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Home / Report / Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin*, dated 4 February 2009, No. A/HRC/10/3

Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin*, dated 4 February 2009, No. A/HRC/10/3

АMANAT партиясы және Заң және Құқық адвокаттық кеңсесінің серіктестігі аясында елге тегін заң көмегі көрсетілді

Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin*, dated 4 February 2009, No. A/HRC/10/3

United Nations General Assembly

Human Rights Council

Tenth session

Agenda item 3

\* The document was submitted late.

Summary

Following the introduction in chapter I of the present report, the main activities of the Special Rapporteur during the period from 17 December 2007 to 31 December 2008 are described. The main part of the report (chapter II) sets out some of the concerns of the Special Rapporteur regarding the role of intelligence services in countering terrorism.

Section A emphasizes the need to establish a specific and comprehensive legislative framework governing the broad powers granted to intelligence services following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The collection of data through the interception of electromagnetic communications and the exchange of such data have given rise to a number of violations of the right to privacy and the principle of non-discrimination, while “human intelligence collection” — the collection of data through direct contacts — has even resulted in violations of peremptory norms, such as the prohibition of torture and other forms of inhuman treatment.

Available information gives grounds for suggesting that the absence of oversight and political and legal accountability contributes to unlawful conduct by intelligence services. This issue is raised throughout the report, while in section B of chapter II the Special Rapporteur specifically examines the problems arising in this context as a result of the expansion of cooperation between intelligence services. He clarifies the human rights obligations of States in situations where their intelligence services conduct joint operations, participate in interrogations, and send or receive intelligence information for operational purposes.

In some cases, intelligence services may engage in unlawful conduct with the acquiescence of State officials or even pursuant to their secret instructions. In relation to such cases, the Special Rapporteur examines best practices employed by oversight bodies in different countries. In section C, he emphasizes that provisions of national legislation concerning immunity from liability on grounds of State secrecy and the public interest do not relieve States of their positive obligations, under human rights standards, to conduct independent investigations into gross human rights violations and to provide persons affected by such violations with effective remedies.

The concluding section contains recommendations addressed to various key actors (intelligence services, national legislatures, executive authorities and the United Nations), aimed at increasing the accountability of intelligence services for their actions in the course of countering terrorism.

Contents

Introduction

I. Activities of the Special Rapporteur.

II. The role of intelligence services and oversight of their activities in countering terrorism.

A. Expansion of the powers of intelligence services and the need for ex ante accountability mechanisms.

B. Cooperation between intelligence services.

C. Ex post facto accountability and the right to effective remedies.

III. Conclusions and recommendations.

A. Conclusions.

B. Recommendations.

Introduction

1. The present report is submitted to the Human Rights Council by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism pursuant to General Assembly resolution 62/159 and Council resolution 6/28. The main part of the report describes the activities of the Special Rapporteur during the period from 1 November 2007 to 31 December 2008, while, thematically, the report is devoted to the role of intelligence services in countering terrorism and oversight of their activities. The accompanying documents include a report¹ on communications and a report on the findings of the fact-finding mission to Spain from 7 to 14 May 2008².

2. With regard to forthcoming country visits, the Special Rapporteur expects to visit Tunisia before submitting the present report. In June 2008, the Government of that country extended an invitation to him, but it did not respond to his request to indicate specific dates for such a visit. Requests for invitations were sent to Algeria, Egypt, Malaysia, Pakistan and the Philippines, which have not yet responded. The Special Rapporteur recently sent similar requests to Peru, Thailand and Chile.

¹ A/HRC/10/3/Add.1.

² A/HRC/10/3/Add.2.

I. Activities of the Special Rapporteur

3. During the period from 1 December 2007 to 31 December 2008, the Special Rapporteur undertook a number of activities in accordance with his mandate. The main aspects of those activities are set out below.

4. From 11 to 14 December 2007, the Special Rapporteur presented his reports to the sixth session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva. He held meetings with staff members of the permanent missions of Egypt, Israel, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, the United States of America and the Philippines, and participated in two parallel events: “Changing the approach to international accountability: inter-State collusion in the context of human rights violations” and “After Guantanamo: protecting human rights while countering terrorism”.

5. On 13 and 14 January 2008, within the framework of the Joint Arab-European Human Rights Dialogue, the Special Rapporteur participated in the Cairo meeting of the Working Group on National Human Rights Institutions, devoted to measures to counter terrorism. In addition, he met with representatives of the Egyptian National Council for Human Rights. On 5 March 2008, in Geneva, during a meeting with the Egyptian Minister of State for Parliamentary and Judicial Affairs, he discussed the problems faced by States in ensuring the protection of human rights when developing counter-terrorism legislation.

6. On 13 February 2008, in Brussels, the Special Rapporteur addressed a meeting of the Working Party on Human Rights of the Council of the European Union (COHOM) and held a meeting with the European Union Counter-Terrorism Coordinator.

7. On 18 February 2008, in Geneva, the Special Rapporteur met with staff members of the permanent missions of Egypt and El Salvador in Geneva.

8. On 4 March 2008, at the Danish Institute for Human Rights in Copenhagen, the Special Rapporteur delivered a lecture entitled “Human rights after 11 September — a setback or new opportunities?”

9. On 19 and 28 March 2008, respectively, the Special Rapporteur delivered public lectures on human rights and counter-terrorism in Melbourne and Sydney.

10. On 23 April 2008, the Special Rapporteur delivered a public lecture on human rights and counter-terrorism in St. Petersburg.

11. On 19 and 20 May 2008, the Special Rapporteur participated in a meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) in New York. The Special Rapporteur is a member of the Working Groups on protecting human rights while countering terrorism, supporting and giving a voice to victims of terrorism, and countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes.

12. On 5 June 2008, the Special Rapporteur participated in a teleconference with staff members of the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and submitted a written document setting out the human rights components incorporated into UNODC draft model legislative provisions on counter-terrorism.

13. From 9 to 12 June 2008, the Special Rapporteur was in Washington, where he made an informal presentation to members of Congress. The meeting was organized by the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation. He held a working meeting with representatives of the Office of the Legal Adviser of the United States Department of State, during which the legal aspects of cases considered by military commissions at Guantanamo Bay and the methods used to interrogate persons suspected of terrorism were discussed, further to his report on his mission to that country³. In addition, the Special Rapporteur participated in a panel discussion on the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, held at American University.

14. On 16 June 2008, the Special Rapporteur was in Prague, where he participated in a seminar for European and Mediterranean countries on respect for human rights while countering terrorism, in accordance with international law, jointly organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic and the European Commission during Slovenia's Presidency of the European Union (EU).

15. From 23 to 27 June 2008, the Special Rapporteur participated in the fifteenth session of the annual meeting of special procedure mandate holders. In addition, he held high-level meetings with staff members of the permanent missions of Tunisia and Thailand.

16. On 24 June 2008, in Geneva, a meeting of experts on the topic “International air law: promoting legal safeguards and protecting human rights in the context of counter-terrorism” was held under the chairmanship of the Special Rapporteur. It was organized by REDRESS with the support of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Lawyers from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the Council of Europe's Venice Commission participated in the meeting.

17. On 26 June 2008, the Special Rapporteur participated in a panel discussion organized by the International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP) at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva on the topic “Terrorism: risks and options for human rights organizations”.

18. From 14 to 18 July 2008, the Special Rapporteur held consultations in Geneva in preparation for his reports to the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council. In addition, he met with the Permanent Representative of Pakistan.

19. On 18 and 19 September 2008, the Special Rapporteur held an expert group meeting at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence, during which thematic issues relevant to his mandate were discussed. The meeting was held with financial support from the Institute for Human Rights of Åbo Akademi University, within the framework of its project to assist the Special Rapporteur in carrying out his mandate.

20. On 18 October 2008, the Special Rapporteur addressed participants at a workshop in the Norwegian Parliament on the topic “Accountability in international cooperation between intelligence services”, organized by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, the Norwegian Parliamentary Oversight Committee on Intelligence and the Centre for Human Rights of the University of Durham.

21. From 20 to 22 October 2008, the Special Rapporteur was in New York, where he presented his report (A/63/223) to the Third Committee of the General Assembly. The Special Rapporteur attended official meetings with members of the Security Council Committee concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban, the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED). He met with the Chair of the CTITF and members of two of its working groups. Under the chairmanship of the Special Rapporteur, an expert meeting was held on the basis of earlier activities concerning international air law, during which particular attention was given to the capacities of international bodies such as the CTC, CTED and ICAO to identify legal measures that could help prevent, detect and investigate the air transportation of detained persons in the context of extraordinary rendition. In addition, he met with representatives of a number of non-governmental organizations and held a press conference.

22. On 27 October 2008, within the framework of a regional seminar on respect for human rights while countering terrorism, organized by OHCHR in Amman, the Special Rapporteur chaired a meeting on the topic “The principle of legality: defining terrorism and terrorism-related offences”.

23. On 7 November 2008, the Special Rapporteur participated in an expert meeting on the topic “The impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism measures on economic, social and cultural rights”, organized by the CTITF Working Group on Protecting Human Rights.

24. On 11 and 12 November 2008, a representative of the Special Rapporteur attended a stakeholders' meeting in New York, organized by the CTITF Working Group on Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes.

³ A/HRC/6/17/Add.3.

II. The role of intelligence services and oversight of their activities in countering terrorism

25. In carrying out his mandate, the Special Rapporteur has observed that the absence of oversight and political and legal accountability contributes to unlawful conduct by intelligence services⁴. Such unlawful conduct may take place with the acquiescence of State officials or even pursuant to their secret instructions. Accordingly, the present report examines the implications for human rights of granting broader powers to intelligence services and expanding cooperation between them. An analysis will be made of the case law, legislation and practice of a number of Member States in order to clarify the scope of their human rights obligations with regard to the activities of intelligence services and to identify best practices that contribute to strengthening accountability and oversight in relation to the counter-terrorism operations of such services⁵.

A. Expansion of the powers of intelligence services and the need for ex ante accountability mechanisms

26. In general terms, the primary task of intelligence services is to identify potential threats to national security, including terrorist threats, through the secret collection of data⁶ and information from persons under surveillance, using a range of special investigative techniques, such as covert surveillance, interception and monitoring of (electronic) communications, secret searches of premises and inspection of objects, and the use of undercover agents. These investigative techniques may be effectively employed by States in combating international terrorism⁷. Their justification can be found in the positive obligation of States under international human rights law to take preventive measures to protect persons whose lives and security are threatened by the criminal acts of others, including terrorists, according to available information or suspicions⁸.

⁴ In the present report, the term “intelligence services” is used to refer to services operating in other countries and/or in their own countries.

⁵ The Special Rapporteur wishes to express his gratitude for the assistance provided in the preparation of the present report by his research assistant at the EUI, Matthias Vermeulen, the staff of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), the International Commission of Jurists and the participants in his seminar for postgraduate law students on national, European and international counter-terrorism measures, organized at the European University Institute (EUI).

⁶ For the purposes of the present document, the word “data” is used to describe reliable, individual and precise facts that may be used to identify a living person (first and last name, date of birth, addresses, telephone and fax numbers, e-mail addresses, vehicle registration details, fingerprints and DNA profiles).

⁷ See, for example, Klass and Others v. Germany, European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), 6 September 1978, paras. 48–50; Murray v. the United Kingdom, ECHR, 28 October 1994, para. 58.

⁸ The Human Rights Committee has repeatedly emphasized that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also provides protection for the right to personal security outside the context of formal deprivation of liberty. See, in particular, Delgado Páez v. Colombia, communication No. 195/1985, Views adopted on 12 July 1990, para. 5.5.

1. Legal framework for special investigative techniques

27. The first and most important factor in ensuring the accountability of States and their intelligence services for their actions is the development of a specific⁹ and comprehensive legal framework defining the mandate of each intelligence service and setting out its special powers. Without such a framework, States are unlikely to be able to fulfil their treaty obligations in the field of human rights to respect human rights and ensure their effective observance¹⁰. As an example of best practice, reference may be made to the very detailed description of each investigative technique authorized for use by the intelligence service of the Netherlands¹¹.

28. States' approaches to the question of which measures and techniques require judicial authorization generally differ, depending on the scope and comprehensiveness of the constitutional rights recognized by the State concerned, in particular the scope of the right to privacy¹². The mere opening of an investigative file concerning an issue, an organization or a private individual cannot in itself be regarded as a human rights violation where there are suspicions that someone is planning to commit a terrorist act¹³.

29. Nevertheless, in this connection, the Special Rapporteur emphasizes that information collected for “strategic purposes” (i.e. obtained by intelligence services for policy development) should not be used in judicial proceedings where there is no judicial oversight of the measures taken in respect of the persons concerned. The Special Rapporteur notes with concern that, in various courts, the boundary between such strategic information and evidentiary information has become blurred under pressure from various “national security requirements”. The use in court as evidence of the results of special investigative techniques requires the appropriate authorization of a court.

30. States may use certain preventive measures, such as covert surveillance or the interception and monitoring of communications, provided that these forms of interference are connected with the investigation of specific cases. This requires an order by a judge, issued on the basis of possible grounds or reasonable considerations presented to him or her. There must also be specific facts relating to the conduct of the person concerned that would provide grounds for suspecting that he or she may be involved in the preparation of a terrorist attack. Such a preventive approach, using the information collected, is intended to facilitate subsequent judicial proceedings rather than circumvent them and may constitute a desirable, reasonable and appropriate method of assessing risks or obtaining additional information about suspicions against a person suspected of terrorist activity. At the same time, States must bear in mind that the first sentence of paragraph 1 of article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights applies to all cases considered by judicial bodies and requires compliance with the fundamental principles of a fair trial¹⁴.

31. Although international law contains no general rule that expressly prohibits or restricts the collection of information, it is extremely important for States to clarify the “threshold criteria” on the basis of which intelligence services may undertake various activities affecting human rights, ranging from “data mining” to covert operations¹⁵. Granting intelligence services powers clearly defined by law also helps to distinguish the tasks of such services from those of law enforcement agencies. The absence of such clear distinctions leads to blurred areas of responsibility and creates the risk that special powers will be used in ordinary situations where there is no serious threat to the population¹⁶.

⁹ See, for example, Kruslin v. France, ECHR, 24 April 1990, para. 33.

¹⁰ See, similarly, Rotaru v. Romania, ECHR judgment, 4 May 2000.

¹¹ Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002, articles 17–34.

¹² European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Report on the Democratic Oversight of the Security Services, CDL-AD(2007)016, para. 199.

¹³ See the discussion in Leander v. Sweden, ECHR, 26 March 1987, paras. 52–57.

¹⁴ See Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 32 (2007) on the right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, paras. 7 and 8.

¹⁵ Covert operations are understood to mean covert intervention or measures undertaken by an intelligence service in the territory of another country or involving interference in its affairs.

¹⁶ H. Born and I. Leigh, Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best Practice for Oversight of Intelligence Activities, (Oslo, Publishing House of the Parliament of Norway, 2005), p. 29.

2. Minimum threshold criteria for the collection of information: the problem of “data mining” and information sharing

32. The increasingly widespread use by intelligence services of “data mining” techniques, which involve comparing different databases according to a number of indicators, blurs the boundary between permissible targeted surveillance and questionable mass screening, which may amount to arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy. In particular, “data mining” often gives rise to the risk of “overbroad collection” (i.e. information is collected on the basis that it may prove useful, rather than for specific purposes), because a person applying this method, aware of its capabilities, may broaden the definition of suspicious activities.

33. In this connection, the Special Rapporteur returns to his recommendations concerning racial/ethnic profiling¹⁷. Although “data mining” as such is not prohibited, it should not involve searches based on characteristics whose use undermines the right to non-discrimination. Data mining using computer programs that “analyse sentiment”, searching for and aggregating opinions on the basis of informal documents posted on the Internet by various individuals, for the purpose of developing a descriptive profile of a terrorist — techniques which, as far as can be determined, are used by the intelligence services of the United States, Canada, China, Germany, Israel, Singapore and Taiwan¹⁸ — should not be used for the purposes of depriving persons of their liberty or including them on “blacklists” that may prevent them from travelling by air, conducting banking transactions or obtaining employment at airports or in places where radioactive materials are used, such as hospitals.

34. In addition to the frequently occurring problem of poor data quality, whereby information may be incorrectly recorded, misinterpreted or become outdated when compared with other databases¹⁹, there is serious concern that innocent persons may be perceived as sources of terrorist threats²⁰. Such potential shortcomings in the data collected are of concern to the Special Rapporteur, particularly in view of the trend towards expanded sharing of data concerning specific individuals by intelligence services and law enforcement agencies at the national level and internationally, within the framework of bilateral and multilateral agreements such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

35. As a general element of best practice, the Special Rapporteur proposes that Member States adopt legislation based on the basic principles of data protection set out in documents such as the Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files, adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 45/95²¹. This document begins with the following principle: “Information relating to persons should not be collected or processed by unfair or unlawful means, nor should it be used for ends contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations”²². This includes the obligation of all Member States to promote and respect human rights. The Special Rapporteur emphasizes that any departure from the principles of accuracy (article 2), purpose (article 3) or access (article 4) should be interpreted restrictively. The Special Rapporteur particularly reminds States that, in accordance with the fifth principle (the principle of non-discrimination, article 5), “data likely to give rise to unlawful or arbitrary discriminatory measures, including data on racial or ethnic origin, colour, sex life, political, religious, philosophical and other beliefs, as well as membership of organizations or trade unions”, must not be collected and, consequently, must not be shared. Derogations from the fifth principle may be permitted only within the limits provided for by the International Bill of Human Rights and other relevant human rights and anti-discrimination instruments. In this context, the Special Rapporteur is deeply concerned about the sharing of data and information by the intelligence services of China, the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan within the framework of the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism. No substantive oversight is exercised over such data and information sharing, and this activity is not subject to human rights safeguards.

36. The Special Rapporteur refers to best practice whereby the transmission and receipt of data by intelligence services and their subsequent use are regulated on the basis of written agreements concluded between the relevant authorities²³. As one element of best practice, such agreements may be submitted to oversight bodies²⁴, which, ideally, should conduct a thorough assessment of the foreign intelligence service before the State concludes such an agreement. Such an assessment may include on-site visits and consultations with local non-governmental organizations in order to establish the extent to which the intelligence service concerned respects human rights.

¹⁷ See also the observations of the Special Rapporteur on the use of counter-terrorism measures based on descriptive profiles of terrorists, which include characteristics such as the presumed “racial, ethnic affiliation, national origin or religion” of the person concerned (A/HRC/4/26, para. 59).

¹⁸ The Economist, 25 September 2008.

¹⁹ See F. Bignami, “Towards a Right to Privacy in Transnational Intelligence Networks”, Michigan Journal of International Law, vol. 28, No. 3 (2007), p. 668.

²⁰ See, for example, the case of Bisher al-Rawi, in Amnesty International, State of Denial: Europe's Role in Rendition and Secret Detention, (London, Amnesty International Publications, 2008), p. 11.

²¹ With regard to the regional level, see also the working document of the European Commission's Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data, “Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries: Applying Articles 25 and 26 of the EU Data Protection Directive”, 24 July 1998.

²² E/CN.4/1990/72.

²³ See, for example, the Netherlands Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002, articles 36, paragraph 1 (d), 40, paragraphs 1 and 42.

²⁴ See, for example, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, section 17 (2).

3. Unconventional powers of arrest, detention and interrogation

37. Following the events of 11 September 2001, the Governments of some countries began to argue that clear distinctions between the powers of intelligence services and law enforcement agencies no longer existed, asserting that the extraordinary nature of the current terrorist threat required intelligence services to be granted new powers of interrogation, arrest and detention. The granting of powers of arrest, detention and interrogation to intelligence services does not in itself constitute a violation of international law, provided that those services comply with all relevant human rights standards concerning arrest and detention, as well as national constitutional and other provisions governing the activities of ordinary law enforcement agencies²⁵. Nevertheless, the Special Rapporteur is concerned by the fact that, in some countries, the transfer of the centre of activity for countering and preventing the terrorist threat from law enforcement agencies to intelligence services was deliberately carried out with the aim of circumventing safeguards that are mandatory in a democratic society, going beyond the normally legitimate requirements for ensuring the secrecy of special operations²⁶. Ultimately, such a change — as the boundaries between information gathering and the collection of information about criminal offences become blurred — may undermine the rule of law²⁷. This has resulted in a situation in which, during administrative investigations, States have begun to give preference to undisclosed information collected by intelligence agents instead of attempting to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt in criminal court proceedings. In view of the inherent limitations of intelligence information, preventive measures involving deprivation of liberty cannot be based exclusively on such information. In such cases, after a certain period of time, they must be replaced by specific evidence and proof so that the person concerned can challenge them. If, after a certain period of time, it is impossible to present evidence on the basis of such information, or if no new evidence becomes available to the State authorities, the relevant preventive measures must be discontinued.

38. In some countries, intelligence services have lawfully been granted powers to arrest and detain persons who are presumed to possess information about terrorist activities²⁸. Preventive detention, justified by considerations of public safety, including the interrogation of persons for the purpose of obtaining information, may, in exceptional circumstances, constitute a reasonable restriction of the right to liberty, provided that it is carried out on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by law, that the reason for the detention is communicated and that a court order is issued concerning the lawfulness of the detention²⁹. Detention must not be arbitrary³⁰, and compensation must be provided in cases of unjustified detention³¹. The Special Rapporteur is concerned about cases of prolonged detention solely for the purpose of obtaining information or on the basis of general preventive measures. Such cases constitute arbitrary deprivation of liberty³². The existence of grounds for prolonged detention must be established by an independent and impartial court. Such prolonged detention imposes on the relevant authorities an obligation to confirm the reasonableness of the suspicions that a criminal offence has been committed and, if this is the case, to charge the suspect and bring him or her before a court. Merely placing a person in “administrative” detention solely for the purpose of collecting information would be unlawful³³.

39. The Special Rapporteur is deeply concerned about situations in which intelligence services have powers to arrest and detain persons but there is no effective judicial oversight of such actions, leading to impunity. In Algeria, for example, the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) specializes in detaining and interrogating persons who are believed to possess information about terrorist activities by armed groups operating in Algeria or international terrorist organizations operating in other countries. Articles 12 and 16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provide that the MIS performs these functions under the supervision of a prosecutor. However, it has been reported that, in practice, the MIS conducts its operations without any civilian oversight³⁴. Unlike cases in which arrests are carried out by police officers or gendarmes, prosecutors apparently are not notified of arrests carried out by the MIS. Prosecutors do not appear to exercise their prerogatives with regard to ordering medical examinations, visiting barracks used for short-term detention, or inspecting records relating to the arrest, interrogation and release of persons detained by the MIS. The Special Rapporteur is concerned that such circumstances significantly increase the risk of arbitrary detention or the use of torture or other forms of inhuman treatment against persons.

40. The Special Rapporteur is deeply concerned about the situation in, for example, Morocco³⁵, Jordan³⁶ and Pakistan, where the powers of intelligence services to detain and interrogate persons in the course of counter-terrorism operations and investigations have no clear basis in legislation³⁷. The arrest and detention of persons on grounds that are not clearly set out in domestic legislation constitute a violation of article 9, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In the absence of such a legal framework, there is a risk that intelligence services may arrest persons solely on the basis of assumptions, which may be based only on “guilt by association”.

41. The Special Rapporteur notes that, since September 2001, there has been a trend towards transferring information-gathering functions to private contractors³⁸. Although the involvement of private entities may be technically necessary in order to obtain access to relevant information (for example, for electronic surveillance purposes), there are grounds for concern about the use of contractors to interrogate persons deprived of their liberty³⁹. The combination of factors such as the lack of appropriate training, financial interest in situations fraught with human rights violations, and the often low likelihood of such contractors being held accountable by judicial and parliamentary bodies confirms the conclusion that those types of information-gathering activities that may affect the lives, physical integrity or liberty of individuals should remain exclusively within the domain of the State. However, where States do decide to involve private military and security companies in such activities, they must, at a minimum, comply with the provisions of the “Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict”⁴⁰, which was developed to be observed even in the difficult conditions of armed conflict.

²⁵ See, for example, Ocalan v. Turkey, ECHR, 12 March 2003, para. 106.

²⁶ See, for example, the Russian Federation's Law on Countering Terrorism of 6 March 2006, which provides for the transfer of ordinary police functions to intelligence services while simultaneously weakening the regime of legal safeguards protecting against such powers, for example, with regard to the monitoring of communications and the checking of identity documents of individuals.

²⁷ As early as the 1970s, the United States Senate Church Committee pointed out that it was precisely the blurring of the boundary between law enforcement activities and investigative activities carried out in the interests of national security using foreign intelligence resources that had caused the various violations described in the report “Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities”, United States Senate, 94th Congress, 1976.

²⁸ See also the previous observations of the Special Rapporteur concerning compulsory hearings in Australia (A/HRC/4/26/Add.3, paras. 31–32 and 46–47).

²⁹ Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 8 (1982) on article 9 (Right to liberty and security of person), para. 4.

³⁰ See also ECHR, Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. the United Kingdom, 30 August 1990, para. 32.

³¹ See, for example, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, report No. 2/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc. 7 rev. (1997), para. 12.

³² See also the observations of the Special Rapporteur concerning the situation at Guantanamo Bay (A/HRC/6/17/Add.3, paras. 13–14).

³³ See, for example, Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom, ECHR, 19 November 1988, para. 53; Murray v. the United Kingdom, ECHR, 28 October 1994, para. 67.

³⁴ Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights, forthcoming report, chapter IV, section 2.2.2.

³⁵ See Alkarama for Human Rights, Contribution dans le cadre de l'examenperiodique universel de Maroc, 2007, pp. 2–4; Amnesty International, Morocco, submission to the Universal Periodic Review, 2007, p. 5.

³⁶ Human Rights Watch, Suspicious Sweeps — The General Intelligence Department and Jordan's Rule of Law Problem, (2006), vol. 18, No. 6(E), pp. 11–17.

³⁷ Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights, forthcoming report, chapter IV, section 2.2.2.

³⁸ In general, 70 per cent of information-gathering activities in the United States are currently carried out by private entities. See S. Chesterman, “‘We can't spy. if we can't buy!’: the privatization of intelligence and the limits of outsourcing ‘inherently governmental functions’”, New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, No. 82, 2008, p. 2.

³⁹ See, for example, United States v. Passaro, (No. 5:04-CR-211-1, United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, 17 June 2004). See also statements by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Michael Hayden, who confirmed that contractor companies, “under the direction and control of government agencies”, had interrogated detainees using waterboarding at secret CIA facilities (Hearing of the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Annual Worldwide Threat Assessment, 5 February 2008, p. 26).

⁴⁰ A/63/467-S/2008/636.

4. Mechanisms for Oversight and Control of the Activities of Special Services

Executive authorities, being the primary recipients of the information collected, must effectively control and direct the activities of special services. Relevant instructions must be set out in writing41, including a detailed description of the measures that special services are permitted and prohibited from taking in respect of individuals. In this regard, it is important not only to ensure oversight and control of the activities of special services, but also to prevent the creation of conditions for so-called “plausible deniability”42 on the part of the head of the agency, so that he or she cannot evade responsibility for possible violations. In this context, the Special Rapporteur emphasizes that, when authorizing covert operations, States’ human rights obligations must be taken into account, not only in order to comply with legal and moral standards, but also in the interests of the intelligence-gathering activities themselves43.

Authorizing special services to commit murder, kidnapping or the arbitrary detention of persons suspected of terrorism can in no circumstances be considered a lawful, intelligence-based means of preventing terrorism. Similarly, granting powers to arrest and detain high-value detainees in secret facilities and authorizing inhuman and degrading treatment of suspects under the guise of using “enhanced interrogation techniques” for the purpose of obtaining information44 constitute direct violations of international law. In this regard, the Special Rapporteur emphasizes that the concept of the “defence of necessity” existing in the criminal law of certain countries can under no circumstances serve as the basis for a policy or as an ex ante justification for the use of prohibited interrogation methods—even in so-called “ticking bomb” situations45.

In some States, independent bodies have been established on a permanent basis, such as inspector-generals, judicial commissions or audit bodies, operating under statutes or administrative regulations, which examine the extent to which special services fulfil their duties. These bodies may serve as preventive early-warning mechanisms, bringing possible problems to the attention of executive authorities and thereby contributing to greater accountability. Such institutions may be required to inform the relevant executive authorities at least every six months about developments within special services and the activities they undertake. In order to properly fulfil this obligation, these institutions must have unrestricted access to all files, premises and personnel of special services, as is the case, for example, in Canada46, South Africa47 and various European countries. Continuous oversight exercised by specialized bodies has clear advantages over ad hoc investigations conducted by ordinary oversight authorities48. Direct oversight activities fall within the remit of the national parliament, which, in matters relating to intelligence gathering, should perform its traditional role of ensuring that the executive branch and its agencies are accountable to the general public. In practical terms, it should be noted that various parliamentary oversight bodies exist, with different functions depending on the country's constitution and legal traditions.

Although the Special Rapporteur recognizes that it is difficult to identify a single best-practice example suitable for all circumstances in this area, the system of parliamentary oversight existing in Norway contains at least certain elements of best practice, since it is expressly aimed at protecting human rights, namely, at “identifying and preventing all cases of violations of the law in respect of any person” and “ensuring that the relevant activities do not exceed the limits established by statutory law, directives of administrative or military authorities and customary law”49. Furthermore, the parliamentary oversight committee consists of seven members appointed by parliament, who need not necessarily represent political parties. Thus, the committee cannot be used by different parties to achieve political objectives, while ensuring a high level of professionalism and integrity among its expert members. The members of the committee are assisted by a secretariat consisting of three lawyers and a secretary, who have access to classified information. Its members may insist that information on all matters related to the performance of their duties be submitted to the committee. In carrying out their activities, committee members have access to the archives and repositories, premises and facilities of all executive authorities and special services.

In the absence of a unified approach, where oversight bodies are tasked with examining only one area of the activities of special services, there is a risk that they may fail to identify cross-sectoral problems. Accordingly, oversight bodies with a thematic mandate are better equipped to examine issues relating to the increasingly close convergence of functions, the expansion of opportunities for cooperation and the exchange of information concerning the activities of various government institutions. For example, the Norwegian oversight body is tasked with examining “all intelligence-gathering, surveillance and security services carried out under the control or at the direction of the State administration”50.

 

41 See, for example, Act CXXV of 1995 on National Security, Hungary, section 11; Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002, Netherlands, article 19; Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act 1984, section 7 (1) and (2).

42 The creation of conditions for “plausible deniability” means the deliberate establishment of such security structures and chains of command that are sufficiently obscure and informal to enable a manager to evade responsibility if a human rights violation is uncovered.

43 See, for example, the investigation by the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services into the treatment of persons in United States custody, document dated 12 December 2008, p. xii of the English text: “Senior officials of the United States Government solicited information about when physical coercive techniques could be used, modified the law to make such techniques legal, and authorized their use against detainees. These actions damaged our ability to collect accurate intelligence that could have saved lives, played into the hands of the enemy and undermined our moral authority.”

44 J. Warrick, “CIA tactics endorsed in secret memos”, Washington Post, 15 October 2008.

45 See A/HRC/6/17/Add.4, paragraphs 17–21.

46 Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act 1984, section 31 (1) and (2).

47 Intelligence Services Oversight Act No. 40 of 1994, South Africa, section 7 (8)(a).

48 See also the report of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) on the democratic oversight of security services, CDL-AD(2007)016, para. 142.

49 Act relating to the monitoring of intelligence, surveillance and security services, February 1995, section 2.

50 Ibid., section 1.

B. Cooperation between Special Services

When, shortly after the events of 11 September 2001, it became clear that preparations for the attacks in question had also been carried out in Western Europe and that some of the terrorists who apparently had links to them had been under surveillance, in particular by the special services of Germany and France, the idea of establishing more effective and coordinated cooperation between special services gained widespread recognition51. The benefits derived from intelligence sharing are quite obvious: no State possesses an “all-seeing eye” that would enable it to have all the information potentially relevant to its national security interests.

Such entirely legitimate cooperation frequently creates problems from the perspective of accountability. This is mainly because national accountability mechanisms generally cover only the activities of national services, since their mandates do not extend to cooperation between their services and third parties. In cases where they are tasked with examining such cooperation, the relevant powers are very limited. On the other hand, the existence of the two main concepts underlying most agreements on the exchange of highly classified information, namely the “need-to-know” principle (concerning the dissemination of information)52 and the originator control principle53, increases the likelihood that many countries, including liberal democratic regimes opposed to torture, may become complicit in international crimes. In seeking to preserve cooperative relations with foreign services (particularly more powerful ones), special services have little incentive to seek clarification as to how particular information was obtained or to insist that the information they provide not be used in ways that result in human rights violations. Furthermore, national oversight bodies are often unable to monitor how a foreign intelligence service complies with the conditions under which the relevant information is transferred.

Cooperation between special services often takes place within the framework of multilateral organizations, such as NATO or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The Special Rapporteur is concerned that the policies of secrecy and information protection pursued by States within these multilateral agreements create insurmountable obstacles to independent investigations of human rights violations. Thus, the report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (rapporteur Dick Marty) contains credible information indicating that, on the basis of NATO “blanket” authorizations agreed upon on 4 October 2001, bilateral (secret) agreements were developed granting unrestricted overflight, port access and use of military bases for covert operations by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), including secret detention and the air transportation of detainees under the extraordinary rendition programme54. As regards the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, cooperation between intelligence services takes place without any form of oversight. One service simply requests “assistance”55 from another service, upon receipt of which the relevant State “shall take all necessary measures to ensure the prompt and fullest possible execution of the request”56. Under article 11, paragraph 4, of the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, information concerning the methods used to provide assistance to another service “shall not be disclosed”.

In order to overcome the lack of accountability in cooperation between special services, cooperation between national oversight bodies must be expanded. Initiatives already put forward in this area, such as the holding of international conferences of special services oversight institutions every two years and special meetings of parliamentary committees overseeing special services in EU member States and candidate countries, constitute an important first step in the right direction. However, they are convened very irregularly and currently involve only a very limited number of States. The Special Rapporteur supports the idea put forward by Belgium's Standing Committee I to establish a permanent structure of (parliamentary) oversight bodies for special services to exchange information on best practices in legislation and jurisprudence and on general developments in this field, thereby helping to increase the level of professionalism of oversight personnel in member States57. Such a system could also be extended to operational matters, thereby facilitating cooperation in investigations and information sharing—a form of “joint oversight”58.

1. Joint Operations

The Special Rapporteur remains deeply concerned by the fact that the United States established a comprehensive system of extraordinary rendition, prolonged secret detention and the use of methods that violate the prohibition of torture and other forms of ill-treatment. This system required an international intelligence-sharing network in order to function, and its establishment resulted in the emergence of an entire body of distorted information systematically transmitted to partners in the war on terror through cooperation between special services, thereby undermining the fundamental culture of the legal and institutional systems of the States using such information.

Although this system was developed and established by the United States, this was possible only through cooperation with a large number of other States. There is consistent and credible information that, at least until May 2007, a number of States assisted extraordinary rendition in various ways. States such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Indonesia, Canada, Kenya, Pakistan, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Croatia provided information or carried out the initial detention of persons who were subsequently transferred to (mostly secret) detention facilities in Afghanistan, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Uzbekistan, Ethiopia or to one of the CIA's secret detention facilities known as the Agency's “black sites”. In many cases, officials of the receiving authorities reportedly subjected these detainees to torture and other forms of ill-treatment.

The Special Rapporteur reminds States of their responsibility for knowingly participating in internationally wrongful acts, or providing aid or assistance in their commission, including human rights violations59. Accordingly, where States commit gross human rights violations, such as torture, enforced disappearances or arbitrary detention, other States must significantly restrict their cooperation with them, including through their special services. The prohibition of torture is an absolute and peremptory norm of international law60. States must not aid or assist in the commission of acts of torture or recognize such practices as lawful, including through the use of information obtained as a result of torture61. States must establish safeguards to prevent special services from using such information62.

 

51 Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001), paragraph 3 (a) and (b), and 1465 (2003), paragraph 3; EU Declaration on Combating Terrorism, 2004, paragraph 9; ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism, 2007, article VI (h).

52 The “need-to-know” principle provides that “persons shall be granted access to classified information only where such information is necessary for the performance of their duties, and access shall not be granted ‘solely on the basis that the person holds a particular position, even if a senior one’”, NATO Security Committee, A Short Guide to the Handling of Classified Information (Brussels, NATO Archives, August 22, 1958, AC/35-WP/14), quoted in A.S. Roberts, “Entangling alliances: NATO's security policy and the entrenchment of State secrecy”, Cornell International Law Journal, vol. 36, No. 2 (2003), p. 337.

53 Under the “originator control” principle, often also referred to as the “third-party rule”, intelligence services transfer information on the understanding that neither the information nor its source will be disclosed without the prior consent of the entity that provided it.

54 Secret detentions and illegal transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member states: second report, explanatory memorandum, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, June 2007, paras. 11, 39 and 105.

55 A State is only required to describe the “content” of the requested assistance (Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, article 8, paragraph 3). Such assistance may include the interrogation, detention and extradition of persons.

56 Ibid., article 9.

57 Another example of such cooperation may be found in the periodic meetings of police oversight bodies in European countries.

58 H. Born, “International intelligence cooperation: the need for networking accountability”, DCAF, 2007.

59 General Assembly resolution 56/83, annex, “Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts”, articles 4 and 16. See also Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, p. 76: “In such a case, the assisting State will be responsible only to the extent that its own conduct provoked the internationally wrongful act or contributed to its commission.” Article 16 reflects a rule of customary international law. See International Court of Justice (ICJ), “Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)”, Judgment of 26 February 2007, para. 420.

60 The obligation to protect against torture and punish those responsible for it is an obligation erga omnes, i.e. an obligation owed to all States. See International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Prosecutor v. Furundzija (Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, 1988); Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), ICJ Reports 1970.

61 General Assembly resolution 56/83, annex, International Law Commission draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, articles 40 and 41.

62 As Judge Neuberger argues, “... even by simply making use of the fruits of torture, a democratic State, by using the methods of terrorists, weakens its position in the fight against them, thereby undermining the high moral principles of an open democratic society”. Lord Justice Neuberger (dissenting) in “A and Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department”, [2004] EWCA Civ 1123 (11 August 2004), para. 497.

2. Participation in Interrogations

The Special Rapporteur is concerned about the participation of foreign agents in the interrogation of persons held in conditions that violate international human rights standards. The distinction drawn by the governments of some countries between intelligence officers and law enforcement officers is not materially significant, since active participation through the dispatch of investigators63 or the submission of questions64, or even the mere presence of intelligence officers during an interview with a person held in a place where their rights are being violated65, may well be regarded as conduct that effectively condones the use of such methods66. The repeated involvement and presence of foreign officials have in some cases been perceived as encouragement or even support for such activities67. In the view of the Special Rapporteur, the receiving State may incur responsibility even in cases involving more passive and remote forms of creating demand for intelligence obtained through internationally wrongful means. Accordingly, the Special Rapporteur considers that the active or passive participation of State representatives in the interrogation of persons organized by representatives of another State constitutes an internationally wrongful act if the State knew or ought to have known that there was a real risk of torture68 or other prohibited forms of treatment, including arbitrary detention, in respect of the person concerned69.

 

63 There are reports that Australian, British and United States intelligence officers personally interviewed detainees held incommunicado under the control of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in so-called “safe houses”, where they were subjected to torture. Many countries (Bahrain, Germany, Jordan, Spain, Italy, Canada, China, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Uzbekistan and France) also sent investigators to the Guantanamo Bay facility (see Center for Constitutional Rights, “Foreign interrogators in Guantanamo Bay”, available at: http://cciiustice.org/files/Foreign%20Interrogators%20in%20Guantanamo%20Bav l.pdf).

64 The intelligence services of Germany and Canada submitted questions to the Syrian Military Intelligence Directorate concerning the cases of Mohammed Zammar and Abdullah Almalki. Both detainees, who were in Syrian custody, were subsequently subjected to torture. See Amnesty International, United States of America: Below the radar - Secret flights to torture and 'disappearance', 5 April 2006, pp. 18–19; Internal Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Abdullah Almalki, Ahmed Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin, 2008, p. 411.

65 For example, intelligence officers of the United Kingdom conducted or attended slightly more than 2,000 interviews in Afghanistan, at Guantanamo Bay and in Iraq. See Intelligence and Security Committee, The Handling of Detainees by UK Intelligence Personnel in Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay and Iraq, 2005, para. 110.

66 See footnote 61 above.

67 This primarily concerns cases such as those reportedly occurring in Pakistan, where persons are detained at the request and with the consent of foreign agents. Similarly, the consideration of sending a team of investigators to establish contact with the Syrian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) in the context of the investigation into the Arar case appears highly controversial.

68 See, by analogy, ICTY Furundzija Appeal Judgement (21 July 2000), paras. 115–120 and General Assembly resolution 56/83, annex, International Law Commission draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, articles 40 and 41.

69 See also Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, principle 21, paragraph 1.

3. Sending and Receiving Information for Operational Use

The Special Rapporteur emphasizes that not only active participation in interrogations during which persons concerned are subjected to torture, but also the indirect use of coercive detention conditions, constitutes a violation of human rights. At a minimum, States that know or ought to know that they are being provided with information obtained through torture and other forms of inhuman treatment or arbitrary detention, and that either create demand for such information or make its use part of their policy, are complicit in the relevant human rights violations70. The Special Rapporteur considers that the use of information obtained through torture in another country, even if such information is collected exclusively for operational purposes, inevitably implies “recognition of the lawfulness” of such practices and therefore requires the application of the principles of State responsibility71. Thus, States that make use of information obtained through torture or inhuman or degrading treatment are complicit in internationally wrongful acts. Such participation is also incompatible with the obligation erga omnes of States to cooperate in the eradication of torture.

States also argue that, in practice, it is difficult to determine the conditions under which particular information was obtained. Information is usually transmitted not in the form of raw intelligence, but as “finished product”. Although the Special Rapporteur recognizes that this is done for convenience, he is concerned that special services also adhere to this practice in order to be able to evade responsibility for using information collected in violation of international law.

The Special Rapporteur is equally concerned about the transfer of information to foreign intelligence services in cases where there are insufficient safeguards regarding its subsequent distribution among the government institutions of the receiving State, for example, where it is transmitted to human rights and immigration authorities that have the power to arrest and detain individuals. Thus, in the Arar case, information-sharing between the United States and Canada was carried out exclusively on the basis of an oral agreement on “free exchange”: the various agencies involved transmitted information in real time through direct interaction72.

Under this arrangement, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police did not comply with the privacy requirements normally observed in investigations involving national security interests, which resulted in the exchange of inaccurate and misleading information, and in a greater volume than is usually the case. It was precisely on the basis of this information that the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service concluded that Arar was a member of Al-Qaeda, which served as the basis for his deportation to Syria, where he was subsequently subjected to torture.

 

70 See also the conclusions of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights in its report, to be published shortly, chapter IV, part 3.2.

71 General Assembly resolution 56/83, annex, International Law Commission draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, articles 40 and 41.

72 See Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar, Factual Background, vol. I, p. 38; F. Bignami, “Towards a right to privacy in transnational intelligence networks”, Michigan Journal of International Law, vol. 28, No. 3 (2007), pp. 675–676.

C. Ex post facto Accountability and the Right to an Effective Remedy

Ex ante oversight and control mechanisms are important for preventing and identifying human rights violations committed by special services in the course of counter-terrorism activities. Equally important is the State's obligation to establish a system that allows for independent investigations into human rights violations committed by special services on the basis of a complaint received, in order, first, to establish the facts and, second, to hold special services and the relevant officials accountable for their actions. In this context, the Special Rapporteur expresses concern about the adoption of liability exemption/immunity clauses, which lead to impunity for special services personnel73. Such immunity clauses may significantly impede access to courts and violate the human right of access to effective remedies.

Abuse of State Secrecy Provisions

Although the Special Rapporteur recognizes that States may restrict public access to specific information that is important for the protection of national security, such as information concerning sources, personal data and the working methods of intelligence agents, he is nevertheless concerned about the increasingly frequent use of State secrecy provisions and public-interest immunities in countries such as Germany, Italy, Poland, Romania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, with the aim of concealing unlawful actions from oversight bodies and judicial authorities, protecting themselves from criticism, avoiding embarrassment and, most importantly, evading accountability.

States' human rights obligations, in particular the obligation to ensure the availability of effective remedies, imply that such legal provisions must not serve as a basis, a priori, for refusing to conduct investigations or preventing the disclosure of information about unlawful acts, especially where there are allegations of international crimes or gross human rights violations74. The constant invocation of confidentiality on grounds of State secrecy in relation to policies as a whole, for example, in the case of the United States programme of secret detention, interrogation and transportation of persons under the extraordinary rendition programme75 and the use of information collected by a third party (in accordance with the originator control principle (see paragraph 48 above)), prevents genuine investigations and turns the right to a remedy into an illusion. This is incompatible with article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Furthermore, it may constitute a violation of States' obligation to provide judicial assistance in investigations into gross human rights violations and serious violations of international humanitarian law76.

The Special Rapporteur considers that effective investigations are impossible without effective mechanisms for protecting whistle-blowers, designed for secret agents and other informants, in order to dismantle unlawful systems of secrecy. The most likely source of reliable facts concerning serious human rights violations by a special service is the personnel of that very service. In such cases, society's need to expose these facts outweighs its interest in concealing them. Such whistle-blowers must first and foremost be protected against legal retaliation and disciplinary penalties for disclosing official information. Furthermore, independent oversight mechanisms must be able to provide whistle-blowers and informants with the necessary means of protection, which could be based on witness protection programmes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Court.

The Special Rapporteur emphasizes the importance of the work carried out by numerous investigative journalists and non-governmental organizations around the world to expose human rights violations by special services. Accountability is often achieved not through official procedures, but on the basis of reports by such actors. In order for the press to perform its important functions as an external, informal oversight mechanism, effective laws protecting freedom of information and the confidentiality of journalists' sources are necessary77. States should provide for prosecution for breaches of secrecy only in respect of their officials78, establish a mandatory public-interest test and require courts, when considering the publication of official State secrets, to take into account whether such publication serves the public interest.

In considering any cases involving serious human rights violations, the question of whether a claim to State secrecy is justified must ultimately be decided by judges. They may order that the information in dispute be disclosed to the public or to the person suspected of terrorist activity and his or her lawyer in judicial proceedings. In the latter case, in order to examine claims of secrecy, judicial authorities must have access to the actual factual information whose confidentiality the Government seeks to preserve, rather than relying solely on summaries or statements submitted by the Government. Where there are grounds for excluding elements reasonably considered to constitute State secrets, courts should consider adopting measures to compensate for this by preventing disclosure of such information during public hearings, for example, by allowing access to the information only to the defendant's lawyer (who may be required to undergo the necessary security clearance). Only in cases of absolute necessity may a judge decide to separate the source of information (i.e. the source itself and the method used) from the substance of such information, which must always remain open to challenge.

 

73 See, for example, articles 45 and 46 of Algerian Ordinance 06-01 of 27 February 2006 (implementing the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation), which provide for the exemption of security personnel from liability and even criminal penalties for criticism of State agency agents, in the form of several years' imprisonment.

74 See, for example, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Myrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala, judgment, 25 November 2003, para. 180; ECHR, “Imakayeva v. Russia”, judgment, 9 November 2006.

75 In the proceedings in the case of “El-Masri v. Tenet”, the Government submitted a statement by CIA Director Porter J. Goss, who insisted that consideration of the allegations made by El-Masri, who had been secretly transported under the extraordinary rendition programme, would force the CIA to admit or deny the existence of secret operations and that, accordingly, considerations of State secrecy required the case to be dismissed. (Assertion of a Formal Claim of State Secrets Privilege and Request for Expedited Consideration, 8 March 2006, United States District Court - Eastern District of Virginia, Case No. 1:05-cv-1417-TSE-TRJ). See also statements by Acting Attorney General James B. Comey and Secretary of Homeland Security Thomas Ridge, United States Department of Homeland Security, dated 18 January 2005, in the case of Arar v. Ashcroft C.A. No. 04-CV-249-DGT-VVP.

76 See principle 12 of the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, adopted in General Assembly resolution 60/147.

77 In Belgium, for example, the Act of 7 April 2005 on the Protection of Journalistic Sources (Moniteur Belge, 27 April 2005) expressly permits journalists and media employees to “maintain the confidentiality of their sources” (article 3).

78 In this context, see the judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the “Cicero” case (2007), which stated that there were no lawful grounds for charging journalists with disclosing State secrets where they published secret information received from informants. See BVerfG, 1 BvR 538/06 of 27.2.2007, Absatz-Nr. (1–82), available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20070227_1bvr053806.html.

III. Conclusions and Recommendations

A. Conclusions

The expansion of the powers of special services to take measures that have a serious impact on the rights of individuals, as well as the increasing importance of the information collected for decision-making in the legal and administrative spheres, necessitate the establishment of adequate accountability mechanisms to prevent human rights violations. Under international human rights law, States have a positive obligation to conduct independent investigations into allegations of violations of the right to life, freedom from torture and other forms of inhuman treatment, enforced disappearance or arbitrary detention79, to prosecute those responsible for such acts and to provide reparation where they have participated in such violations. This positive obligation to protect human rights also applies in cases where States, within their national territory, grant privileges to entities of another State, including its special services.

B. Recommendations

Legislatures

The Special Rapporteur recommends ensuring that any interference by a special service with the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence is carried out in accordance with legislative provisions that must be formulated with particular clarity, be proportionate to the security threat and contain effective safeguards against abuse. States should ensure that competent authorities use less intrusive investigative means than special investigative techniques where such means are sufficiently effective in detecting, preventing or prosecuting terrorist offences. A multi-level decision-making system should be established whereby an increase in the degree of intrusion into private life requires authorization at a higher level. Furthermore, in order to prevent the arbitrary use of special investigative techniques and human rights violations, the use of such techniques by special services must be subject to appropriate oversight and control.

Countries should develop a domestic legal framework governing the retention and use of information by intelligence and security services that is predictable in its effects and subject to rigorous scrutiny in terms of the public interest. Furthermore, legislation should provide for effective control measures regarding the periods of information retention, the methods of its use and the categories of persons authorized to access it, as well as ensure compliance with international data protection principles in the processing of information. An audit process should be established, including the involvement of independent external personnel, in order to ensure compliance with these rules.

In addition, the Special Rapporteur recommends adopting legislation clarifying the rights, obligations and responsibilities of private companies with regard to information transferred to government institutions.

In order for parliamentary oversight committees, special parliamentary committees of inquiry, royal commissions, etc., to perform their internal oversight functions, they must be granted extensive investigative powers and access to the archives and repositories, premises and facilities of executive authorities and special services. These bodies should also be able, on their own initiative, to examine relations between national institutions and specific States or services and to review all correspondence with cooperating foreign services in a particular case. Following such a review, these bodies should prepare both a confidential report for the executive branch and a separate report for the general public.

The Special Rapporteur supports the recommendation of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights that special services should not perform the functions of law enforcement officers80. If, notwithstanding the risk of abuse, special services are granted powers to arrest, detain and interrogate, the Special Rapporteur strongly urges that strict and effective control over them by ordinary civilian authorities be ensured and that they operate in full compliance with international human rights standards.

Cooperation between special services must be expressly regulated by law (including with regard to human rights safeguards) and transparent rules, conducted in accordance with clearly established procedures (while maintaining appropriate documentary records) and subject to control or oversight by parliamentary or expert bodies.

 

79 Aydin v. Turkey (1997) 25 ECHR 251; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, articles 5, 6, 12 and 13; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 (2004) on the Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, paragraphs 15 and 18.

80 Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights, 2009, forthcoming report, chapter IV, part 5.

Executive Authorities

In order for executive authorities to exercise effective control over the activities of special services, they must be equipped with effective statutory means of such control and have adequate information about the activities of these services. In this regard, the minister responsible for special and security services should have the authority to authorize activities concerning politically sensitive matters (for example, cooperation with the special services of other countries) or actions affecting fundamental rights (for example, approving the granting of special investigative powers and determining the need for additional external authorization from a judge).

The Special Rapporteur calls upon all relevant authorities in those countries that are alleged to have been involved in extraordinary rendition, torture, disappearances, secret detention or any other serious human rights violations to conduct comprehensive investigations into all unlawful acts committed by special services on their territory. States must ensure the rehabilitation of persons affected by such unlawful acts and compensation for the damage caused to them. Furthermore, States must cease transferring any persons to officials of another State or assisting in such transfers, except where the transfer takes place under judicial supervision and in accordance with international standards.

The Special Rapporteur recommends that States include in their intelligence-sharing agreements a provision stipulating that the actions of the relevant party under such an agreement are subject to review by its oversight bodies and that the oversight bodies of each party are competent to cooperate with one another in assessing the activities of either party or both parties81.

Special Services

The Special Rapporteur recommends that special services exchange classified information with other special services only where there is a written stipulation restricting the further dissemination of such information among other government institutions of the receiving State, for example, law enforcement agencies and immigration services that have the power to arrest and detain individuals. In this regard, the Special Rapporteur recommends that information provided by foreign intelligence services should not be used when determining preventive measures in respect of any person, except where the relevant party is able effectively to challenge the authenticity, accuracy and reliability of such information and there are substantial grounds for believing that it is accurate and reliable.

The Special Rapporteur strongly urges Member States to minimize restrictions on transparency on grounds of State secrecy and national security. Information and evidence concerning the civil, criminal or political responsibility of State representatives, including special services personnel, for human rights violations cannot be considered State secrets requiring protection. Where it is impossible to separate the substance of such cases from genuine, legitimate State secrets, appropriate procedures must be provided to ensure that the persons responsible are punished for their actions while preserving State secrecy.

The Special Rapporteur recommends that special services develop training programmes for internal use and for use in international activities on methods of ensuring respect for human rights during operations. Such training should be based on the understanding that respect for human rights is one of the professional requirements and also a source of professional pride for every member of a special service.

Guarantees of appropriate support for and protection of the security of whistle-blowers within special services should be established by law.

Human Rights Council

The Special Rapporteur recommends the development and adoption of guidelines concerning respect for human rights and the use of best practices by special services82.

 

81 See C. Forcese, The Collateral Casualties of Collaboration - the Consequence for Civil and Human Rights of Transnational Intelligence Sharing, conference paper for the DCAF workshop on accountability of international intelligence cooperation, Oslo, 17 October 2008.

82 See also the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 34/169.

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