On Ratification of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

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Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated March 19, 2011 No. 416-IV

To ratify the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted in Vienna on July 8, 2005.

President  Of the Republic of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev

Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

1. The name of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted on October 26, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the "Convention"), is replaced by the following name:

CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS

2. The preamble of the Convention is replaced by the text given below:

THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS CONVENTION

RECOGNIZING the right of all States to develop and use atomic energy for peaceful purposes and their legitimate interest in obtaining possible benefits from the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, CONVINCED of the need to promote international cooperation and transfer of nuclear technology for the peaceful uses of atomic energy, BEARING IN MIND that physical protection is vital importance for public health, safety, the environment, and national and international security, BEARING IN MIND the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as the promotion of good-neighbourly and friendly relations and cooperation among States, BEARING in MIND that, in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, "all Members of the United Nations shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force as against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other way, incompatible with the purposes of the United Nations," RECALLING the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, contained in the annex to General Assembly resolution 49/60 of 9 December 1994, DESIRING to prevent the potential danger resulting from illicit trafficking, illegal seizure and use of nuclear material and sabotage of nuclear material and nuclear installations, and noting that physical Protection against such actions has become a matter of increased concern at the national and international levels, DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT the worldwide escalation of acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, as well as the threats posed by international terrorism and organized crime, BELIEVING that physical protection plays an important role in supporting the goals of nuclear non-proliferation and countering terrorism, DESIRING through this Convention to contribute to strengthening worldwide the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear installations, used for peaceful purposes, BEING CONVINCED THAT, That offences relating to nuclear material and nuclear installations are a matter of serious concern and that there is an urgent need to take appropriate and effective measures or to strengthen existing measures aimed at preventing, detecting and punishing such offences, DESIRING to further strengthen international cooperation with a view to implementing, in accordance with the national legislation of each Participating State and with this Convention, effective measures for the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear installations, CONVINCED that this Convention should complement the safe use, storage and transportation of nuclear material, as well as the safe operation of nuclear installations, RECOGNIZING that there are internationally formulated recommendations on physical protection, which are updated periodically and which can serve as guidance on modern means of achieving effective levels of physical protection, RECOGNIZING also, ensuring effective physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear installations, being used for military purposes is the responsibility of the State in possession of such nuclear material and such nuclear facilities, and understanding that such material and such facilities are and will continue to be under strict physical protection, HAVE AGREED as follows:

3. In article 1 of the Convention, after paragraph (c), two new paragraphs are added below: (d) "nuclear installation" means an installation (including related buildings and equipment) where the production, processing, use, processing, storage or burial of nuclear material is carried out, if damage to or interference with the operation of such an installation may lead to significant radiation exposure or significant release of radioactive materials. (e) "Sabotage" means any deliberate act against a nuclear installation or nuclear material during its use, storage or transportation that may directly or indirectly endanger the health and safety of personnel, the public or the environment as a result of radiation exposure or the release of radioactive substances; 4. A new article 1 (A) is added after article 1 of the Convention.:

Article 1 A

The objectives of this Convention are to achieve and maintain worldwide an effective level of physical protection of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes and nuclear installations used for peaceful purposes; to prevent and combat offences related to such material and installations worldwide; and to promote cooperation between Member States.participants in achieving these goals. 5. Article 2 of the Convention is replaced by the text given below: 1. This Convention applies to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes, in use, storage and transportation, and to nuclear installations used for peaceful purposes, provided, however, that articles 3 and 4 and paragraph 4 of article 5 of this Convention apply only to such nuclear material in the process of international transportation of nuclear material. 2. The responsibility for establishing, implementing and maintaining a physical protection regime within a participating State lies entirely with that State. 3. Apart from the obligations expressly assumed by the States Parties under this Convention, nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as affecting the sovereign rights of a State. 4. (a) Nothing in this Convention affects the other rights, obligations and responsibilities of States Parties under international law, in particular in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international humanitarian law. (b) The actions of armed forces during an armed conflict, as these terms are understood in international humanitarian law, which are governed by this law, are not governed by this Convention, nor are the actions taken by the military forces of a State in the exercise of their official functions governed by it, insofar as they are governed by other norms of international law. (c) Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as legitimately authorizing the use or threat of use of force against nuclear material or nuclear installations used for peaceful purposes. (d) Nothing in this Convention exempts from liability for otherwise unlawful acts or makes them lawful or prevents them from being held accountable on the basis of other legal acts. 5. This Convention does not apply to nuclear material used or stored for military purposes, or to a nuclear installation containing such material. 6. A new article 2 (A) is added after article 2 of the Convention.:

Article 2 A

1. Each State Party shall establish, implement and maintain an appropriate physical protection regime applicable to nuclear material and nuclear facilities under its jurisdiction in order to: (a) protect against theft and other illegal seizure of nuclear material during its use, storage and transportation; (b) ensure the implementation of prompt and comprehensive measures to the discovery and, where appropriate, the return of missing or stolen nuclear material; when material is found outside its territory, that State Party shall act in accordance with article 5; (c) Protecting nuclear material and nuclear installations from sabotage; and (d) mitigating or minimizing the radiological effects of sabotage. 2. In implementing the provisions of paragraph 1, each State Party shall: (a) establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework for the management of physical protection; (b) establish or designate a competent authority or competent authorities, which (e) is responsible for the implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework.; and (c) Take other appropriate measures necessary for the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear installations. 3. In fulfilling the obligations under paragraphs 1 and 2, each State Party, without prejudice to any other provisions of this Convention, shall apply, to the extent justified and practicable, the following Fundamental Principles of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Installations.  THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF A: State responsibility Responsibility for the creation, introduction and maintenance of a physical protection regime within a State lies entirely with that State.  THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE IN: Liability during international transportation The responsibility of a State to ensure that nuclear material is sufficiently protected extends to its international transportation until such time as this responsibility is properly transferred to another State, as appropriate.  THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE WITH: Legislative and regulatory framework The State is responsible for creating and maintaining a legislative and regulatory framework for the organization of physical protection management. This framework should establish applicable physical protection requirements and include an assessment and licensing system or other procedures for issuing permits. This framework should include an inspection system for nuclear installations and vehicles to verify compliance with applicable requirements and conditions of a license or other authorizing document, as well as establish a mechanism to ensure compliance with applicable requirements and conditions, including effective sanctions.  THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF D: Competent authority The State should establish or designate a competent authority that is responsible for implementing the legislative and regulatory framework and has the appropriate authority, competence and financial and human resources to carry out its assigned duties. The State should take steps to ensure effective independence between the functions of the competent authority of the State and those of any other authority dealing with the promotion of the application or use of nuclear energy.  THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF E: Responsibility of license holders Responsibilities for the implementation of various elements of physical protection in the State should be clearly defined. The State should ensure that the primary responsibility for the physical protection of nuclear material or nuclear installations lies with holders of appropriate licenses or other authorizing documents (for example, operators or shippers).  THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF F: Safety culture All organizations involved in the implementation of physical protection should pay due attention to the safety culture, its development and maintenance as necessary factors for its effective implementation throughout the organization.  THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF G: Threat The State's physical protection system should be based on the current threat assessment conducted by the State.  THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF H: A differentiated approach Physical protection requirements should be based on a differentiated approach, taking into account the results of the current threat assessment, the relative attractiveness, the nature of the material, and the possible consequences associated with unauthorized removal of nuclear material and sabotage against nuclear material or nuclear installations.  FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE I: Deep-layered protection The State's requirements for physical protection should reflect the concept of several levels and methods of protection (structural or other engineering, personnel and organizational) that the violator needs to overcome or circumvent in order to achieve his goals.  THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF J: Quality assurance Quality assurance policies and programs should be established and implemented to ensure that the requirements defined for all activities that are important from the point of view of physical protection are met.  BASIC PRINCIPLE K: Contingency Plans In order to respond to unauthorized seizure of nuclear material or sabotage of nuclear installations or nuclear material, or attempts to do so, all relevant licensees and competent authorities should prepare and properly implement contingency plans (contingency plans).  THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF L: Confidentiality The State should establish requirements for protecting the confidentiality of information, the unauthorized disclosure of which could jeopardize the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear installations. 4. (a) The provisions of this article shall not apply to any nuclear material to which, in accordance with a reasoned decision by a State Party, it is not necessary to extend the physical protection regime established in accordance with paragraph 1, taking into account the nature of the material, its quantity and relative attractiveness and the potential radiological and other consequences associated with any unauthorized the action taken in relation to this material, as well as the current threat assessment in relation to it. (b) Nuclear material that is not subject to the provisions of this article in accordance with subparagraph (a) should be protected in accordance with sound management practices.

7. Article 5 of the Convention is replaced by the text given below:

1. The Participating States shall determine their point of contact on matters falling within the scope of this Convention and inform each other about it directly or with the assistance of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 2. In the event of theft, seizure by robbery or any other illegal seizure of nuclear material, or a real threat of such actions, the Participating States, in accordance with their national legislation, shall provide the maximum possible cooperation and assistance in the return and protection of such material to any State that so requests. In particular: (a) The State Party shall take appropriate steps to inform, as soon as possible, other States that it considers to be affected of any theft, seizure by robbery or other illegal seizure of nuclear material or a real threat of such acts, as well as to inform, where appropriate, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations; (b) In doing so, as appropriate, the Participating States concerned shall exchange information with each other, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations in order to ensure the protection of endangered nuclear material, verify the integrity of a shipping container, or return illegally seized nuclear material, and: (i) Coordinate their efforts on diplomatic and other matters. (ii) Provide assistance, if requested.; (iii) Ensure the return of recovered nuclear material stolen or lost as a result of the above-mentioned events.

The means of such cooperation shall be determined by the Participating States concerned. 3. In the event of a real threat of sabotage with respect to nuclear material or a nuclear installation, or in the event of sabotage with respect to them, the Participating States, to the maximum extent possible, in accordance with their national legislation and in compliance with their relevant international legal obligations, shall cooperate as follows: (a) If a State Party is aware of a real threat of sabotage with respect to nuclear material or a nuclear installation in another State, it shall decide on appropriate measures to, to inform this State as quickly as possible about this threat, as well as, when necessary, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations in order to prevent sabotage.; (b) In the event of sabotage of nuclear material or a nuclear installation in a State Party and if, in its opinion, other States are likely to be exposed to radiological effects, it shall, without prejudice to its other obligations under international law, take appropriate measures to inform the State or States that may, as soon as possible, to be exposed to radiological effects, and to inform when necessary, The International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations in order to minimize or mitigate its radiological effects; (c) If, in the context of the provisions of subparagraphs (a) and (b), a State Party requests assistance, each State Party to which assistance is requested shall promptly decide and inform the requesting State Party, directly or with the assistance of the International Atomic Energy Agency, whether it is in a position to provide the requested assistance; as well as the scope and conditions of assistance that can be provided.; (d) Coordination of cooperation concerning the provisions of subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) shall be carried out through diplomatic and other agreed channels. The ways of implementing such cooperation are determined by the interested participating States on a bilateral or multilateral basis. 4. The Participating States shall cooperate and consult with each other, as appropriate, directly or with the assistance of the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations, in order to obtain recommendations on the organization, operation and improvement of physical protection systems for nuclear material during international transportation. 5. A State Party may, as appropriate, consult and cooperate with other States Parties, directly or with the assistance of the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations, in order to obtain their recommendations on the organization, operation and improvement of its national system of physical protection of nuclear material during its use, storage and transportation within the State, as well as nuclear installations.

8. Article 6 of the Convention is replaced by the text given below:

1. States Parties shall take appropriate measures consistent with their national legislation to protect any information that they receive from another State Party confidentially by virtue of the provisions of this Convention or as a result of participation in activities carried out to implement this Convention. If States parties provide information to international organizations or States that are not parties to the Convention confidentially, measures shall be taken to ensure the protection of such information. A State Party that has received confidential information from another State Party may provide such information to third parties only with the consent of such other State Party. 2. Under the terms of this Convention, States Parties are not required to provide any information that they are not authorized to disseminate under national law or that could endanger the security of the State concerned or the physical protection of nuclear material or nuclear installations.

9. Paragraph 1 of article 7 of the Convention is replaced by the text given below: 1. Intentional commission of: (a) Without the permission of the competent authorities, an act constituting the receipt, possession, use, transfer, modification, destruction or dispersion of nuclear material, which entails or may result in the death of any person or cause serious injury to him, or cause significant damage to property or the environment; (b) theft of nuclear material or its capture by robbery; c) misappropriation or receipt of nuclear material by deception; (d) An act that constitutes the transfer, transfer or transfer of nuclear material to or from a State without the authorization of competent authorities; (e) An act directed against a nuclear installation or an act that constitutes interference with the operation of a nuclear installation, when the offender intentionally causes or knows that this act is likely to cause death or serious injury to any person or significant damage to property or the environment as a result of exposure or release of radioactive substances, if this act does not It is carried out in accordance with the national legislation of the State Party in whose territory the nuclear installation is located.; (f) An action that constitutes a demand by threat or use of force or any other form of intimidation for the release of nuclear material; g) Threats: (i) To use nuclear material with the aim of causing death or serious injury to any person, or causing substantial damage to property or the environment, or to commit an offence referred to in subparagraph (e), or (ii) to commit an offence referred to in subparagraphs (b) and (e) in order to force a natural or legal person, an international organization, an organization or a State to commit or refrain from any action; h) attempts to commit any of the offences referred to in subparagraphs (a)-(e); (i) An act that constitutes complicity in any of the offences referred to in subparagraphs (a) to (h); (j) an act by any person who organizes or directs others to commit any of the offences referred to in subparagraphs (a) to (h); and (k) an act that facilitates the commission of any of the offences referred to in subparagraphs (a) to (h) by a group of persons acting with a common purpose; such an action is intentional and is being committed.: (i) Either for the purpose of supporting the criminal activities or criminal objectives of this group, when such activities or objectives involve the commission of one of the offences referred to in subparagraphs (a) to (g), (ii) or when aware of the intent of this group to commit one of the offences referred to in subparagraphs (a) to (g);

It is an offence punishable by each State Party within the framework of its national legislation.

10. After article 11 of the Convention, the following two new articles are added, article 11 A and article 11 B:

Article 11 A

None of the offences referred to in article 7 shall be considered, for the purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance, as a political offence or an offence related to a political offence or an offence committed for political reasons. As a result, a request for extradition or mutual legal assistance related to such an offence cannot be rejected solely on the grounds that it concerns a political offence or an offence related to a political offence or an offence committed for political reasons.

Article 11 In

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to extradite a person or provide mutual legal assistance if the requested State Party has reasonable grounds to believe that the request for extradition in connection with the offences referred to in article 7 or for mutual legal assistance in respect of such offences is intended to prosecute or punish that person. persons because of their race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political beliefs, or that granting this request would prejudice the position of that person for any of these reasons.

11. A new article 13 A is added after article 13 of the Convention:

Article 13 A

Nothing in this Convention affects the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, which is carried out in the interests of strengthening the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear installations.

12. Paragraph 3 of article 14 of the Convention is replaced by the text given below: 3. If the offence concerns nuclear material during its use, storage or transportation within the State, and the alleged offender and the nuclear material remain in the territory of the State Party in which the offence was committed, or if the offence concerns a nuclear installation and the alleged offender remains in the territory of the State Party in which the offence was committed, Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as requiring a State Party to provide information regarding criminal proceedings in connection with such an offence. 13. Article 16 of the Convention is replaced by the text given below: 1. Upon the expiration of five years from the date of entry into force of the Amendment adopted on July 8, 2005, the depositary shall convene a conference of the States Parties to review the implementation of this Convention and the compliance of its preamble, all operational parts and annexes with the requirements of the existing situation at that time. 2. Thereafter, no more than once every five years, the majority of the Participating States may convene subsequent conferences for the same purpose by submitting a corresponding proposal to the depositary. 14. Footnote b/ of Annex II of the Convention is replaced by the following text:  b/ Material not irradiated in the reactor, or material irradiated in the reactor, but with a radiation level equal to or less than 1 gray /h (100 rad /h) at a distance of one meter without protection (biological). 15. The footnote e/ of Annex II of the Convention is replaced by the following text:  e/ Other fuels that were classified into categories I and II before irradiation due to the initial composition of fissile isotopes may be reduced by one category if the fuel's radiation level exceeds 1 gray/h (100 rad/h) at a distance of one meter without biological protection.

CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL AMENDMENT

On behalf of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as the depositary of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Convention), adopted on October 26, 1979, I hereby certify that the attached document is an authentic and complete copy of the Amendment to the Convention. The attached Amendment was adopted in Vienna on July 8, 2005, at a Conference to Review and Adopt Proposed Amendments to the Convention, which was held at the IAEA Headquarters from July 4 to July 8, 2005.

Johann Rautenbach

Director of the Bureau of Legal Affairs

for THE CEO

May 27, 2008

I hereby certify that this text is a certified copy of the certified copy of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted on July 8, 2005 in Geneva.

Head of the International Law Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan B. Piskorsky

The RCPI's note. The following are the texts of the Convention and Protocol in English, Arabic, Chinese and French.

President

Republic of Kazakhstan

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