW.

5.8.2. Solenoids for ion excitation

Specially designed or prepared solenoids for radio frequency excitation of ions in the frequency range of more than 100 kHz and capable of operating at an average power of more than 40 kW.

5.8.3. Uranium plasma generation systems

Specially designed or prepared uranium plasma generation systems, which may contain high-power strip or raster electron beam guns with a transmitted power of more than 2.5 kW/cm to the target.

5.8.4. Systems for processing liquid metallic uranium

Specially designed or prepared liquid metal processing systems for molten uranium or uranium alloys, consisting of crucibles and cooling equipment for crucibles.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The crucibles and other components of this system that come into contact with molten uranium or uranium alloys are made of corrosion-resistant and heat-resistant materials or are protected by a coating of such materials. Acceptable materials include tantalum, graphite coated with yttrium oxide, graphite coated with oxides of other rare earth elements or mixtures thereof.

5.8.5. Aggregates for collecting "product" and "tailings" of metallic uranium

Specially designed or prepared aggregates for collecting "product" and "tailings" for metallic uranium in solid form. These collection units are made of materials that are resistant to heat and corrosion caused by uranium metal vapors, such as graphite coated with yttrium oxide or tantalum, or are protected by a coating of such materials.

5.8.6. Enclosures of the separation module

Cylindrical chambers specially designed or prepared for use in plasma separation enrichment plants, for placing in them a source of uranium plasma, a radio frequency energy solenoid and collectors of "product" and "tailings".

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These enclosures have multiple inlet openings for power supply, diffusion pump connections, as well as for diagnostics and monitoring of instrumentation. They have devices for opening and closing to ensure the maintenance of internal components and are made of suitable non-magnetic materials such as stainless steel.

5.9. Specially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in electromagnetic enrichment plants.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

In an electromagnetic process, uranium metal ions produced by ionization of a salt feed material (usually UCl 4) are accelerated and pass through a magnetic field that forces ions of different isotopes to pass in different directions. The main components of an electromagnetic isotope separator are: a magnetic field for deflecting/separating isotopes of an ion beam, an ion source with its acceleration system, and a collection system for separated ions In an electromagnetics, uranium metal ions produced by ionization of a salt feed material (usually UCl 4) are accelerated and pass through a magnetic field that forces ions of different isotopes to pass in different directions. The main components of an electromagnetic isotope separator are: a magnetic field for deflecting/separating isotopes of ann beam, an ion source with its acceleration system,d a collection system for separated ions. Auxiliary systems for ary systems for this process include a magnetic energy supply system, high-voltage ion source supply systems, a vacuum system, and extensive chemical treatment systems for product recovery and component purification/regeneration.

5.9.1. Electromagnetic isotope separators

Electromagnetic isotope separators specially designed or prepared for the separation of uranium isotopes, and equipment and components for this purpose, including:

a) Ion sources

Specially designed or prepared individual or multiple sources of uranium ions, consisting of a steam source, an ionizer, and a beam accelerator, made of appropriate materials such as graphite, stainless steel, or copper, and capable of providing a total ion beam current of 50 mA or more.

b) Ion collectors

Collector plates having two or more slots and grooves, specially designed or prepared for collecting ion beams of enriched and depleted uranium and made of appropriate materials such as graphite or stainless steel.

c) Vacuum housings

Specially designed or prepared vacuum enclosures for electromagnetic uranium separators, made of suitable non-magnetic materials such as stainless steel, and designed to operate at a pressure of 0.1 Pa or lower.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

These enclosures are specifically designed to house ion sources, collector plates, and water-cooled liners, and have devices for connecting diffusion pumps and devices for opening and closing in order to extract and replace these components.

d) Magnetic pole tips

Specially designed or prepared magnetic pole tips having a diameter of more than 2 m, used to provide a permanent magnetic field in an electromagnetic isotope separator and to transfer the magnetic field between adjacent separators.

5.9.2. High-voltage power supplies

Specially designed or prepared high-voltage power supplies for ion sources that have a full set of the following characteristics: they can operate in continuous mode, an output voltage of 20,000 V or more, an output current of 1 A or more, and voltage stabilization of less than 0.01% for 8 hours.

5.9.3. Power supplies for electromagnets

Specially designed or prepared high-power DC power supplies for electromagnets with a full set of the following characteristics: continuous output current of 500 A or more at a voltage of 100 V or more, with current or voltage stabilization of less than 0.01% for 8 hours.

6. Installations for the production of heavy water, deuterium and deuterium compounds and equipment specially designed or prepared for this purpose

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Heavy water can be produced using various processes. However, two processes are commercially advantageous: the process of isotopic exchange of water and hydrogen sulfide (GS process) and the process of isotopic exchange of ammonia and hydrogen. The GS process is based on the exchange of hydrogen and deuterium between water and hydrogen sulfide in a column system that operates with a cold upper section and a hot lower section. Water flows down the columns, while hydrogen sulfide gas circulates from the bottom to the top of the columns. A number of perforated trays are used to facilitate the mixing of gas and water. Deuterium moves to water at low temperatures and to hydrogen sulfide at high temperatures. Deuterium-enriched gas or water is removed from the columns of the first stage at the junction of the hot and cold sections, and the process is repeated in the columns of the next stage. The product of the last phase, water enriched with deuterium up to 30%, is sent to a distillation unit for the production of reactor-pure heavy water, i.e. 99.75% deuterium oxide. During the exchange between ammonia and hydrogen, deuterium can be extracted from the synthesis gas by contacting liquid ammonia in the presence of a catalyst. The synthesis gas is fed into the exchange columns and then into the ammonia converter. Inside the columns, gas rises from the bottom to the top, while liquid ammonia flows from the top to the bottom. Deuterium in synthesis gas is stripped of hydrogen and concentrated in ammonia. The ammonia then enters the ammonia cracking unit at the bottom of the column, while the gas is collected in an ammonia converter at the top. In subsequent stages, further enrichment takes place, and reactor-pure heavy water is produced by final distillation. The synthesis gas supply can be provided by an ammonia plant, which in turn can be built together with a plant for the production of heavy water by isotopic exchange of ammonia and hydrogen. In the process of ammonia-hydrogen exchange, ordinary water can also be used as a source of initial deuterium. Many items of key equipment for heavy water production plants using GS or ammonia-hydrogen exchange processes are widely used in some branches of the petrochemical industry. This is especially true for small installations using the GS process. However, few pieces of equipment are standard. GS and ammonia-hydrogen exchange processes require the treatment of large quantities of flammable, corrosive and toxic liquids at elevated pressure. Accordingly, when developing standards for the design and operation of installations and equipment using these processes, great attention should be paid to the selection of materials and their characteristics in order to ensure a long service life while maintaining high safety and reliability. The scale is determined mainly by considerations of economics and necessity. Thus, most of the equipment items are manufactured according to customer requirements. Finally, it should be noted that both in the GS process and in the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process, items of equipment that are not individually designed or prepared specifically for the production of heavy water can be assembled into systems specifically designed or prepared for the production of heavy water. Examples of such systems used in both processes are the catalytic cracking system used in the process of exchanging ammonia and hydrogen, and distillation systems used in the process of final concentration of heavy water, bringing it to the level of reactor-pure. Items of equipment that are specifically designed or prepared for the production of heavy water by using either a water and hydrogen sulfide exchange process or an ammonia and hydrogen exchange process include:

6.1. Water-hydrogen sulfide exchange columns

Exchange columns made of fine-grained carbon steel (e.g. ASTM A516), ranging in diameter from 6 m (20 ft) to 9 m (30 ft), which can be operated at pressures above or equal to 2 MPa (300 psi inches) and have a corrosion tolerance of 6 mm or more, are specially designed or prepared for the production of heavy water by using the isotope exchange process of water and hydrogen sulfide.

6.2. Gas blowers and compressors

Single-stage, low-pressure (i.e. 0.2 MPa or 30 lb/sq. inches) centrifugal blowers or compressors for the circulation of hydrogen sulfide gas (i.e., gas containing more than 70% H2S), specially designed or prepared for the production of heavy water by using a water and hydrogen sulfide exchange process. These blowers or compressors have a capacity exceeding or equal to 56 m3/s (120,000 SCFM) when operated at a pressure exceeding or equal to 1.8 MPa (260 psi inches) at the inlet, and are equipped with seals resistant to H 2 S.

6.3. Ammonia-hydrogen exchange columns

Ammonia-hydrogen exchange columns with a height of more than or equal to 35 m (114.3 ft) in diameter from 1.5 m (4.9 ft) to 2.5 m (8.2 ft), which can be operated at pressures exceeding 15 MPa (2225 psi inches), specially designed or prepared for the production of heavy water by using an ammonia and hydrogen exchange process. These columns also have at least one flanged axial opening of the same diameter as the cylindrical part through which the inner parts of the column can be inserted or removed.

6.4. Internal parts of the column and step pumps

The internal parts of the column and step pumps, specially designed or prepared for columns for the production of heavy water by using the process of ammonia-hydrogen exchange. The internal parts of the column include specially designed contactors between the steps, facilitating close contact between gas and liquid. Step pumps include specially designed liquid-immersed pumps for the circulation of liquid ammonia within the volume of contactors located inside the column steps.

6.5. Ammonia cracking plants

Ammonia cracking plants operated at pressures exceeding or equal to 3 MPa (450 lb/sq. inches), specially designed or prepared for the production of heavy water by using the process of isotopic exchange of ammonia and hydrogen.

6.6. Infrared absorption analyzers

Infrared absorption analyzers capable of analyzing the ratio between hydrogen and deuterium in real time when deuterium concentrations are equal to or exceed 90%.

6.7. Catalytic furnaces

Catalytic furnaces for processing enriched deuterium gas into heavy water, specially designed or prepared for the production of heavy water using the process of isotopic exchange of ammonia and hydrogen.

7. Uranium conversion plants and equipment specially designed or prepared for this purpose

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

In installations and systems for the conversion of uranium, one or more transformations can be carried out from one chemical isotope of uranium to another, including: conversion of uranium ore concentrates to UO3 , conversion of UO3 to UO2 , conversion of uranium oxides to UF 4 or UF 6 , conversion of UF 4 to UF 6 , conversion of UF 6 to UF 4 , the conversion of UF4 to metallic uranium and the conversion of uranium fluorides to UO2 . Many key components of the equipment of uranium conversion plants are typical for some sectors of the chemical processing industry. For example, the types of equipment used in these processes may include: furnaces, carousel furnaces, fluidized bed reactors, flame reactor towers, liquid centrifuges, distillation columns, and liquid-liquid extraction columns. However, not many components of the equipment are available "ready-made"; most of them must be prepared according to the requirements and specifications of the customer. In some cases, it is necessary to take into account special design and engineering features to protect against the aggressive properties of some of the processed chemicals (HF, F2, ClF3 and uranium fluorides). Finally, it should be noted that in all uranium conversion processes, equipment components that are not specifically designed or prepared for uranium conversion can be combined into systems that are specifically designed or prepared for use for uranium conversion purposes.

7.1. Specially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of uranium ore concentrates to UO3

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The conversion of uranium ore concentrates to UO3 can be carried out first by dissolving the ore in nitric acid and extracting purified uranyl dinitrate hexahydrate using a solvent such as tributyl phosphate. Uranyl dinitrate hexahydrate is then converted to UO3 either by concentration and denitration, or by neutralization with ammonia gas to produce ammonium diuranate, followed by filtration, drying, and calcination.

7.2. Specially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UO 3 to UF 6

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The conversion of UO3 to UF 6 can be carried out directly by fluorination. The process requires a source of fluorine gas or chlorine trifluoride.

7.3. Specially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UO 3 to UO 2

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The conversion of UO3 to UO2 can be carried out by reducing UO3 with gaseous cracking ammonia or hydrogen.

7.4. Specially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UO 2 to UF 4

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The conversion of UO2 to UF4 can be carried out by reaction of UO2 with gaseous hydrogen fluoride (HF) at a temperature of 300-500 ° C.

7.5. Specially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF 4 to UF 6

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The conversion of UF 4 to UF 6 is carried out by exothermic reaction with fluorine in the reactor tower. UF 6 condenses from hot volatile gases by passing a gas stream through a cold trap cooled to -10 °C. The process requires a source of fluorine gas.

7.6. Specially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF 4 into metallic uranium

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The conversion of UF4 to metallic uranium is carried out by reducing it with magnesium (large batches) or calcium (small batches). The reaction is carried out at temperatures above the melting point of uranium (1130 0 C).

7.7. Specially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF 6 to UO 2

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The conversion of UF 6 to UO 2 can be carried out through one of three processes. In the first process, UF 6 is reduced and hydrolyzed to UO2 using hydrogen and steam. In the second process, UF6 is hydrolyzed by dissolution in water, ammonia is added to precipitate ammonium diuranate, and diuranate is reduced to UO2 by hydrogen at a temperature of 820 ° C. In the third process, gaseous UF6, CO2, and NH3 are mixed in water, precipitating ammonium uranyl carbonate. Ammonium uranyl carbonate is mixed with steam and hydrogen at a temperature of 500-600 ° C to produce UO2. The conversion of UF 6 to UO2 is often carried out at the first stage of a fuel fabrication plant.

7.8. Specially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF 6 to UF 4

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The conversion of UF 6 to UF 4 is carried out by reduction with hydrogen.

I hereby certify that this text is a true copy from the original of the Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency on the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed in Vienna on February 6, 2004.

Advisor to the International Law Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY ON THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN CONNECTION WITH THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

WHEREAS the Republic of Kazakhstan (hereinafter referred to as "Kazakhstan") is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter referred to as the "Treaty"), opened for signature in London, Moscow and Washington on July 1, 1968 and entered into force on March 5, 1970; WHEREAS paragraph 1 of article III of the said Treaty states: "Each of the States - The Parties to the Treaty that do not possess nuclear weapons undertake to accept guarantees, as set out in the agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, solely for the purpose of verifying the fulfillment of its obligations assumed in accordance with this Agreement. The Treaty, in order to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The safeguards procedures required by this Article are carried out with respect to source or special fissionable material, regardless of whether it is produced, processed, or used in any major nuclear installation or located outside any such installation. The safeguards required by this Article shall apply to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere," BEARING IN MIND that the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the "Agency") is authorized to to conclude such agreements in accordance with Article III of its Statute; Kazakhstan and the Agency HEREBY agree as follows:

PART I BASIC COMMITMENT

Article 1

Kazakhstan, in accordance with paragraph 1 of article III of the Treaty, undertakes to take safeguards in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement with respect to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, solely for the purpose of verifying that such material is not He switched to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

APPLICATION OF GUARANTEES

Article 2

The Agency has the right and obligation to ensure the application of safeguards in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of Kazakhstan, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, solely for the purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

COOPERATION BETWEEN KAZAKHSTAN AND THE AGENCY

Article 3

Kazakhstan and the Agency shall cooperate to facilitate the implementation of the guarantees provided for in this Agreement.

IMPLEMENTATION OF GUARANTEES

Article 4

The safeguards provided for in this Agreement shall be implemented in such a way as: (a) to avoid creating obstacles to the economic and technical development of Kazakhstan or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including international exchange of nuclear material; (b) to avoid unjustified interference in peaceful nuclear activities of Kazakhstan and, in particular, in the operation of facilities; and (c) to be consistent with sound management practices necessary for the economical and safe conduct of nuclear activities.

Article 5

(a) The Agency shall take all precautionary measures to protect commercial and industrial secrets and other confidential information that become known to it as a result of the implementation of this Agreement. (b) (i) The Agency shall not publish or transmit to any State, organization or individual any information it receives in connection with the implementation of this Agreement, except that certain information relating to the implementation of this Agreement may be submitted to the Agency's Board of Governors (hereinafter referred to as the "Council") and such Agency staff who need such information due to their official duties in connection with guarantees, but only to the extent, necessary for the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities in the implementation of this Agreement. ii) Generalized information on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement may be published by decision of the Council, if the States directly concerned agree to this.

Article 6

(a) In implementing safeguards under this Agreement, the Agency shall take full account of technological advances in safeguards and shall make every effort to ensure optimal cost-effectiveness and the application of the principle of effective safeguards for the flow of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement through the use of instruments and other technical means in certain key locations to the extent that, to the extent that existing or future technology allows. (b) In order to ensure optimal cost effectiveness, such means are used, for example: (i) conservation as a means of determining material balance zones for accounting purposes; (ii) Statistical methods and random sampling in estimating the flow of nuclear material; and (iii) Focusing verification procedures on the stages of the nuclear fuel cycle related to the production, processing, use or storage of nuclear material from which nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices can be easily produced, and minimizing verification procedures for other nuclear material, provided that this does not impede the Agency's application of safeguards in accordance with with this Agreement.

NATIONAL MATERIALS CONTROL SYSTEM

Article 7

(a) Kazakhstan shall establish and maintain a system for accounting and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards in accordance with this Agreement. (b) The Agency applies safeguards in such a way as to be able to verify Kazakhstan's data systems to ensure that there has been no diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Agency's verification includes, in particular, independent measurements and observations conducted by the Agency in accordance with the procedures set out in Part II of this Agreement. When conducting the audit, the Agency takes due account of the technical efficiency of Kazakhstan's system.

SUBMISSION OF INFORMATION TO THE AGENCY

Article 8

a) In order to ensure the effective implementation of safeguards in accordance with this Agreement, Kazakhstan, in accordance with the provisions set out in Part II of this Agreement, shall provide the Agency with information related to nuclear material subject to safeguards in accordance with this Agreement, as well as the characteristics of facilities relevant to the safeguards of such material. (b) (i) The Agency requires only a minimum amount of information and data compatible with the performance of its duties under this Agreement. (ii) Information related to facilities constitutes the minimum information necessary for the safeguards of nuclear material subject to safeguards in accordance with this Agreement. c) At the request of Kazakhstan, the Agency is ready to study directly in the institutions of Kazakhstan information about the structure, which Kazakhstan considers to be particularly important. Such information does not need to be physically transmitted to the Agency, provided that it remains easily accessible for further study by the Agency in institutions in Kazakhstan.

AGENCY INSPECTORS

Article 9

(a) (i) The Agency receives the consent of Kazakhstan to appoint Agency inspectors to Kazakhstan. ii) If Kazakhstan objects to such an appointment either at the time of the appointment proposal or at any other time after the appointment, the Agency shall propose to Kazakhstan an alternative candidate or candidates for inspectors. (iii) Kazakhstan's repeated refusal to accept the appointment of Agency inspectors, which would make it difficult to conduct inspections in accordance with this Agreement, is being considered by the Council upon presentation of the matter by the Director General of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as the "Director General") with a view to taking appropriate action by the Council. (b) Kazakhstan shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the Agency's inspectors are able to effectively perform their duties in accordance with this Agreement. (c) Visits and activities of Agency inspectors are organized in such a way as to: (i) minimize possible inconvenience and interference to Kazakhstan and to the peaceful nuclear activities being inspected; and (ii) ensure the protection of industrial secrets or any other confidential information that becomes known to the inspectors.

PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

Article 10

Kazakhstan grants the Agency (including its property, funds and assets) and its inspectors and other officials performing their functions in accordance with this Agreement privileges and immunities similar to those set out in the relevant provisions of the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

TERMINATION OF THE GUARANTEES

Article 11

Consumption or dilution of nuclear material

Safeguards for nuclear material are terminated after the Agency determines that the material has been used up or diluted in such a way that it is no longer suitable for any nuclear activity of interest from the point of view of safeguards, or has become practically unregenerated.

Article 12

Transfer of nuclear material from Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan shall notify the Agency in advance of proposed transfers of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement from Kazakhstan in accordance with the provisions set out in Part II of this Agreement. The Agency shall terminate the application of safeguards to nuclear material in accordance with this Agreement upon acceptance by the recipient State of responsibility for it, as provided for in Part II of this Agreement. The Agency maintains accounting documents showing each transfer and, where applicable, the resumption of safeguards for transferred nuclear material.

Article 13

Provisions concerning nuclear material used in non-nuclear activities

When nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is intended to be used in non-nuclear activities such as the production of alloys or ceramics, Kazakhstan shall, prior to such use of the material, coordinate with the Agency the circumstances under which safeguards may be terminated with respect to such material.

NON-APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO NUCLEAR MATERIAL USED IN NON-PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES

Article 14

If Kazakhstan intends to exercise its right to use nuclear material that must be placed under safeguards in accordance with this Agreement in nuclear activities that do not require safeguards in accordance with this Agreement, the following procedures shall apply: (a) Kazakhstan shall inform the Agency of such activities, explaining: (i) that the use of nuclear material in non-prohibited military activities It will not contradict any commitment that nuclear material will be used only in peaceful nuclear activities., which Kazakhstan may have given and in accordance with which Agency safeguards are applied; and ii) that during the period when safeguards will not be applied, nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; b) Kazakhstan and the Agency agree that the safeguards provided for in this Agreement they will not be applied only as long as nuclear material is used in this kind of activity. This arrangement defines, as far as possible, the time period or conditions when the guarantees will not apply. In any case, the safeguards provided for in this Agreement shall be applied again as soon as the nuclear material is returned to peaceful nuclear activities. The Agency is informed of the total quantity and composition of such unsafeguarded nuclear material in Kazakhstan and of all cases of export of such material; and (c) each agreement is reached with the Agency's consent. Such consent is given as soon as possible and concerns, in particular, only issues such as interim and procedural provisions and reporting arrangements, but does not entail any approval of military activities and does not affect classified information in this area, or does not relate to the use of nuclear material in such activities.

FINANCIAL ISSUES

Article 15

Kazakhstan and the Agency shall bear the costs they incur in fulfilling their respective obligations under this Agreement. However, if Kazakhstan or persons under its jurisdiction incur additional costs in connection with fulfilling a special request from the Agency, the Agency will reimburse such costs provided that it has previously agreed to do so. In any case, the Agency pays the costs of any additional measurements or sampling that may be requested by the inspectors.

LIABILITY TO A THIRD PARTY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE Article 16

Kazakhstan shall ensure that any protection against third-party liability for nuclear damage, including any insurance or other financial security that may be provided in accordance with its laws or regulations, is applied for the purpose of implementing this Agreement to the Agency and its officials in the same manner as this protection applies to citizens of Kazakhstan.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Article 17

Any claim by Kazakhstan against the Agency or the Agency against Kazakhstan regarding any damage resulting from the implementation of safeguards under this Agreement, other than damage caused by a nuclear accident, shall be settled in accordance with international law.

MEASURES RELATED TO CHECKING FOR NON-SWITCHING

Article 18

If, on the basis of the Director General's report, the Council decides that any action by Kazakhstan is necessary and urgent to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is not being diverted to the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the Council may call on Kazakhstan to take the necessary measures without delay. regardless of the application of dispute settlement procedures in accordance with Article 22 of this Agreement.

Article 19

If, based on the examination of relevant information provided to it by the Director General, the Council concludes that the Agency is unable to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material that should be placed under safeguards under this Agreement to the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, it may make communications, provided for in paragraph "C" of Article XII of the Statute of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as the "Statute"), as well as to take, where applicable, other measures provided for in this paragraph. In taking such actions, the Council takes into account the degree of confidence provided by the safeguards measures taken and gives Kazakhstan any reasonable opportunity to provide the Council with any necessary evidence.

INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE AGREEMENT AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

Article 20

Kazakhstan and the Agency, at the request of one or the other of them, shall consult on any issue arising in connection with the interpretation or application of this Agreement.

Article 21

Kazakhstan has the right to request that any issue arising in connection with the interpretation or application of this Agreement be considered by the Council. The Council invites Kazakhstan to participate in the Council's discussion of any such issue.

Article 22

Any dispute arising in connection with the interpretation or application of this Agreement, with the exception of a dispute concerning the withdrawal of the Council in accordance with Article 19 or actions taken by the Council in connection with such withdrawal, which is not settled through negotiations or in any other way agreed between Kazakhstan and the Agency, shall be referred to an arbitration tribunal at the request of either party. drawn up as follows: Kazakhstan and the Agency appoint one arbitrator each, and the two arbitrators appointed in this way elect the third, who is the chairman. If, within thirty days of the request for arbitration, either Kazakhstan or the Agency does not appoint an arbitrator, Kazakhstan or the Agency may request the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint an arbitrator. The same procedure applies if no third arbitrator has been elected within thirty days of the appointment of the second arbitrator. The majority of the members of the arbitration tribunal shall constitute a quorum, and the consent of two arbitrators is required for making a decision. The arbitration procedure is established by the tribunal. The Tribunal's decision is binding on Kazakhstan and the Agency.

CHANGING THE AGREEMENT

Article 23

a) Kazakhstan and the Agency, at the request of one or the other, consult with each other on amendments to this Agreement. b) All amendments require the consent of Kazakhstan and the Agency. (c) Amendments to this Agreement shall enter into force on the same terms as the Agreement itself. d) The Director General shall immediately inform all Member States of the Agency of any amendment to this Agreement.

ENTRY INTO FORCE AND TERM OF VALIDITY

Article 24

This Agreement shall enter into force on the day when the Agency receives a written notification from Kazakhstan that all the requirements established by law and the Constitution of Kazakhstan necessary for the entry into force of this Agreement have been fulfilled. The Director General shall immediately inform all Member States of the Agency of the entry into force of this Agreement.

Article 25

This Agreement remains in force as long as Kazakhstan is a party to the Agreement.

PART II INTRODUCTION

Article 26

The purpose of this part of this Agreement is to define the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I.

THE PURPOSE OF GUARANTEES

Article 27

The purpose of the safeguards procedures set out in this part of this Agreement is to detect in a timely manner the diversion of significant amounts of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or to unknown purposes, as well as to deter such diversion due to the risk of early detection.

Article 28

In order to achieve the objective set out in Article 27, material accounting is used as a safeguard measure of primary importance, combined with conservation and surveillance measures as important complementary measures.

Article 29

The technical report on the Agency's verification activities is a statement indicating, for each material balance zone, the amount of unaccounted-for material for a certain period and giving limits on the accuracy of the specified amounts.

NATIONAL SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

Article 30

In accordance with Article 7, the Agency, in carrying out its verification activities, makes full use of Kazakhstan's accounting and control system for all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, and avoids unnecessary duplication of Kazakhstan's accounting and control activities.

Article 31

The accounting and control system for all nuclear material of Kazakhstan subject to safeguards in accordance with this Agreement is based on the structure of the material balance zones and provides, if necessary, as indicated in the Additional Provisions, for the adoption of such measures as: a) the use of a measurement system to determine the quantities of nuclear material that has been received, produced, shipped, lost or otherwise removed from the inventory of the material, as well as to determine the inventory quantities of the material; (b) Assessment of precision and accuracy of measurements and assessment of measurement errors; (c) Development of procedures for identifying, reviewing and evaluating discrepancies in measurements between the sender and recipient; (d) Development of procedures for determining the actual quantity of material available; (e) Development of procedures for assessing accumulations of unmeasured inventory of material and unmeasured losses; (f) The establishment of a system of accounting and accounting documentation showing, for each material balance zone, the inventory of nuclear material and changes in that inventory, including arrivals to and transfers from the material balance zone; (g) the development of provisions to ensure the correct application of accounting procedures and activities; and (h) the development of procedures for reporting to the Agency in accordance with Articles 58-68.

THE STARTING POINT OF THE GUARANTEES APPLICATION

Article 32

The guarantees under this Agreement do not apply to the material during mining or processing of ore.

Article 33

(a) If any material containing uranium or thorium that has not reached the stage of the nuclear fuel cycle specified in paragraph (c) below is exported directly or indirectly to a non-nuclear-weapon State, Kazakhstan shall inform the Agency of the amount of such material, its composition and purpose, if this the material is not exported specifically for non-nuclear purposes; (b) If any material containing uranium or thorium that has not reached the stage of the nuclear fuel cycle specified in paragraph (c) below is imported, Kazakhstan shall inform the Agency of the amount of such material and its composition, unless this material is imported specifically for non-nuclear purposes.; and c) if any nuclear material, the composition and purity of which make it suitable for the manufacture of fuel or isotope enrichment, leaves the plant or processing stage where it was produced, or if such nuclear material or any other nuclear material produced at a later stage of the nuclear fuel cycle is imported into Kazakhstan, then this nuclear material becomes subject to other safeguards procedures specified in this Agreement.

TERMINATION OF THE GUARANTEES

Article 34

a) The application of safeguards to nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement shall be terminated under the conditions set out in Article 11. In the event that the conditions of this article are not fulfilled, but Kazakhstan considers that the extraction of nuclear material under safeguards from waste is currently impractical or undesirable, Kazakhstan and the Agency consult on the application of appropriate safeguards measures. (b) The application of safeguards to nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement shall be terminated under the conditions set out in Article 13 if Kazakhstan and the Agency agree that such nuclear material is practically non-renewable.

EXEMPTION FROM GUARANTEES

Article 35

At the request of Kazakhstan, the Agency exempts the following nuclear material from safeguards: (a) special fissile material when it is used in quantities measured in grams or less as a sensitive element in instrumentation; (b) nuclear material when it is used in non-nuclear activities in accordance with Article 13, if such nuclear material is regenerated; and c) plutonium with a concentration of the isotope plutonium-238 exceeding 80%.

Article 36

At the request of Kazakhstan, the Agency shall exempt from safeguards nuclear material that would otherwise be subject to safeguards, provided that the total amount of nuclear material exempt from safeguards in Kazakhstan in accordance with this Article may not at any time exceed: (a) a total of one kilogram of special fissionable material, which may consist of one or more of the following materials: i) plutonium; ii) uranium with an enrichment of 0.2 (20%) or higher, calculated by multiplying its mass by its enrichment value; and iii) uranium enriched below 0.2 (20%) and above the enrichment of natural uranium, calculated by multiplying its mass fivefold by the square of its enrichment; b) a total of ten metric tons of natural uranium and depleted uranium enriched above 0.005 (0.5%); c) twenty metric tons of depleted uranium enriched 0.005 (0.5%) or lower; and (d) twenty metric tons of thorium; or such large quantities as may be determined by the Council for uniform application.

Article 37

If nuclear material exempt from safeguards is to be processed or stored in a warehouse together with nuclear material subject to safeguards in accordance with this Agreement, provision should be made for the resumption of safeguards application to it.

ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS

Article 38

Kazakhstan and the Agency are developing Additional Provisions specifying in detail, to the extent necessary to enable the Agency to effectively and efficiently perform its duties under this Agreement, how the procedures set out in this Agreement should be applied. Additional provisions may be expanded or amended by agreement between Kazakhstan and the Agency without modification of this Agreement.

Article 39

The additional provisions shall enter into force simultaneously or as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Agreement. Kazakhstan and the Agency shall make every effort to put them into effect within ninety days from the date of entry into force of this Agreement; the extension of this period requires agreement between Kazakhstan and the Agency. Kazakhstan immediately submits to the Agency the information necessary to finalize the development of Additional Regulations. As soon as this Agreement enters into force, the Agency has the right to apply the procedures set out in the Agreement to nuclear material listed in the inventory list provided for in Article 40, even if Additional Provisions have not yet entered into force.

INVENTORY LIST

Article 40

Based on the initial report referred to in Article 61, the Agency shall compile a single inventory of all nuclear material in Kazakhstan that is subject to safeguards under this Agreement, regardless of its origin, and maintain this inventory based on subsequent reports and the results of its verification activities. Copies of the inventory list are provided to Kazakhstan at agreed time intervals.

INFORMATION ABOUT THE CONSTRUCTION

General provisions

Article 41

In accordance with Article 8, information on the design of existing installations is provided to the Agency when discussing Additional Provisions. Additional Provisions set deadlines for the submission of information on the construction of new facilities, and such information is provided as early as possible before the introduction of nuclear material into a new facility.

Article 42

The design information provided to the Agency includes, for each installation, where applicable: (a) the identification of the installation, indicating its general characteristics, purpose, rated capacity and geographical location, as well as the name and address used for normal business purposes; (b) a description of the general location of the installation, indicating, if possible, the shape, location, and flow of nuclear material and the general layout of important core parts of equipment where nuclear material is used, produced, or processed; (c) A description of the characteristics of the facility related to material accounting, conservation and monitoring; and (d) a description of the procedures applied at the facility and intended for accounting and control of nuclear material, with particular attention to the material balance zones established by the operator, material flow measurements and procedures for determining the actual amount of material.

Article 43

The Agency is also provided with other information regarding each facility relevant to the application of safeguards, in particular information regarding organizational responsibility for accounting and material control. Kazakhstan provides the Agency with additional information on the health and safety regulations that the Agency must adhere to and which inspectors at the facility must follow.

Article 44

Information on design changes relevant to the purposes of safeguards is submitted to the Agency for consideration, and it is notified of any changes to the information provided to it in accordance with Article 43 sufficiently in advance so that appropriate clarifications can be made to the procedures for the application of safeguards, if necessary.

Article 45

The purpose of reviewing information about the design

The design information provided to the Agency is used for the following purposes: (a) to identify the characteristics of facilities and nuclear material relevant to the application of safeguards to nuclear material in sufficient detail to facilitate verification; (b) to identify the balance zones of materials used for Agency accounting purposes and to select key locations that are key measurement points and which will be used to determine the flow and inventory of nuclear material; In determining such material balance zones, the Agency applies, in particular, the following criteria: (i) the size of the material balance zone depends on the accuracy with which the material balance can be established; (ii) in determining the material balance zone, every opportunity is taken to apply conservation and monitoring measures to help ensure the completeness of material flow measurements and thus simplify the application of guarantees and focus measurement efforts on key measurement points.; (iii) Several balance zones of materials used at the facility or at separate sites may be combined into one balance zone of materials used for Agency accounting purposes when the Agency determines that this meets its verification requirements; and (iv) at the request of Kazakhstan, a special balance zone of materials may be established under any (c) To establish a nominal schedule and procedures for determining the actual amount of nuclear material available for the Agency's accounting purposes.; (d) To establish requirements for records and reports and procedures for evaluating records; (e) to establish requirements and procedures for verifying the quantity and location of nuclear material; and (f) to select appropriate combinations of conservation and surveillance methods and key locations where they will be applied. The results of the review of the design information are included in Additional Provisions.

Article 46

Re-examination of design information

Design information is reviewed in the light of changes in operating conditions, the development of safeguards technology, or experience with verification procedures in order to modify the Agency's measures in accordance with Article 45.

Article 47

Checking the design information

The Agency, in cooperation with Kazakhstan, may send inspectors to installations to verify the design information provided to the Agency in accordance with Articles 41-44 for the purposes set out in Article 45.

INFORMATION ABOUT NUCLEAR MATERIAL OUTSIDE THE FACILITY

Article 48

The Agency is provided with the following information regarding nuclear material commonly used outside installations, where applicable: (a) a general description of the use of nuclear material, its geographical location, the last name (or name) of the consumer and the address used for routine business correspondence; and (b) a general description of existing and proposed accounting and control procedures for nuclear material, including organizational responsibility for accounting and control of the material. The Agency is promptly notified of any change in the information provided to it in accordance with this article.

Article 49

The information provided to the Agency in accordance with Article 48 may be used to the extent necessary for the purposes set out in subparagraphs (b) to (f) of Article 45.

THE SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTING DOCUMENTS

General provisions

Article 50

When creating the national material control system referred to in Article 7, Kazakhstan ensures that accounting records are maintained for each material balance zone. The Additional Provisions describe the accounting documents that must be maintained.

Article 51

Kazakhstan is taking measures to facilitate the review of accounting documents by inspectors, especially if they are not kept in English, Spanish, Russian or French.

Article 52

Accounting documents are kept for at least five years.

Article 53

Accounting documents, if necessary, include: (a) material and balance sheet accounting documents for all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement; and (b) operational accounting documents for installations containing such nuclear material.

Article 54

The measurement system on which accounting documents used for preparing reports are based either complies with the latest international standards or is equivalent in quality to such standards.

Material and balance accounting documents

Article 55

The material balance accounting documents include the following for each material balance zone: (a) all changes in inventory quantities of material so that the recorded quantity of material can be determined at any time; (b) all measurement results that are used to determine the actual quantity of material available; and (c) all clarifications and corrections that have been made regarding changes in inventory quantities of material, recorded inventory quantities of material and actual quantities of material available.

Article 56

All changes in inventory quantities of material and actual quantities of material are reflected in the accounting documents for each batch of nuclear material: identification of the material, batch data and initial data. Accounting records are kept separately for the uranium, thorium and plutonium contained in each batch of nuclear material. For each change in the inventory quantity of the material, the date of the change in the inventory quantity of the material and, if necessary, the sending zone of the balance of materials and the receiving zone of the balance of materials or the recipient are indicated.

Article 57

Operational accounting documents

Operational accounting documents for each material balance zone, if necessary, include: (a) those operational data that are used to determine changes in the quantities and composition of nuclear material; (b) data obtained as a result of calibration of tanks and instrumentation, sampling and analysis, quality control procedures for measurements and estimates of accidental and systematic errors; (c) A description of the sequence of actions taken in the preparation and determination of the actual quantity of material in order to ensure the correctness and completeness of such determination; and (d) a description of the actions taken to establish the cause and extent of any accidental or immeasurable loss that may have occurred.

THE REPORTING SYSTEM

General provisions

Article 58

Kazakhstan submits reports to the Agency, as detailed in Articles 59-68, on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement.

Article 59

Reports are prepared in English, Spanish, Russian or French, unless otherwise specified in the Additional Provisions.

Article 60

The reports are based on accounting documents drawn up in accordance with Articles 50-57, and consist, if necessary, of accounting reports and special reports.

Accounting reports

Article 61

The Agency is provided with an initial report on all nuclear material subject to safeguards in accordance with this Agreement. Kazakhstan shall send the initial report to the Agency within 30 days, calculated from the last day of the calendar month in which this Agreement enters into force, and it reflects the situation as of the last day of that month.

Article 62

Kazakhstan submits to the Agency the following accounting reports for each material balance zone: a) reports on changes in inventory quantities of material, showing all changes in inventory quantities of material. These reports are sent as soon as possible and, in any case, within 30 days after the end of the month in which inventory changes have occurred or have been identified.; and (b) Material balance sheets showing the material balance based on the actual amount of nuclear material actually available in the material balance area. These reports are sent as soon as possible and in any case within thirty days after the completion of determining the actual amount of material available. These reports are based on the data available at the time of writing the report and can be corrected later if required.

Article 63

The material inventory change reports provide the identification of the material and the batch data for each batch of nuclear material, the date of the material inventory change, and, if necessary, the sending material balance zone and the receiving material balance zone or recipient. These reports are accompanied by brief notes: (a) Explaining the changes in inventory quantities of material based on the operational data contained in the operational accounting documents submitted in accordance with paragraph (a) of Article 57; and (b) describing, as defined in the Supplementary Provisions, the intended operational program, in particular, the determination of the actual amount of material available.

Article 64

Kazakhstan reports on each change in the inventory quantity of material, clarification and correction either periodically in the form of a consolidated list, or on a case-by-case basis. Data on changes in the inventory quantity of the material is given by batch. As defined in the Additional Provisions, small changes in the inventory of nuclear material, such as transfers of analytical samples, can be combined into one batch, and reports on them can be presented as a single change in the inventory of material.

Article 65

Every six months, the Agency submits to Kazakhstan reports on the registered inventory of nuclear material subject to safeguards in accordance with this Agreement for each material balance zone based on reports on changes in inventory amounts of material for the period covered by each such report.

Article 66

Unless otherwise agreed between Kazakhstan and the Agency, the material balance sheets include the following data: a) the initial actual quantity of material; b) a change in the inventory quantity of material (first an increase, then a decrease); c) the final registered inventory quantity of material; d) a discrepancy in the data of the sender and recipient; e) the adjusted final registered inventory quantity of the material; f) the final actual quantity of the material; and g) the amount of unaccounted-for material. A report on the actual amount of material available, listing all batches separately and indicating the identification of the material and batch data for each batch, is attached to each material balance sheet.

Article 67

Special reports

Kazakhstan shall submit special reports without delay: (a) in the event of any unusual incident or circumstances that lead Kazakhstan to believe that there has been or could have been a loss of nuclear material in quantities exceeding the limits established for this purpose in the Supplementary Provisions; or (b) if the conditions of conservation have unexpectedly changed from those of specified in the Additional Provisions, to the extent that unauthorized removal of nuclear material becomes possible.

Article 68

Additions and explanations to the reports

At the request of the Agency, Kazakhstan provides the Agency with additions and clarifications to any report to the extent it relates to the purpose of the guarantees.

INSPECTIONS

Article 69

General provisions

The Agency has the right to conduct inspections, as provided for in Articles 70-81.

Objectives of inspections

Article 70

The Agency may conduct inspections for special purposes in order to: (a) verify the information contained in the initial report on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement; (b) identify and verify changes in the environment that have occurred since the date of the initial report; and (c) identify and, if possible, verify the quantity and composition of nuclear material in accordance with Articles 92 and 95 before its transfer from Kazakhstan or after its transfer to Kazakhstan.

Article 71

The Agency may conduct routine inspections in order to: (a) verify the compliance of reports with accounting documents; (b) verify the location, identity, quantity and composition of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement; and (c) verify information on possible causes of unaccounted for material, discrepancies in sender and recipient data, and uncertainty. in the registered inventory quantity of the material.

Article 72

Subject to the procedures set out in Article 76, the Agency may conduct special inspections: (a) to verify the information contained in the special reports; or (b) if the Agency considers that the information provided by Kazakhstan, including Kazakhstan's clarifications and information obtained as a result of routine inspections, is insufficient for the Agency to fulfill its obligations. obligations under this Agreement. An inspection is considered special when it is either complementary to the routine inspection efforts provided for in Articles 77-81, or provides access to information or places other than the access specified in Article 75 for special purpose inspections and routine inspections, or includes both cases.

Scope of inspections

Article 73

For the purposes specified in Articles 70-72, the Agency may: (a) examine records maintained in accordance with Articles 50-57; (b) conduct independent measurements of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement; (c) verify the functioning and calibration of instruments and other instrumentation; (d) apply and use surveillance and conservation measures; and (e) use other objective methods whose technical applicability has been demonstrated.

Article 74

Within the framework of Article 73, the Agency has the opportunity to: (a) ensure that samples at key measurement points for material accounting are taken in accordance with procedures that provide representative samples, monitor the processing and analysis of samples and obtain duplicates of such samples; (b) ensure that measurements of nuclear material at key The measurement points for material and balance accounting were representative, and to monitor the calibration of the relevant instruments and equipment; (c) Negotiate with Kazakhstan that, if necessary: (i) additional measurements and additional samples are taken for use by the Agency; (ii) the Agency's standard analytical samples are analyzed; (iii) appropriate absolute standards are used in the calibration of instruments and other equipment; and (iv) other calibrations are performed; (d) Arrange for the use of their own equipment for independent measurement and monitoring and, if agreed and specified in the Supplementary Provisions, arrange for the installation of such equipment; (e) use their seals and other identifying and interference-indicating devices to ensure the preservation of the material, if agreed and specified in the Supplementary Provisions; and (f) negotiate with Kazakhstan regarding the shipment of samples selected for use by the Agency.

Access to inspection sites

Article 75

a) For the purposes specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article 70, and until key locations are identified in the Additional Provisions, Agency inspectors have access to any location where, according to the initial report or any related inspections, nuclear material is located.

b) For the purposes specified in paragraph (c) of Article 70, inspectors have access to any location that the Agency has been notified of in accordance with paragraph (d) (iii) Article 91 or paragraph (d) (iii) Articles 94. c) For the purposes specified in Article 71, inspectors have access only to the key locations specified in the Supplementary Provisions and to accounting records maintained in accordance with Articles 50-57. (d) If Kazakhstan concludes that any unusual circumstances require an extension of the Agency's access restrictions, Kazakhstan and the Agency shall immediately reach an agreement to enable the Agency to implement its safeguards obligations in the light of these restrictions. The Director General shall inform the Council of each such arrangement.

Article 76

In circumstances that may require special inspections for the purposes specified in Article 72, Kazakhstan and the Agency shall immediately consult with each other. As a result of such consultations, the Agency may: (a) conduct inspections in addition to the routine inspections provided for in Articles 77-81; and (b), in agreement with Kazakhstan, obtain access to information or locations in addition to those specified in Article 75. Any disagreement regarding the need for additional access shall be resolved in accordance with Articles 21 and 22.; If any action on the part of Kazakhstan is necessary and urgent, Article 18 applies.

Frequency and intensity of routine inspections

Article 77

The Agency, using an optimal schedule, shall reduce the number, intensity and duration of routine inspections to a minimum compatible with the effective implementation of the safeguards procedures set out in this Agreement, and make the best and most economical use of the inspection resources at its disposal.

Article 78

The Agency may conduct one routine inspection per year for installations and material balance zones outside installations with a maximum of five effective kilograms of nuclear material or an annual production capacity, whichever is greater.

Article 79

The number, intensity, duration, schedule and type of routine inspections for installations with a content or annual capacity of more than five effective kilograms of nuclear material are determined based on the fact that, in the maximum or maximum case, the inspection regime is no more intensive than necessary and sufficient to have continuous information about the flow and inventory quantity. nuclear material, and the maximum amount of routine inspections for such installations is determined as follows: (a) For reactors and sealed warehouses, the total maximum volume of routine inspections per year is set at one sixth of the man-year of inspection for each such facility; (b) For installations, excluding reactors or sealed warehouses, associated with plutonium or uranium enriched above 5%, the total maximum volume of routine inspections per year is set for each such installation within 30 x V man-days of inspection per year, where E is the inventory quantity of nuclear material or the annual capacity of the installation - depending on what is more - in effective kilograms. The maximum set for each such installation, however, should not be less than 1.5 man-years of inspection.; and (c) For installations not covered by paragraphs (a) or (b) of this Article, the total maximum amount of routine inspections per year shall be set for each such installation within one third of the man-year of inspection plus 0.4 x V - E man-days of inspection per year, where E is the inventory quantity of nuclear material or The annual productivity of the plant, whichever is greater, is in effective kilograms. RCPI's Note: (V is the mathematical sign of the root)

Kazakhstan and the Agency may agree to change the figures relating to the maximum volume of inspections specified in this Article, if the Council determines that such a change is justified.

Article 80

Subject to Articles 77-79, the criteria used to determine the actual number, intensity, duration, schedule and type of routine inspections at any installation include: (a) the shape of the nuclear material, in particular, whether the nuclear material is in bulk form or contained in a number of separate items; its chemical composition, and in the case of uranium, whether it is low or high enriched; and accessibility to it; (b) The effectiveness of Kazakhstan's accounting and control system, including the extent to which facility operators are functionally independent of Kazakhstan's accounting and control system, as well as the extent to which the measures referred to in Article 31 have been implemented by Kazakhstan; the rapidity with which reports are submitted to the Agency; their compliance with independent verification conducted by the Agency; and the number and the accuracy of determining the amount of unaccounted-for material checked by the Agency; (c) The characteristics of Kazakhstan's nuclear fuel cycle, in particular the number and types of facilities containing nuclear material subject to safeguards, the characteristics of such facilities relevant to safeguards, especially the degree of conservation; to what extent the design of such facilities facilitates verification of the flow and inventory of nuclear material; and to what extent information coming from various material balance zones, can be correlated; (d) The international relationship, in particular the extent to which nuclear material is obtained from or sent to other States for use or processing; any related Verification Agency activities; and the extent to which Kazakhstan's nuclear activities are interlinked with those of other States; and (e) Technical advances in safeguards, including the use of statistical methods and random sampling in estimating the flow of nuclear material.

Article 81

Kazakhstan and the Agency consult if Kazakhstan considers that inspection efforts are overly focused on certain installations.

Notification of inspections

Article 82

Prior to the arrival of inspectors at installations or in material balance zones outside installations, the Agency shall notify Kazakhstan in advance of: (a) Special purpose inspections conducted in accordance with paragraph (c) of Article 70, at least 24 hours in advance; inspections conducted in accordance with paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article 70, as well as the activities provided for in Article 47, at least one week in advance.; (b) Special inspections conducted in accordance with Article 72, as soon as possible after Kazakhstan and the Agency have conducted the consultations provided for in Article 76, with the issue of notification of arrival usually forming part of the consultations; and (c) routine inspections conducted in accordance with Article 71, at least 24 hours in advance for installations referred to in paragraph (b) of Article 79, and for sealed warehouses containing; plutonium or uranium enriched above 5%, and for one week in all other cases. Such an inspection notice includes the names of the inspectors, and it indicates the installations and material balance areas outside the installations that are planned to be visited, as well as the time during which they will be visited. If inspectors are to arrive in Kazakhstan from another country, the Agency will also notify them in advance of the place and time of their arrival in Kazakhstan.

Article 83

Notwithstanding the provisions contained in Article 82, the Agency may, as an additional measure, conduct, without prior notice, part of the routine inspections in accordance with Article 79, according to the principle of random sampling. In carrying out any unannounced inspections, the Agency fully takes into account any operational program submitted to it by Kazakhstan in accordance with paragraph (b) of Article 63. In addition, whenever practicable, on the basis of the operational program, it periodically informs Kazakhstan of its overall program of announced and unannounced inspections, indicating the general time frame within which inspections are envisaged. In carrying out any unannounced inspections, the Agency shall take all measures to minimize any practical difficulties for Kazakhstan and for the operators of the facility, taking into account the relevant provisions of Articles 43 and 88. Similarly, Kazakhstan is taking all measures to facilitate the performance of inspectors' functions.

Appointment of inspectors

Article 84

The following procedures apply to the appointment of inspectors: (a) The Director General shall inform Kazakhstan in writing of the name, qualifications, nationality, position and all other information that may be necessary for each Agency official whom he proposes to appoint as an inspector for Kazakhstan; (b) Kazakhstan shall inform the Director General within thirty days After receiving such an offer, does Kazakhstan accept this offer?; (c) The Director General may appoint any official accepted by Kazakhstan as one of the inspectors for Kazakhstan and inform Kazakhstan of such appointments; and (d) The Director General, acting at the request of Kazakhstan or on his own initiative, shall immediately inform Kazakhstan of the cancellation of the appointment of any official as an inspector for Kazakhstan. However, with respect to inspectors required for the activities provided for in Article 47 and for carrying out inspections for special purposes in accordance with paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article 70, the appointment procedures shall be completed, if possible, within thirty days after the entry into force of this Agreement. If such an appointment proves impossible within this period, inspectors for such purposes are appointed on a temporary basis.

Article 85

Kazakhstan, when required, issues or renews appropriate visas to each inspector assigned to Kazakhstan as soon as possible.

Conduct of inspectors and their visits to installations

Article 86

Inspectors, in carrying out their functions provided for in Articles 47 and 70-74, shall carry out their activities in such a way as not to interfere with or delay the construction, commissioning or operation of installations or to affect their safety. In particular, inspectors do not manage any installation themselves and do not direct installation personnel during any operation. If the inspectors consider that, in accordance with Articles 73 and 74, certain operations on the installation must be performed by the operator, they request this.

Article 87

If inspectors require services available in Kazakhstan in connection with inspections, including the use of equipment, Kazakhstan provides assistance in obtaining such services and in the use of such equipment by inspectors.

Article 88

Kazakhstan has the right to send its representatives to accompany inspectors during their inspections, provided that this does not lead to delays or interfere in any other way with the performance of their functions by inspectors.

STATEMENTS ABOUT THE AGENCY'S VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES

Article 89

The Agency shall inform Kazakhstan of: (a) the results of the inspections within the time limits to be specified in the Supplementary Regulations; and (b) the conclusions it has reached as a result of its verification activities in Kazakhstan, in particular through statements regarding each material balance zone, which should be made as soon as possible after the Agency has determined and verified the actual the available amount of material and the balance of the material.

INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTS

Article 90

General provisions

Nuclear material that is subject to safeguards or that should be subject to safeguards in accordance with this Agreement, transferred internationally, shall be considered for the purposes of this Agreement as being under the responsibility of Kazakhstan: (a) In the case of importation into Kazakhstan, from the moment when such responsibility is lifted from the sending State, but not later than the moment the material arrives in destination; and (b) in the case of exports from Kazakhstan, up to the time when the recipient State assumes such responsibility, but not later than the time of arrival of the nuclear material at the destination. The moment of transfer of responsibility is determined in the relevant agreements to be reached between the States concerned. Neither Kazakhstan nor any other State is considered to have such responsibility for nuclear material on the sole ground that this nuclear material is being transported in transit through or over its territory, or is being transported on ships flying its flag or on its aircraft.

Transfers from Kazakhstan

Article 91

(a) Kazakhstan shall notify the Agency of any proposed transfer from Kazakhstan of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement if the quantity being shipped exceeds one effective kilogram or if several shipments of nuclear material are made to the same State within three months, each of which is less than one effective kilogram, but the total amount of material in which it exceeds one effective kilogram. (b) Such notification is sent to the Agency after the conclusion of the transfer contract and usually at least two weeks before the nuclear material is ready for shipment. (c) Kazakhstan and the Agency may agree on various pre-notification procedures. d) The notification shall specify: (i) the identification and, if possible, the estimated quantity and composition of the transferred nuclear material, as well as the material balance zone from which it originates; (ii) the State to which the nuclear material is being sent; (iii) The dates and locations where the nuclear material is prepared for shipment; (iv) the approximate dates of dispatch and arrival of the nuclear material; and (v) the point in the transfer process at which the recipient State assumes responsibility for the nuclear material for the purposes of this Agreement, and the probable date of that moment.

Article 92

The notification referred to in Article 91 should enable the Agency, if necessary, to conduct an inspection for special purposes in order to identify and, if possible, verify the quantity and composition of nuclear material prior to its transfer from Kazakhstan and, if the Agency so desires or Kazakhstan so requests, to seal the nuclear material when it is ready for shipment.. However, the transfer of nuclear material should in no way be delayed by any action taken or planned by the Agency in accordance with such notification.

Article 93

If the nuclear material is not subject to Agency safeguards in the recipient State, Kazakhstan shall take measures to obtain confirmation of transfer by the Agency from the recipient State within three months from the moment when the recipient State accepts responsibility for the nuclear material from Kazakhstan.

Transfers to Kazakhstan

Article 94

(a) Kazakhstan shall notify the Agency of each proposed transfer to Kazakhstan of nuclear material that should be subject to safeguards in accordance with this Agreement if the quantity supplied exceeds one effective kilogram or if several separate shipments of material are to be received from the same State within three months, the quantity of which in each case is less than one an effective kilogram, but the total amount of which exceeds one effective kilogram. (b) The Agency shall be notified as far in advance as possible of the expected arrival of nuclear material and in any case no later than the date on which Kazakhstan assumes responsibility for the nuclear material. (c) Kazakhstan and the Agency may agree on various pre-notification procedures. d) The notification shall specify: (i) The identification and, if possible, the estimated quantity and composition of the nuclear material; (ii) the time during the transfer process at which Kazakhstan assumes responsibility for the nuclear material for the purposes of this Agreement, and the probable date of that time; and (iii) the estimated date of arrival, the location to which the nuclear material is to be delivered, and the estimated date of unpacking of the nuclear material.

Article 95

The notification referred to in Article 94 should enable the Agency, if necessary, to conduct an inspection for special purposes in order to identify and, if possible, verify the quantity and composition of nuclear material during unpacking. However, unpacking should not be delayed by any actions taken or planned by the Agency in accordance with such notification.

Article 96

Special reports

Kazakhstan shall prepare a special report, as provided for in Article 67, if any unusual incident or circumstances, including the occurrence of a long delay in international transfer, lead Kazakhstan to believe that there has been or could have been a loss of nuclear material.

DEFINITIONS

Article 97

For the purposes of this Agreement: A. Clarification means an entry in an accounting document or report showing a discrepancy in the data of the sender and recipient or the amount of unaccounted material. B. Annual capacity means, for the purposes of Articles 78 and 79, the amount of nuclear material released annually from a facility operating at rated capacity. C. Batch means a part of nuclear material used as a unit of measurement for accounting purposes at a key measurement point, the composition and quantity of which are determined by a single set of specifications or measurements. Nuclear material can be in bulk form or contained in a number of separate items. D. These batches mean the total mass of each element of the nuclear material, and for plutonium and uranium, the isotopic composition, when necessary. The units for accounting purposes will be: (a) grams of plutonium contained; (b) grams of total uranium and grams of uranium-235 plus uranium-233 for uranium enriched in these isotopes; and (c) kilograms of thorium, natural uranium or depleted uranium contained. For reporting purposes, the mass of individual items in a batch is summed up before rounding to the nearest unit. E. The registered inventory quantity of the material balance zone means the algebraic sum of the actual available quantity of material in this material balance zone according to the most recent definition and all changes in inventory quantities of material that have occurred since this determination of the actual quantity of material. F. Correction means an entry in an accounting document or report in order to correct a discovered error or reflect an improved measurement of the amount of nuclear material previously included in this accounting document or report. Each correction must indicate the record to which it relates. G. Effective kilogram means a special unit used in the implementation of safeguards for nuclear material. The amount of nuclear material in effective kilograms is determined by: a) for plutonium, its mass in kilograms; (b) For uranium with an enrichment of 0.01 (1%) and above, its mass in kilograms multiplied by the square of its enrichment; (c) for uranium with an enrichment below 0.01 (1%) and above 0.005 (0.5%), its mass in kilograms multiplied by 0.0001; and (d) for depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5%) or lower and for thorium - their weights in kilograms multiplied by 0.00005. H. Enrichment means the ratio of the combined mass of the isotopes uranium-233 and uranium-235 to the mass of the total uranium in question. I. Installation means: (a) a reactor, a critical facility, a processing plant, a manufacturing plant, a reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant, or a separate warehouse; or (b) any other place where nuclear material in quantities exceeding one effective kilogram is commonly used. J. A change in the inventory quantity of material means an increase or decrease in the quantity of nuclear material in the material balance zone, expressed in batches; such a change will include one of the following: (a) an increase in: (i) Imports; (ii) Domestic receipts: receipts from other material balance zones, receipts from non-guaranteed (non-peaceful) activities, or receipts at the initial point of application of safeguards; (iii) nuclear production: production of special fissile material in a reactor; and (iv) resumption: resumption of safeguards for nuclear material previously released guarantees in connection with its use or quantity; b) reduction of: i) export; (ii) Domestic shipments: shipments to other material balance zones or shipments for non-guaranteed (non-peaceful) activities; (iii) Nuclear loss: a decrease in the amount of nuclear material due to its transformation into another element(s) or isotope(s) as a result of nuclear reactions; (iv) Measured irretrievable losses: nuclear material that has been measured or determined based on measurements and has been disposed of in such a way that its further nuclear use becomes impossible.; (v) Retained waste: nuclear material obtained during processing or as a result of an accident during operation, which is currently considered unregenerated but stored; (vi) Exemption: exemption of nuclear material from safeguards due to its use or quantity; and (vii) other losses: for example, accidental losses (i.e.E. irreparable and unintended loss of nuclear material as a result of an accident during operation) or theft. To. A key measurement point means a place where the nuclear material is in such a form that it can be measured to determine the flow of material or inventory quantity of material. Key measurement points thus include (but are not limited to) material inputs and outputs (including measured irretrievable losses) and storage areas in the material balance zones. L. A man-year of inspections for the purposes of Article 79 means 300 man-days of inspection, with a man-day of inspection meaning a day during which one inspector has access to the installation at any time with a total stay of no more than eight hours. M. Material balance zone means an area in or outside the facility where: (a) The amount of nuclear material can be determined each time it is moved into or out of the material balance zone; and (b) The actual amount of material available in each material balance zone may, if necessary, be determined in accordance with established procedures so that a material balance can be established for Agency safeguards purposes. N. The amount of unaccounted-for material means the difference between the registered inventory amount of material and the actual amount of material available. A. Nuclear material means any source or any special fissionable material as defined in Article XX of the Charter. The term "source material" is not interpreted to include ore or ore waste. Any determination by the Board of Governors in accordance with Article XX of the Charter after the entry into force of this Agreement, which will contain an addition to the list of materials considered as source or special fissionable materials, shall enter into force in accordance with this Agreement only after its acceptance by Kazakhstan. R. In fact, the amount of material available means the sum of all measured or estimated quantities of nuclear material in batches actually available at a given time in the material balance zone, obtained in accordance with established procedures. Q. A discrepancy in sender and recipient data means a discrepancy between the amount of nuclear material in a shipment reported by the sending material balance zone and measured by the receiving material balance zone. R. Baseline data means data recorded during measurement or calibration or used to derive empirical ratios that identify nuclear material and show batch data. The initial data may include, for example, the mass of the compounds, the conversion coefficient for determining the mass of the element, the specific gravity, the concentration of the element, isotopic ratios, the ratio between volume and pressure gauge readings, and the ratio between plutonium produced and energy generated. S. A key location means a location selected during the study of design information, where, under normal conditions and in combination with information obtained from all key locations combined, information necessary and sufficient for the implementation of safeguards measures is obtained and verified; a key location may include any location where key measurements related to materiel are carried out.-balance sheet accounting, and where conservation and surveillance measures are implemented.

DONE in Almaty, July 26, 1994, in two copies in English and Russian, both texts being equally authentic.

For THE REPUBLIC FOR THE INTERNATIONAL AGENCY KAZAKHSTAN : ON ATOMIC ENERGY :

I hereby certify the accuracy of this copy of the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency on the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed in Almaty on July 26, 1994.

Head of the International Law Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan

THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as "Parties to the Treaty", taking into account the devastating consequences that a nuclear war would have for all mankind and the resulting need to make every effort to prevent the risk of such a war and take measures to ensure the security of peoples, considering that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the risk of nuclear war, in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, Calling for the conclusion of an agreement to prevent the wider proliferation of nuclear weapons, committing themselves to cooperate in order to facilitate the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards for peaceful nuclear activities, expressing their support for research, improvement and other efforts, aimed at facilitating the application, within the framework of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of the principle of effective safeguards for the movement of source and special fissionable materials through the use of instruments and other technical methods in certain key locations, reaffirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products that may be obtained by States with nuclear weapons, from the development of nuclear explosive devices, They should be accessible for peaceful purposes to all States parties to the Treaty, both possessing and not possessing nuclear weapons, being convinced that, in implementing this principle, all Parties to this Treaty have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for the further development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy and to contribute to this development. individually or in cooperation with other States, Declaring its intention to achieve the cessation of the nuclear arms race as soon as possible and to take effective measures towards nuclear disarmament, urging the cooperation of all States in achieving this goal, recalling the determination expressed by the parties to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. In its preamble, to strive to achieve a permanent cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and to continue negotiations to that end, seeking to help ease international tensions and build confidence among States in order to help achieve the cessation of nuclear weapons production, the destruction of all existing stocks of nuclear weapons and the exclusion of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery from national arsenals in accordance with The Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under Strict and effective international control, Recalling, That, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States should refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security should be promoted with the least distraction to world human forces and economic resources for the armament business, have agreed on the following:

ARTICLE I

Each of the nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to anyone nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as control over such weapons or explosive devices, either directly or indirectly; as well as not to assist, encourage or encourage any State in any way. non-nuclear-weapon States to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as control over such weapons or explosive devices.

ARTICLE II

Each of the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty undertakes not to accept transfers of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices from anyone, as well as control over such weapons or explosive devices, either directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other materials in any other way. nuclear explosive devices, as well as not to seek or accept any assistance in the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

1. Each of the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty undertakes to accept guarantees, as set out in the agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, solely for the purpose of verifying the fulfillment of its obligations assumed in accordance with this Treaty, in order to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The safeguards procedures required by this article are carried out with respect to source or special fissionable material, regardless of whether it is produced, processed, or used in any major nuclear installation or located outside any such installation. The safeguards required by this article apply to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such a State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere. 2. Each of the States Parties to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material or (b) equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless this source or special fissionable material is subject to guarantees required by this article. 3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in such a way as to comply with article IV of this Treaty and avoid creating obstacles to the economic or technological development of the Parties to the Treaty or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of the application of guarantees set out in the preamble of the Treaty. 4. Non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency in order to comply with the requirements of this article either individually or jointly with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiations on such agreements shall begin within 180 days of the initial entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after a period of 180 days, negotiations on such agreements shall begin no later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force no later than eighteen months from the date of commencement of negotiations.

ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in accordance with articles I and II of this Treaty. 2. All Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, scientific and technical information on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and have the right to participate in such exchange. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in promoting, individually or jointly with other States or international organizations, the further development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, with due regard to the needs of developing areas of the world.

ARTICLE V

Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international supervision and through appropriate international procedures, the potential benefits of any peaceful use of nuclear explosions are available to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis, and that the cost of the explosive devices used The cost of devices for such Parties to the Agreement was as low as possible., and it did not include the costs of their research and improvement. The non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty will be able to receive such benefits in accordance with a special international agreement or agreements through an appropriate international body in which non-nuclear-weapon States are duly represented. Negotiations on this issue will begin as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Treaty. Non-nuclear weapon States Parties to this Treaty that wish to do so may also receive such benefits in accordance with bilateral agreements.

ARTICLE VI

Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to negotiate in good faith effective measures to end the nuclear arms race in the near future and nuclear disarmament, as well as a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

ARTICLE VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties to ensure the complete absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

ARTICLE VIII

1. Any Party to this Agreement may propose amendments to this Agreement. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the depositary Governments, which shall send it to all Parties to the Treaty. Then, if requested by one third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the depositary Governments shall convene a conference to which they shall invite all Parties to the Treaty to consider such an amendment. 2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority vote of all Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty and all other Parties to the Treaty that are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency as of the date of sending such an amendment. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party to the Treaty depositing its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all Parties to the Treaty, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty and all other Parties to the Treaty that are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the date of dispatch. this amendment. Subsequently, it shall enter into force for any Party to the Treaty upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment. 3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of the Parties to the Treaty shall be convened in Geneva (Switzerland) to review how this Treaty operates in order to ensure that the objectives set out in the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being implemented. After each subsequent five years, the majority of the Parties to the Treaty may, by submitting a proposal to this end to the depositary Governments, arrange for the convening of further conferences with the same purpose of reviewing how the Treaty operates.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty is open for signature by all States. Any State that does not sign the Treaty before it enters into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time. 2. This Treaty is subject to ratification by the signatory States. The instruments of ratification and accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated as the depositary Governments. 3. This Treaty shall enter into force upon its ratification by the States whose Governments have been designated as depositaries of the Treaty and by 40 other signatory States and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is a State that produced and detonated a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device before January 1, 1967. 4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. 5. The depositary Governments shall immediately notify all signatory and acceding States from the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession, the date of entry into force of this Treaty, the date of receipt of any requests to convene a conference, as well as other notifications. 6. This Treaty must be registered by the depositary Governments in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE X

1. Each Party to this Treaty, in the exercise of its State sovereignty, has the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that exceptional circumstances related to the content of this Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. He shall notify all Parties to the Treaty and the United Nations Security Council of such withdrawal three months in advance. Such notification must contain a statement about the exceptional circumstances that he considers to have jeopardized his supreme interests. 2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference is convened to decide whether the Treaty should remain in force indefinitely or whether the Treaty should be extended for an additional specified period or periods of time. This decision is made by the majority of the Parties to the Agreement.

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty, of which the Chinese, English, Russian, French, Spanish and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the signatories below, duly authorized thereto, have signed this Agreement. DONE in triplicate in the cities of Washington, London, and Moscow on the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND: FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: FOR NEPAL: FOR THE REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA: FOR ICELAND: FOR AFGHANISTAN: FOR LAOS: FOR FINLAND: FOR TUNISIA: FOR IRELAND: FOR THE PHILIPPINES: FOR AUSTRIA: FOR THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: FOR GHANA: FOR SAN MARINO: FOR HAITI: FOR CYPRUS: FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA: FOR MOROCCO: FOR BOTSWANA: FOR PARAGUAY: FOR IRAN: FOR GREECE: FOR THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA: FOR HUNGARY: FOR COLOMBIA: FOR NEW ZEALAND: FOR ROMANIA: FOR LIBERIA: FOR EL SALVADOR: FOR PANAMA: FOR NORWAY: BEYOND JORDAN: FOR BOLIVIA: FOR MAURITIUS: FOR DENMARK: FOR SENEGAL: FOR CZECHOSLOVAKIA: FOR LEBANON: FOR POLAND: FOR NIGERIA: FOR BULGARIA: FOR VENEZUELA: FOR NICARAGUA: FOR PERU: FOR COSTA RICA: FOR THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM: FOR URUGUAY: FOR CEYLON: BECAUSE OF THAT: FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA: FOR KENYA: FOR BARBADOS: BEYOND THE IVORY COAST: FOR HUNGARY: FOR DAHOMEY: FOR LESOTHO: FOR ECUADOR: FOR YUGOSLAVIA: FOR CAMEROON: FOR LIBYA: FOR THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: FOR CANADA: FOR MEXICO: FOR GUATEMALA: FOR LUXEMBOURG: FOR KUWAIT: FOR SWEDEN: FOR BELGIUM: FOR THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS: FOR TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: FOR THE MALGASIAN REPUBLIC: FOR ETHIOPIA: FOR THE MALDIVES: FOR THE GAMBIA: FOR THE UPPER VOLTA: FOR ITALY: FOR TURKEY: FOR JAMAICA: FOR MALTA: FOR MALI: FOR SWITZERLAND: FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: FOR JAPAN: FOR SINGAPORE: FOR AUSTRALIA: FOR INDONESIA:

I hereby certify that this text is a true copy of the certified copy of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons signed in Washington, London and Moscow on July 1, 1968.

Head of the International Law Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan

The RCPI's note. The text of the Additional Protocol and Agreement in Russian is duplicated in English (see the paper version).

President

Republic of Kazakhstan

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