On the ratification of the Memorandum of Understanding between Kazakhstan and the NATO Maintenance and Support Organization (NAMSO) on cooperation in the field of logistics

Home / RLA / On the ratification of the Memorandum of Understanding between Kazakhstan and the NATO Maintenance and Support Organization (NAMSO) on cooperation in the field of logistics

Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated July 21, 2007 No. 295

To ratify the Memorandum of Understanding between Kazakhstan and the NATO Maintenance and Support Organization (NAMSO) on cooperation in the field of logistics, signed in Brussels on July 1, 2003.

President of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Memorandum of Understanding between Kazakhstan and the NATO Maintenance and Support Organization (NAMSO) on cooperation in the field of logistics

This Memorandum of Understanding provides the legal basis for the establishment of the maintenance and logistics relations between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the NATO Organization, as set out in the following articles.

The preamble

Considering that: - Kazakhstan, having accepted the invitation to join the Partnership for Peace Program (PIM), having signed and joined the Framework Document of the Partnership for Peace Program on May 27, 1994, is a partner country of the Partnership for Peace program; - The Ministry of Defense of Kazakhstan expressed interest in the services offered by the NATO Organization for maintenance and support in the framework of its programs and partnerships in the field of weapons systems; - The Ministry of Defense of Kazakhstan is entering into negotiations with the NATO Maintenance and Support Organization in order to establish cooperation in certain areas of logistics; - The Board of Directors of the NATO Maintenance and Support Organization has agreed to provide logistical support services to Kazakhstan (as defined below); - The Board of Directors of the NATO Maintenance and Support Organization, in the context of cooperation with the State participating in the NATO Partnership for Peace Program (PIM), is aware of the common interest of NATO member countries in reducing the cost of the programs of the NATO Maintenance and Support Agency, which is one of the goals set out in the Charter of the NATO Organization for maintenance and maintenance; - The North Atlantic Council approved the recommendations of the Board of Directors of the NATO Maintenance and Support Organization on concluding a maintenance and support agreement with the Ministry of Defense of Kazakhstan, provided that entry into such an agreement under no circumstances grants Kazakhstan the status of a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and does not entitle Kazakhstan to apply for such status; - The Board of Directors of the NATO Maintenance and Support Organization has authorized the General Manager of the NATO Logistics Agency (NAMSA) to sign this Memorandum of Understanding. Kazakhstan and the NATO Maintenance and Support Organization, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties", have reached an understanding on the provision of logistical support based on the provisions set out in this Memorandum of Understanding.

Definitions/abbreviations

In the text of this Memorandum of Understanding and in the texts of specific agreements arising from it: - "NATO" means the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; - "NAMSO" means the NATO Logistics and Support Organization; - "NAMSA" means the NATO Logistics and Support Agency; - "PIM" means the program Partnership for Peace, established at the NATO Summit in Brussels on January 10-11, 1994; - "Technical information" means recorded or documented information of a scientific or technical nature, whatever its format, documentary characteristics, or presentation method. This information may include, but is not limited to, the following: experimental and test data, technical specifications, designs and design processes, inventions and discoveries, both patentable and non-patentable, technical descriptions and other technical work, work on semiconductor topography/mask configuration, technical and production data packages, know-how and trade secrets, as well as information related to industrial technologies. It can be presented in the form of documents, graphic reproductions, drawings and other graphical representations, recordings on disks and tapes (optical, magnetic and laser), computer software related to both programs and databases, printouts of computer memory or data stored in computer memory, or in any other - "PSV" means a partnership in the field of weapons systems.

Article 1 Purpose

This Memorandum of Understanding establishes a formal framework for the provision of logistics services in clearly defined areas, including, but not limited to, provisioning, maintenance, purchase of goods and services, transportation, configuration management, and technical assistance.

Article 2 Implementation

2.1. The implementation of this Memorandum of Understanding will require the drafting of specific written agreements, such as sales agreements, service agreements, PSA agreements or others. 2.2. It is understood that the agreements referred to in paragraph 2.1. and participation in the PSV may require prior approval by the Ministry of Defense of Kazakhstan and will require approval by the NAMSO Board of Directors, as well as by the country of origin of the relevant weapons systems or equipment.

Article 3 Financial arrangements

3.1. The Parties do not incur any financial obligations in connection with this Memorandum of Understanding, unless otherwise agreed by virtue of subsequent agreements such as those specified in paragraph 2.1., and which relate to specific areas of activity and tasks performed. 3.2. It is understood that after signing the agreement referred to in paragraph 2.1., Kazakhstan, as the customer, will bear the costs of paying for services ordered from NAMSO and provided by it, including costs incurred in the event of termination of the Memorandum in accordance with Article 12.

Article 4 Obligations, guarantees and insurance

4.1. Each of the Parties, receiving materials or services under this Memorandum of Understanding, waives claims for personal injury (including injury resulting in death), loss or damage, if such injury, loss or damage occurs during the normal use and / or operation of such materials or services. 4.2. The Parties will provide mutual assistance in defending themselves against claims or lawsuits of any kind brought by any third party against one of the Parties in order to ultimately protect the supplying organization from such claims made by third parties. 4.3. Waiver of claims and protection against claims mentioned in paragraphs 4.1. and 4.2. do not apply to cases of intentional unlawful acts and gross negligence, as well as to cases specifically stipulated in the agreement concluded between the two Parties. 4.4. Each agreement of the type specified in clause 2.1. will detail the guarantee for the relevant materials or services for each type of activity and tasks performed. 4.5. The shipment of goods organized by NAMSO under such agreements will usually take place without insurance, unless a specific request from Kazakhstan is received. The costs of such insurance, which can be carried out at the request of Kazakhstan, will be reimbursed to NAMSO without delay.

Article 5 Management

5.1. The authorities responsible for managing the implementation of this Memorandum of Understanding are listed in Appendix A. 5.2. For subsequent agreements specified in paragraph 2.1., the Parties may designate specific contact points.

Article 6 Safety requirements

6.1. The Parties will develop and implement a coordinated industrial safety program based on the NATO Security Policy (C-M(2002)49 and C-M(2002)50) and its Subsidiary Directives. 6.2. The Parties will notify each other about the degree of secrecy applied by the Developer Party to any information or data transmitted to the other Party in accordance with the terms of the agreements specified in clause 2.1. 6.3. Any exchange of classified information, including contracts containing such information, must be conducted in accordance with the terms of the Security Agreement concluded on July 31, 1996 between NATO and Kazakhstan, as well as in accordance with the security requirements set out in the NATO Security Policy (C-M(2002)49 and C-M(2002)50) and its Subsidiary Directives.

Article 7 Exchange of technical information related to property rights

7.1. The following conditions apply to data and information that are subject to transfer, dissemination or exchange in any other way under the agreements specified in paragraph 2.1., and which are explicitly determined by one Party or another by affixing appropriate stamps, inscriptions or other written designations as related to property rights. 7.2. It is understood that each of the Parties undertakes the following obligations: 7.2.1. to use information belonging to the other Party only for the purposes of the agreements specified in paragraph 2.1.; 7.2.2. ensure the complete confidentiality of information belonging to the other Party and refrain from disclosing, transmitting or otherwise providing such information to a third party; 7.2.3. to treat information belonging to the other Party as classified information and ensure its security by implementing the same measures and applying the same controls with respect to such information that the receiving Party normally implements and applies to protect its proprietary information in order to prevent unintentional disclosure, publication, dissemination or transfer, and also take all necessary actions to ensure that only employees of the receiving Party, those who needed such information for official reasons had access to information belonging to the other Party. 7.3. The information will not be considered an object of ownership, and its use will not lead to any obligations of the receiving Party, if such information: 7.3.1. is or becomes publicly available not because of malicious or illegal actions of the receiving Party; 7.3.2. provided in a lawful manner by a third party without such restrictions and violations of this Memorandum of Understanding; 7.3.3. approved for distribution or use with the written permission of the transmitting Party. 7.4. Unless otherwise agreed between the Parties, no provisions of the relevant agreements of the type referred to in paragraph 2.1. will be considered as granting any rights or licenses in respect of any patents, inventions or data owned or owned by either Party at any time.

Article 8 Taxes and duties

NAMSO, its property and all types of activities are exempt from: 8.1. all types of direct and indirect taxes; however, NAMSO will not insist on exemption from taxes and duties that are payment for the use of public services; 8.2. customs duties, restrictions or prohibitions related to the import or export of personal goods, provided that that these imported goods are not intended for sale in Kazakhstan; 8.3. customs duties, restrictions and prohibitions related to the import and export of printed materials.

Article 9 Procedures for conducting visits

9.1. Upon request, representatives of the Parties will be granted access to public or private facilities where work is being carried out, including tests and trials, on the basis of an agreement concluded under this Memorandum of Understanding, provided that these representatives need it due to official necessity. 9.2. The organization of visits will be carried out in accordance with the Security Instructions set out in Annex G to document C-M(2002)49 under the title "International visits". All visitors will also comply with any additional safety and security requirements set by the host Party. The same rules apply to trade secrets and other technical information shared with visitors as if they had been shared with the Party sending visitors.

Article 10 Language

The usual NATO policy will be applied, providing for the maintenance of all official documentation in English and French.

Article 11 Amendments

The provisions of this Memorandum of Understanding may be amended by written agreement of the Parties.

Article 12 Termination

12.1. If one of the Parties intends to withdraw from this Memorandum of Understanding or one of the subsequent agreements referred to in paragraph 2.1., this Party will provide the other Party with a written notification six months before January 1 of this year. 12.2. In the event of withdrawal from the Memorandum of Understanding or from one of the subsequent agreements referred to in paragraph 2.1., the Parties will promptly consult with each other on the most satisfactory exit conditions. 12.3. If required by the withdrawal notification, the Parties will begin negotiations on each agreement of the type specified in paragraph 2.1., on the earliest possible exit date and resolution of financial issues related to the tasks performed and services provided, which will be affected by the withdrawal. The Party that announced its withdrawal will fully fulfill its obligations by the date of termination of the Memorandum. 12.4. If the Parties jointly decide to terminate this Memorandum of Understanding, they will jointly bear the costs of terminating it. 12.5. The rights and obligations of the Parties with respect to the disclosure and use of technical information, security, sale and transfer to third parties, resolution of disputes, claims and obligations, as well as withdrawal and termination of the Memorandum will remain regardless of the withdrawal of one of the Parties from this Memorandum of Understanding or termination of its operation or the agreements arising from it of the type specified in paragraph 2.1.

Article 13 Dispute resolution

Any differences that arise between the Parties related to the interpretation or application of this Memorandum of Understanding will be resolved during negotiations between them without involving an external jurisdiction or a third party.

Article 14 Entry into force

This Memorandum of Understanding shall enter into force on the date of its signature by the last of the Parties.

Article 15 Signature

The above articles reflect the mutual understanding reached between Kazakhstan and NAMSO. Two original copies are executed in English and French each, and are duly signed. Texts in both languages are equally valid.

On behalf of the Government On behalf of the NATO Organization of the Republic of Kazakhstan for Maintenance and Support

Tuleutai Suleimenov Peter Markey is the Emergency and General Manager Ambassador Plenipotentiary to NATO ____________________ _________________________

Date: July 1, 2003 Date: July 1, 2003

Appendix A

The bodies of contact on all issues related to the provisions of this Memorandum are: From the Ministry of Defense of Kazakhstan: Representative Office of Kazakhstan in NATO B-1110, Brussels tel.: 0032 2 374 9562 fax: 0032 2 374 5091

From the NATO Maintenance and Support Organization (NAMSO): Legal Adviser L-8302, Capellin Luxembourg city tel.: 00352-3063 6554 Fax: 00352-308721

I hereby certify that this text is an unofficial translation into Russian of the Memorandum of Understanding between Kazakhstan and the NATO Maintenance and Support Organization (NAMSO) on cooperation in the field of logistics, signed in Brussels on July 31, 1996.

Head of the Main Department of International Programs Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Colonel V. Reichel

NATO IS UNCLASSIFIED

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

June 17, 2002 DOCUMENT C-M(2002)49

SECURITY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) Note by the Secretary-General

Reference: C-M (2002) 23 and a list of its events

1. This document is the result of a Fundamental Review conducted by the NATO Security Committee and was approved by the Council on the Non-Disclosure Procedure on March 26, 2002. 2. This document, along with document C-M (2002)49 "Measures to protect NATO civilian and military authorities, deployed forces and facilities (facilities) of NATO against the threat of terrorism" cancels document C-M (55)15 (Final). With the exception of Appendix A, "Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty on Security," which is still valid for countries that have not ratified the "Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty on Information Security," all previous versions of document C-M(55)15 (Final) must be destroyed. The following directives support this document: AC/35-D/2000 Directive on Personnel Safety AC/35-D/2001 Directive on Physical Security AC/35-D/2002 Directive on Information Security AC/35-D/2003 Directive on Industrial Safety AC/35-D/2004 Basic Directive on Information Security Directive AC/35-D/2005 on Information Security Management for CIS The first four directives (AC/35-D/2000-2003) were approved by the Council, the last two AC/35-D/2004 and AC/35-D/2005 were approved by the NATO Security Committee and the Command Council., NATO Management and Communications. 3. For ease of reference, a list/compendium containing both security policy documents (C-M (2002)49 and C-M (2002)50), as well as the above-mentioned support directives, will be sent in the near future to all current holders of C-M{55)15{Final) .

(Signed) George Robertson

Original: English

AMENDMENT RECORD SHEET

Cross out the corresponding number of each of the enclosed amendments.

content

Note by the Secretary-General

Amendment record sheet

Content Appendix A - Security Agreement Appendix B - Basic Safety principles Appendix C - Personnel safety Appendix D - Physical security Appendix E - Information security Appendix F - Information Security Appendix G - Industrial safety

Dictionary of terms used

Appendix "A" to C-M (2002)49

APPENDIX "A" AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ON THE SECURITY OF INFORMATION1

The parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington on April 4, 1949; Affirming that effective political consultations, cooperation and defense planning in the implementation of the objectives of the Treaty involve the exchange of classified information between the parties; Considering the need for agreements between the Governments of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty on the mutual protection and protection of exchanged classified information; Aware of the need to establish a common framework for safety standards and procedures; Representing national interests and the interests of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, we have reached an agreement on the following:

ARTICLE 1

(i) protect and protect: (a) classified information (see ANNEX 1) marked as such, originating from NATO (see ANNEX 2) or transferred to NATO by a Member State; (b) classified information marked as such, transferred by one Member State to another Member State in support of programs, projects and contracts of NATO; (ii) maintain the category/classification of information secrecy in accordance with paragraph (i) of this article and make every effort to ensure its appropriate protection; (iii) to use the classified information defined in paragraph (i) of this article solely for the purposes set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as well as in accordance with related decisions and resolutions; (iv) not to disclose classified information defined in paragraph (i) of this article to non-NATO member States, without the consent of the source.

ARTICLE 2

According to Article 1 of this Agreement, the participants must establish a National Security Authority responsible for ensuring compliance with security measures during NATO events. Participants should develop and apply security standards that provide a general level of security for classified information.

_______________________________________________________________ 1 This agreement is currently being ratified by the Governments of the following NATO member States: Belgium, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The "Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on Security" contained in annex A to document C-M(55)15 (Fina[) remains in force for States that have not ratified this agreement.

ARTICLE 3

(1) Participants must conduct an appropriate review of all persons representing them, the performance of whose functional duties requires or may require access to information classified as "Confidential" or higher, before assuming office. (2) The admission procedure should be aimed at determining the possibility of providing access to classified information to a person based on his loyalty and trustworthiness, without exposing security to unacceptable risk. (3) Upon request, each participant must assist the other participants in carrying out the appropriate admission procedures.

ARTICLE 4

The Secretary General is responsible for compliance with the relevant terms of this Agreement within the framework of NATO (see APPENDIX 3).

ARTICLE 5

This Agreement in no way prevents the Parties from concluding other Agreements regarding the exchange of classified information initiated by them and not affecting the subject matter of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 6

(a) This Agreement is signed by the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and is subject to ratification, acceptance and approval. The instruments of ratification, acceptance and approval must be deposited with the Government of the United States of America. (b) This Agreement shall enter into force 30 (thirty) days after the two signatory States have submitted their instruments of ratification, acceptance and approval. For each other signatory State, this Agreement shall enter into force 30 (thirty) days after the submission of its own instruments of ratification, acceptance and approval. (c) This Agreement, for the parties in respect of whom it has entered into force, replaces the "Treaty on the Security of the Parties with respect to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization" approved by the North Atlantic Council in Annex A (paragraph 1) to the Addendum to Annex D.C. 2/7 dated April 19, 1952, and subsequently set out in Annex "A" (paragraph 1) to C-M (55)15 (final), approved by the North Atlantic Council on March 2, 1955.

ARTICLE 7

This Agreement will be open for any new Party to join the North Atlantic Treaty in accordance with the constitutional procedures of the Parties. The documents of the Parties on accession to the international treaty must be deposited with the Government of the United States of America. For each other acceding State, this Agreement shall enter into force 30 (thirty) days after the submission of the State's own documents on accession to the international treaty.

ARTICLE 8

The Government of the United States of America must inform the Governments of other Parties about the custody of the instruments of ratification, acceptance and approval or accession.

ARTICLE 9

This Agreement may be terminated by either Party by written notification of denunciation to the depositary, who must inform all other Parties of receipt of such notification. Such denunciation shall take effect upon the expiration of one year from the receipt by the depositary of the notification, but shall not affect the obligations and rights or prerogatives previously assumed by the Parties in accordance with the terms of this Agreement. In witness whereof, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments for this purpose, have signed this Agreement.

Done at Brussels, _______________, in a single copy in English and French, each text is equally authentic and must be deposited in the archives of the United States Government Depository, and certified copies must be transmitted to the signatory Governments.

NATO IS UNCLASSIFIED

Appendix "A" to C-M (2002)49

APPENDIX 1

This application is an integral part of the Agreement.

The NATO definition of classified information includes: (a) information - information that can be transmitted in any form; (b) classified information is information or material that requires protection from unauthorized disclosure, and which has been characterized as such by the security classification; (c) the term "materials" includes documents, and also, any elements of mechanisms, equipment/components or weapons either manufactured or in the process of production.; (d) the term "document" means any recorded information, regardless of its physical form or characteristics, including, without limitation, written and printed materials, cards and records of processed data, maps, drawings, photographs, images, drawings, engravings, sketches, work notes and papers, typewritten copies or carbon tapes, or reproduction made by any method or process, as well as sound, voice, magnetic, electronic, optical or video recordings in any form., and portable equipment for automatic data processing from stationary or removable computer storage media.

APPENDIX 2

This Application is an integral part of the Agreement.

For the purposes of this Agreement, the term "NATO" means the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the bodies governed by either the Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, National Representatives and the International Headquarters, signed on September 20, 1951 in Ottawa, or the Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters, established in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Paris on August 28, 1952.

APPENDIX 3

This Application is an integral part of the Agreement.

The consultation takes place with the participation of military leaders in order to respect their prerogative (exclusive right).

NATO IS UNCLASSIFIED

Appendix "B" to C-M (2002)49

APPENDIX "B" BASIC PRINCIPLES AND MINIMUM STANDARDS OF SAFETY

introduction

ARTICLE 4

The Secretary General is responsible for compliance with the relevant terms of this Agreement within the framework of NATO (see APPENDIX 3).

ARTICLE 5

ARTICLE 6

ARTICLE 7

ARTICLE 8

The Government of the United States of America must inform the Governments of other Parties about the custody of the instruments of ratification, acceptance and approval or accession.

ARTICLE 9

NATO IS UNCLASSIFIED

Appendix "A" to C-M (2002)49

APPENDIX 1

This application is an integral part of the Agreement.

APPENDIX 2

This Application is an integral part of the Agreement.

APPENDIX 3

This Application is an integral part of the Agreement.

The consultation takes place with the participation of military leaders in order to respect their prerogative (exclusive right).

NATO IS UNCLASSIFIED

Appendix "B" to C-M (2002)49

APPENDIX "B" BASIC PRINCIPLES AND MINIMUM STANDARDS OF SAFETY

introduction

1. This C-M establishes the basic principles and minimum security standards applied by NATO member countries and NATO civilian and military organizations in order to ensure a common level of protection for the exchange of classified information between the parties. NATO's security procedures are most effective only when they are based on and supported by national security systems having the characteristics outlined in this Annex. This Annex also presents the responsibility for security in NATO.

GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

2. NATO member countries, civilian and military organizations of NATO must ensure the application of the basic principles and minimum security standards set out in this C-M to protect the confidentiality of classified information and its integrity. 3. NATO member countries, civil and military organizations of NATO should establish security programs that meet the basic principles and minimum security standards, guaranteeing the overall level of protection of classified information.

application

4. These basic principles and minimum security standards should be applied to: (a) classified information created by NATO, created by a NATO member country and submitted to NATO, or submitted by a NATO member country to another NATO member country in support of NATO programs, projects or contracts; (b) classified information received by NATO from sources from non-NATO member countries; and (c) classified information entrusted to individuals or organizations outside the government (or civilian and military organizations of NATO), for example, consultants (advisers), industry, universities, who must protect it according to the same standards that are applied by the government or civilian or military organizations of NATO. 5. Access and Protection of Information on Nuclear Weapons (ATOMAL) is the subject of an Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty on Cooperation on Information on Nuclear Weapons - C-M (64)39. Administrative measures for the implementation of the Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty on Cooperation in Nuclear Weapons Information (ATOMAL) - current version C- M (68)41 o will be used to control access, handling and protection of such information. 6. Access and protection of information on the United States Unified Integrated Operational Plan (US-SIOP) is the subject of the provisions of C-M (71)27 (Amended), "Special procedures for handling information on the United States Unified Integrated Operational Plan within NATO." 7. The secret nature of cryptographic information, measures, and products requires the application of strict security measures, often in addition to those outlined in this C-M. Therefore, access and protection of cryptographic information, measures and products approved by the country or the NATO Military Committee must be in accordance with Annex E, supporting directives and procedures established by the relevant authorities.

power

8. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) has approved this document, which ensures the implementation of the Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty on Information Security (reproduced in Appendix "A"), and thus defines NATO's Security Policy.

BASIC PRINCIPLES

9. The following basic principles should be applied: (a) NATO countries and NATO civilian and military organizations should ensure that the minimum standards set out in this C-M are adopted to ensure the overall degree of protection of classified information exchanged between the parties; (b) classified information should be distributed solely on the basis of the principle of staff who have been informed of the relevant security procedures are not required to do so.; in addition, only persons who have been verified for trustworthiness have access to classified information classified CONFIDENTIAL or higher; (c) guidance on taking measures to reduce the risk in terms of ensuring the security of classified information should be mandatory in the military and civilian authorities of NATO. It is not necessary to take such measures within the NATO member states.; (d) classified information should be protected by a balanced set of security measures, including personnel, physical, information and information systems (INFOSEC) security measures, which should apply to all persons with access to classified information, all information passing through the media, and all premises containing such information; (e) all suspicious The facts of a security breach should be immediately reported to the relevant management responsible for security. The reports should be evaluated by relevant officials for damage to NATO and appropriate action taken. Appendix "E" provides detailed information in this regard; (f) the drafters of classified documents distribute them to NATO and to NATO countries within the framework of NATO programs, projects or contracts with the understanding that they will be treated and protected in accordance with the NATO information management strategy and NATO security policy; (g) the classified information is subject to the control of the compiler; (h) the classified information should be distributed in accordance with the requirements of Annex E to this C-M and the relevant instructions.; (i) subject to the consent of the drafter and in accordance with Annex E of this C-M, classified NATO information should be transmitted only to those non-NATO countries and organizations that have signed a Security Agreement with NATO or have provided security guarantees to NATO, either directly or through NATO countries or military and the civilian NATO bodies that organize the distribution. In all cases of dissemination of classified information by NATO, the degrees of protection specified in this Code must be respected. 10. Principles relevant to national security: (a) the security organization is responsible for: (i) collecting and recording intelligence information regarding espionage, terrorism, terrorists, sabotage, and threats of subversion; and (ii) concentrating such information so that it can be used in any situation relevant to recruitment of personnel by government departments and government agencies and contractors; and (iii) providing information and recommendations to the Government on the nature of security threats and remedies against them; and (b) ongoing cooperation between government departments and government agencies: (i) identifying classified information that needs to be protected; and (ii) establishing and applying general degrees of protection as set out in this Section.M.

STAFF ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

11. Personal security procedures should be developed with an assessment of the ability of personnel to have initial or permanent access to classified information without causing a security risk, taking into account their dedication, creditworthiness and reliability. All civilians and military personnel who need access or whose functional and official duties may allow access to classified information classified CONFIDENTIAL or higher should be appropriately checked and instructed before gaining access. A person should have access to classified NATO information only as necessary. 12. A security check is not required for access to information classified FOR LIMITED USE; such persons should be informed of their responsibility to protect information FOR LIMITED USE. 13. Personnel safety is further described in Appendix "C" of this C-M and in the relevant personnel safety instructions.

PHYSICAL SECURITY

14. Physical security is the application of physical measures to protect places, buildings, or premises containing information that requires protection against loss or compromise. Physical protection programs, consisting of active and passive security measures, should be established to ensure levels of physical security consistent with the threat, the level of secrecy, and the amount of information requiring protection. 15. Physical security is further described in Appendix "D" of this C-M and in the instructions for ensuring physical security.

INFORMATION SECURITY

16. Information security is the application of general protection measures and procedures to prevent, detect or disclose the loss of information or its declassification. Classified information must be protected throughout its entire life cycle at a level commensurate with the level of secrecy. Guarantees should be achieved for the application of an appropriate security classification, a clear definition of information as classified, and information should remain classified only for the necessary time. 17. The security classification applied to the information should indicate possible damage to the security of NATO and/or NATO member countries if this information is the subject of unauthorized disclosure. The NATO classification of secrecy must be imposed in accordance with Appendix "E" of this Code. Defining and changing the classification of secrecy is the prerogative of the information compiler. 18. NATO Secrecy Labels and their definitions: (a) TOP SECRET (CTS) - unauthorized disclosure can lead to very serious damage to NATO security; (b) NATO CLASSIFIED (NS) - unauthorized disclosure may seriously compromise NATO's security; (c) NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NC) - unauthorized disclosure may compromise NATO's security; (d) NATO FOR LIMITED USE (NR) - unauthorized disclosure may harm NATO's interests and effectiveness. 19. When classifying information, the compiler must take into account the damage that this information may cause in the event of unauthorized disclosure, and must indicate, where possible, a known date or event when the information's security category may be reduced or its declassification. 20. NATO Classified Information is UNCLASSIFIED - Policies and procedures for managing and protecting unclassified NATO classified information are UNCLASSIFIED in the NATO Information Flow Management (NIMP) Procedures. 21. Information security is further described in Appendix "E" of this C-M and in the information instructions for ensuring security.

INFORMATION SECURITY (INFOSEC)

22. INFOSEC is the application of security measures to protect information available, stored, or transmitted via communications, information service systems, and other electronic systems against loss of confidentiality, integrity, or accessibility, whether accidental or intentional, and to prevent loss of integrity or accessibility of the systems themselves. To achieve the security objectives of secrecy, integrity and accessibility of classified information storage, processing or transmission by means of communication, information and other electronic systems, balanced sets of security measures (physical, personnel, information security and INFOSEC) must be applied to create a secure environment in which communication, information and other electronic systems operate. 23. INFOSEC is further described in Appendix "F" of this C-M, in the INFOSEC Guidance Guidelines, INFOSEC Technical Directives and INFOSEC Application Directives.

INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

24. Industrial safety is the application of protective measures and procedures for the prevention, detection and recovery from loss or unauthorized disclosure of classified information that is processed in industry during the execution of contracts. Classified information from NATO is communicated to industry as a result of a contract, and secret contracts with industry must be protected in accordance with NATO's Security Policy and relevant instructions. 25. Before enterprises and their personnel, management, or owners can gain access to classified information, or be invited to participate in a competition, in a negotiation process, or fulfill a secret contract, or work in the field of classified research that includes access to classified information classified CONFIDENTIAL or higher, the enterprise must obtain admission access to classified information issued by the National Security Agency (NSA) (or, if necessary, designated national security agencies) of the country of origin, in other words, the country in which the company is located and registered to conduct business. 26. Enterprises must protect classified information in accordance with the basic principles and minimum standards contained in this C-M. National Security Authorities (NSA) must ensure that they have the means to oblige industry to comply with industrial safety requirements and have the rights to inspect and authorize measures taken by industry to protect classified information. 27. Industrial safety is further described in Appendix "G" of this C-M and in the relevant industrial safety instructions.

PROTECTION OF INFORMATION ON KEY POINTS

28. Publishing information about civilian facilities (supplying defense products, providing energy, and so on) of military importance during a tense situation or during wartime can facilitate bombing, sabotage, or terrorist attacks by allowing a potential adversary to collect information about a list of facilities of key importance and identify facilities vulnerable to sabotage or terrorism. A strategy of behavior should be developed to prevent a potential adversary from compiling a List of key facilities, allowing for security reasons, the use of extracts from publications of relevant information and promoting awareness of risks among owners and managers of facilities.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR SAFETY

Powers of the National Security Authorities (NSA)

29. Each country should establish national security Agencies (NSAs) responsible for the security of classified NATO information. 30. National Security Agencies (NSA) are responsible for: (a) maintaining the security of classified NATO information in government agencies and their components, military and civilian, at home and abroad; (b) Ensuring that appropriate checks are periodically conducted on the protection of classified NATO information in all government organizations at all levels, both military and civilian, to determine the adequacy of the measures taken in accordance with current NATO security regulations. If an organization has information classified TOP SECRET (CTS) or regarding nuclear weapons (ATOMIC), security checks should be carried out at least once every 18 months, except if they were conducted by the NATO Security Office (NOS) during this period. (c) ensuring that the security review decision has been made with respect for all citizens who need access to classified information with a stamp (NC) or higher in accordance with the NATO Security Policy; (d) ensuring that government emergency security plans are in place to prevent classified NATO information from reaching individuals without authorization or into the hands of the enemy; and (f) authorizing the compilation (or cancellation) of the State basic Register of top secret information. The NATO Security Office (NOS) must be notified of the compilation (or cancellation) of the State basic Register of top secret information.

Designated Security Authorities (DSAs)

31. Each NATO member country may designate one or more designated Security Agency (DSA) responsible for National Security Agencies (NSA). In this case, the Designated Security Authority (DSA) of a NATO member country is responsible for linking industry to government policy and all NATO industrial safety policy issues and for providing instructions and assistance in their implementation. In some states, the functions (DSA) may be performed by a national security agency (NSA).

NATO Security Committee (NSC)

32. The NATO Security Committee (NSC) is established by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and consists of representatives of NATO member countries with experience in the field of security issues in their countries. The NATO Security Committee (NSC) reports directly to the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Representatives of the NATO Military Committee (NAMILCOM) must attend meetings of the NATO Security Committee (NSC). Representatives of NATO military and civilian authorities may also be present if they are relevant to the discussion. 33. The NATO Security Committee (NSC) is directly responsible to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) for: (a) reviewing issues related to NATO Security Policy; (b) reviewing security issues referred by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), a NATO member country. The Secretary General, the NATO Military Committee (NAMILCOM), or the Heads of NATO military and civilian bodies; and (c) making appropriate recommendations to the North Atlantic Council (NAC).

NATO Security Office (NOS)

34. The NATO Security Office (NOS) is established within the framework of the international headquarters of NATO. The office consists of staff with experience in the field of security, both in the military and civilian spheres. The Office maintains close relations with the National Security Authorities (NSA) of each NATO member country, as well as with NATO military and civilian authorities. Also, if necessary, the Office may request NATO member states, military and civilian authorities of NATO to provide additional staff to assist for a short period of time in the event that the involvement of additional full-time staff in the Office would not be justified. The Director of the NATO Security Office (NOS) is the Chairman of the NATO Security Committee (NSC). 35. The NATO Security Office (NOS) is responsible for: (a) examining any issues affecting NATO's security; (b) identifying the means by which NATO's security can be improved; (c) overall coordination of security issues for NATO among NATO member countries and military and civilian bodies; (d) ensuring the implementation of NATO's security decisions, including providing such advice as may be requested by the NATO member country and the military; and by NATO civilian authorities, either in their application of the basic principles and standards of safety described in this annex, or in the implementation of special safety requirements. (e) informing the NATO Security Committee (NSC), the Secretary General and the Chairman of the Military Committee, as appropriate, in the prescribed manner within NATO and the progress made in implementing the decisions of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) regarding security issues; (f) performing periodic inspections of security systems for the protection of classified NATO information in NATO member countries, NATO military and civilian authorities, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the NATO Combined Armed Forces in Europe (SHAPE), and the Supreme Commander of the NATO Combined Armed Forces in the Atlantic (SACLANT); (g) coordinating with the national security authority (NSA) and NATO military and civilian authorities, conducting investigations in case of loss, disclosure or possible disclosure of classified NATO information; (h) informing national security authorities (NSA) of any information hostile to NATO interests that leads to perceived concerns of their countries; (i) developing security measures to protect NATO Headquarters in Brussels and ensuring their proper implementation; and (j) performing, under the direction and on behalf of the Secretary General, on behalf of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and under their leadership, responsibilities for monitoring the implementation of NATO's Nuclear Weapons Information Protection (ATOMAL) security programs within the framework of the Agreements and supporting Administrative Agreements listed in paragraph 5 above.

The NATO Military Committee and the NATO Military Bodies

36. As the top military leadership in NATO, NAMILCOM is responsible for the overall management of military issues. Thus, the NATO Military Committee is responsible for all security issues in NATO military structures, including the centralized and general jurisdiction of measures necessary to ensure the adequacy of encryption technology and materials used in the transmission of classified information to NATO, including authorization from the point of view of the security of encryption equipment, as defined in Appendix "F". In accordance with the previously agreed policy and in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 35 above, (NOS) perform security functions within the NATO military structures and inform the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. 37. The heads of the NATO military authorities, established under the auspices of the NATO Military Committee (NAMILCOM), are responsible for security issues within their institutions. This includes responsibility for ensuring that organizational security structures are established, that security programs are designed and implemented in accordance with NATO's Security Policy, and that security measures are periodically inspected at each command level. In cases where organizations have information classified as TOP SECRET (CTS) or related to nuclear weapons (ATOMAL), security checks should be carried out at least once every 18 months, except if they were conducted by the NATO Security Office (NOS) during this period.

NATO civilian authorities

38. The NATO International Headquarters and NATO civilian institutions are responsible to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) for maintaining security within their institutions. This includes responsibility for ensuring that organizational security structures are established, that security programs are designed and implemented in accordance with NATO's Security Policy, and that security measures are periodically reviewed at each command level. In cases where organizations have information classified TOP SECRET (CTS) or related to nuclear weapons (ATOMAL), security checks should be carried out at least once every 18 months, except if they were conducted by the NATO Security Office (NOS) during this period.

INFORMATION SECURITY (INFOSEC)

39. The main organizations responsible for information security (for example, the NATO Advisory, Command and Control Council (NC3B), National Communications Security Authorities (NCSA) and National Distribution Authorities (NDA)) described in Appendix "F".

SECURITY COORDINATION

40. Any security issues requiring coordination between the National Security Authorities (NSAs) of NATO member countries and the military and civilian authorities of NATO should be referred to the NATO Security Office (NOS) for review. In cases where such a transfer is carried out by the military leadership, it must pass through the command authority. Any unresolved disagreements that arise during such cooperation should be submitted by the NATO Security Office (NOS) to the NATO Security Committee (NSC). 41. Any proposals from NATO member states and NATO military and civilian authorities making changes to NATO security procedures should be considered in the first instance at the NATO Security Office (NOS). Any proposals from the military leadership must go through the command authority. If the NATO security issues that have arisen in NATO can only be resolved by changing the NATO Security Policy, the proposals should be sent for consideration to the NATO Security Committee (NSC) and, if necessary, by the NATO Security Committee (NSC) to the North Atlantic Council (NAC).

APPENDIX "C" PERSONNEL SAFETY

introduction

1. This Annex clearly sets out the policy and minimum standards of personnel safety. Detailed information can be found in the relevant personnel safety instructions. 2. Agreed standards of confidence in loyalty, reliability and trustworthiness should be established for individuals with access or responsibilities and functions that allow access to NATO classified information. All persons, civilian or military, whose duties require access to information classified as CONFIDENTIAL or higher, should be sufficiently vetted to obtain a satisfactory degree of confidence in the acceptability of access to such information. 3. Persons who have received permission to access information classified as NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NC) or higher must also obtain the appropriate category of NATO Security Clearance (PSC) issued by the National Security Agency (NSA) of their country or another competent authority, and valid for the entire period of validity of the issued security clearance, and also in accordance with the principle of official necessity. The degree of procedures for assigning a security clearance category is determined by the security category of the NATO information to which the person will be admitted. The procedures for granting the admission category are carried out in accordance with the NATO Security Policy and relevant instructions. 4. Persons who have received permission to access information classified as NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NC) or higher must also obtain the appropriate security clearance category (PSC), receive instruction on NATO security procedures, understand their duties and the principle of official necessity. Persons who require access to information classified as NATO - RESTRICTED USE (NR) should be instructed in their security duties and understand the principle of official necessity. A security clearance is not required to gain access to information classified as NATO - RESTRICTED USE (NR), unless otherwise specified by national rules and regulations. 5. The assignment of a security clearance (PSC) category should not be regarded as the final step in the personnel security process.; There is a requirement to ensure that an individual is permanently eligible for access to NATO classified information. This is achieved through continuous assessment by security authorities and supervisors; and through a security education and competence program that reminds individuals of their responsibilities in this area and the need to report information to their supervisors or security personnel that may affect their security status.

APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF OFFICIAL NECESSITY

6. Persons in NATO countries and military and civilian bodies of NATO should have access to classified NATO information only on the basis of the principle of official necessity. No individual is entitled solely by rank or position or security clearance category to access classified NATO information.

PERSONNEL ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION (PSCs)

Responsibilities

7. The responsibilities for personnel access to classified information of the National Security Authorities (NSA) or other competent national authorities of NATO member States, as well as the heads of civilian and military authorities of NATO, are set out in the relevant personnel security instructions. 8. Individuals should be aware of their responsibilities in accordance with security regulations and act in the interests of security.

Personnel Safety Instructions

9. The relevant personnel security instruction includes the following: (a) requirements for determining positions requiring the appropriate security clearance (PSC); (b) criteria for assessing loyalty, reliability and trustworthiness towards an individual in order to obtain and maintain a security clearance (PSC); (c) requirements for conducting verification activities to obtain access to information classified as NATO - FOR LIMITED USE, NATO is CLASSIFIED and TOP SECRET; (d) Security Clearance Requirements (PSC) for NATO civilian and military personnel; (e) security clearance renewal requirements (PSC); (f) procedures for handling unfavorable information regarding a person with a security clearance (PSC); and (g) requirements for the preservation of data on persons with security clearance (PSC).

SAFETY AWARENESS AND INDIVIDUAL INSTRUCTION

10. All persons holding positions with access to information classified as NATO - for limited use, or having access to information classified as NATO - CONFIDENTIAL or higher, should be instructed on security procedures and their security responsibilities. All persons who have received admission must confirm that they fully understand their duties and the consequences that result from the transfer of information to unauthorized hands intentionally or due to inattention, and activities that are carried out in accordance with the law or through an administrative or executive order. The signed confirmation document must be stored in a database by a NATO member State or a NATO civilian or military authority that issues access to NATO classified information. 11. All persons who have gained access or who need to work with classified NATO information should be aware of, and they should also be periodically reminded of the security risks arising from careless conversations with persons for whom, according to the principle of official necessity, knowledge and possession of information is not required to perform official tasks and duties. having links to the media; and the threat posed by the activities of intelligence agencies targeting NATO and its member States. Individuals should receive a full briefing on these dangers and immediately report to the appropriate security authorities any actions or attempts they deem suspicious or unusual.

PROVIDING ACCESS TO NATO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

12. An individual can gain access to NATO classified information only after he has passed the appropriate personal verification, and the official necessity has been determined, and he has been instructed in NATO security procedures and has realized his security responsibilities.

Special circumstances

13. However, there may be circumstances where, for example, for urgent assignment purposes, some of the requirements in paragraph 12 above cannot be met. Detailed information regarding temporary appointments, one-time access, urgent access, and attendance at conferences and meetings is provided in the relevant personnel safety instructions.

ACCESS FOR NON-CITIZENS OF NATO MEMBER STATES

Access for integrated members of the armed forces of NATO member States

14. Citizens of non-NATO member States working as integrated members of the armed forces of NATO member States may obtain permission to access information classified as TOP SECRET. In such cases, the national security authority is responsible for complying with the conditions set out in paragraphs 12 or 13 above.

Access to Project/Program or contract support, a NATO operation or related mission

15. Persons who are nationals of non-NATO States2 may have access to NATO classified information on a case-by-case basis, provided that: (a) access is necessary in support of a specific program, project, contract, NATO operation or related mission; (b) the individual has been granted a security clearance NATO on the basis of a security clearance procedure no less stringent than that required for a national of a NATO member State in accordance with the NATO Security Policy and supporting instructions; bearing in mind that the NATO security clearance category is not required for access to information classified as NATO-RESTRICTED; and (c) the prior written consent of the NATO Member State or the civilian or military authority from which the information originated has been obtained. 16. As an exception to the source control requirement in subparagraph 15 (c), the national security authority of NATO member States may approve access to classified NATO information for citizens of certain non-NATO member States who have been employed by the Government of a NATO member State or a contractor located and working in a NATO State, provided provided that, in addition to the criteria listed in sub-paragraphs 15 (a) and 15 (b) above, the criteria set out in the equivalent section of the relevant personnel safety instruction apply.

___________________________________________________________ 2 Citizens of non-NATO countries include "subjects of the Kingdom," "citizens of the United States," and "settled immigrants in Canada." "Settled immigrants in Canada" are individuals who have passed a national background check, including a residence check, criminal record check, and security check, and who are about to obtain a legal permanent residence permit in the country.

APPENDIX "D" PHYSICAL SECURITY

introduction

1. This Annex clearly sets out the policy and minimum standards of physical security measures for the protection of NATO classified information. Detailed information can be found in the relevant physical security instructions. 2. NATO member States and NATO military and civilian authorities should establish physical security programs that meet these minimum standards. Such programs, consisting of both active and passive security measures, should provide an overall level of protection in accordance with the NATO classification of the security of protected classified information.

SAFETY REQUIREMENTS

3. All premises, buildings, offices, rooms and other areas where classified NATO information and materials are stored and/or handled must be protected by appropriate physical security measures. When deciding what degree of physical security protection is needed, all relevant factors should be taken into account, such as: (a) the level of secrecy and category of information; (b) the quantity and form of information available (printed text/stored on a computer); (c) access to classified information and the principle of official necessity for personnel access to classified information; (d) on-site assessment of the threat from intelligence services targeting NATO and/or NATO member countries, sabotage, terrorism, subversive or criminal activities; and (e) how the information will be stored. 4. Physical security measures should be designed to: (a) prevent the intruder from secretly or forcibly entering; (b) deter, obstruct and detect the actions of unreliable persons (spies from within); (c) separation of personnel in their access to classified NATO information in accordance with the principle of official necessity; and (d) detection and action on all security breaches as soon as possible.

PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES

5. Physical measures represent only one aspect of ensuring security and should be supported by voicing personnel safety, information security, and information security measures, the details of which are found in Appendices "C", "E", and "F", respectively. The practical organization of security against risk involves the establishment of the most effective and cost-effective methods of countering threats and balancing vulnerability with a combination of measures to protect against such risk areas. This efficiency and cost-effectiveness is best achieved by defining physical security requirements as part of infrastructure planning and development, thus reducing the need for expensive renovation. 6. Physical security programs should be based on the principle of "deep defense", and although physical security measures depend on the location, the following principles should apply. First, it is necessary to identify the premises that require protection. Then, multi-level protection measures are taken to ensure "deep defense" and delay factors. The most external physical protection measures should define the area of protection and keep it from unauthorized access. The next level of measures should identify unauthorized access or attempted access and alert security forces. The innermost level of measures should be sufficient to detain violators until they can be taken into custody by security forces. Therefore, there is a mutual relationship between the reaction time of the security forces and the physical security measures designed to delay the intruder. 7. Regular maintenance of physical security systems is necessary to ensure the operation of equipment with optimal characteristics. It is also necessary to periodically reassess the effectiveness of individual safety measures and the security system as a whole. This can be achieved by training the implementation of a response plan.

Security areas

8. Areas in which information classified as CONFIDENTIAL (NC) or higher is handled and stored must be organized and systematized in accordance with one of the following requirements: (a) A Class I NATO Security Area is an area in which classified information classified as CONFIDENTIAL (NC) or higher is handled and stored thus, entering the area with all possible intentions creates access to classified information. Such areas require: (i) a clearly defined and secure perimeter through which all entrances and exits are monitored; (ii) an access control system that allows access only to persons with appropriate access and special authorization to enter the area; (iii) specifications of the security level and category of information commonly accessed in the area, that is, information to which entry gives access; (b) NATO Class II Security Area, in which classified information with the NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NC) stamp and above is handled and stored in such a way that it can be protected from unauthorized access through internal control measures. Such areas require: (i) a clearly defined and secure perimeter through which all entrances and exits are monitored; (ii) an access control system that allows unaccompanied access only to persons who are trusted and have special permission to enter the area. For other persons, access must be provided with an escort or equivalent control to prevent unauthorized access to classified NATO information and uncontrolled entry into the area that is the subject of a technical security check. 9. Those areas that are not occupied by personnel during daily duty should be checked immediately after the end of the working day to ensure that NATO's classified information is adequately protected.

Administrative areas

10. An administrative zone may be established around or lead to NATO Class I or Class II security areas. Such a zone requires a visually defined perimeter, within which it is possible to control personnel and vehicles. Only classified information marked up to and including "NATO FOR LIMITED USE" (NR) must be handled and stored in Administrative Areas.

Special measures

11. The following measures are defined to indicate examples of physical security measures that can be applied: (a) perimeter fence - the perimeter fence will form an effective physical barrier and will define the boundaries of the area requiring protection. The effectiveness of any security perimeter will largely depend on the level of security at the access points.; (b) Intruder Detection System (IDS) - (IDS) can be used around the perimeter to enhance the level of security provided by the barrier, or can be used in rooms and buildings instead of or to assist security; (c) access control - access control can be carried out on the site, in the building or buildings on the site or the area, or the rooms inside the building. Control can be electronic, electronically mechanical, by means of security guards or a person leading the reception of visitors, or physical; (d) Security - the use of appropriately vetted, trained and supervised guards can create a significant obstacle for individuals with a covert entry plan; (e) Covert Surveillance System (CCTV) - (CCTV) is a valuable aid to security in checking incidents and alarms of the intruder detection system (IDS) in large areas or perimeters; and (f) Security lighting - security lighting can provide a high degree of obstruction to an intruder, in addition to providing the lighting necessary for effective surveillance, either directly by security personnel or through a covert surveillance system.

Entrance and exit inspection

12. NATO institutions should undertake random entry and exit checks designed to prevent unauthorized entry and removal of materials and classified information from a location or building.

Access control

13. A security pass or recognition system that monitors regular personnel must control access to Class I and Class II security areas. Visitors should be allowed access (escorted or unaccompanied) to NATO facilities based on identity verification and admission regulations.

NATO MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE STORAGE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

14. NATO's classified information should be kept only under conditions designed to prevent unauthorized access to information. 15. TOP SECRET (CTS). Information marked "CTS" must be stored in Class I and Class II security areas under the following conditions: (a) in a safe equipped with an intruder detection system (IDS) or in a secure container approved by the country, in an area that is subject to permanent protection or periodic inspection; and (b) in an open storage area equipped with an intruder detection system (IDS) in accordance with instructions providing physical protection. 16. NATO IS CLASSIFIED (NS). Information marked "NS" must be stored in Class I and Class II security areas under the following conditions: (a) under the same conditions as prescribed for information marked (CTS); or (b) in a country-approved secure container or safe; or (c) in an open storage area equipped with an intruder detection System (IDS), or in a region that is subject to constant protection or periodic inspection. 17. NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NC). Information marked "NC" must be stored under the same conditions as prescribed for information marked (CTS) or (NS), except for those that do not require additional control measures described in the physical security instructions. 18. NATO FOR LIMITED USE (NR). Information marked "NR" must be stored in closed containers. 19. Expanded details on the storage of NATO classified information are set out in the relevant physical security instructions.

PROTECTION AGAINST TECHNICAL MEANS OF INFORMATION INTERCEPTION

Unauthorized extraction of information

20. Offices or areas where classified information with the NATO CLASSIFIED (NS) and higher is regularly discussed should be protected against active and passive unauthorized extraction by taking measures of sound physical protection and access control to places of possible risk for such actions. The responsibility for determining the risk should be agreed with the technical specialists, and the decision should be made by the relevant safety management.

Technically safe areas

21. Areas protected against unauthorized extraction of audio information should be defined as technically secure areas, and entry to such areas should be specially monitored. Rooms where no work is carried out must be locked and/or guarded in accordance with physical security standards, and any keys are treated as security system keys. Such areas will be subject to regular physical and/or technical inspections in accordance with the requirements of the relevant safety guidelines, which will also be undertaken after any unauthorized entry or suspicion of such entry and the entry of personnel to carry out maintenance or repair work on the premises.

PHYSICAL SECURITY OF COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS (CIS)

22. Areas where NATO classified information is presented or accessed using information technology, or where potential access to such information is possible, should be organized to meet the combined requirements for confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information. The zones in which classified information classified as "NATO CLASSIFIED" (NS) or higher is located, stored, processed or transmitted, or where potential access to such information is possible, should be organized as zones with NATO Class I and Class II security levels or the national equivalent of the security level. The areas where classified information with the "NR" stamp is located, stored, processed or transmitted, or where potential access to such information is possible, can be organized as Administrative Zones.

AUTHORIZED EQUIPMENT

23. The National Security Agency (NSA) must maintain lists of equipment that they or other NATO member countries have authorized to be used to protect NATO classified information under various specified circumstances and conditions. NATO's military and civilian authorities must ensure that any equipment purchased complies with the Regulations of the NATO member country(s).

OTHER PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES

24. Detailed requirements are set out in the relevant physical security instructions for, for example, rooms and locks, keys and combination codes, containers and locks.

APPENDIX "E" INFORMATION SECURITY

introduction

1. This Annex sets out the policy and minimum standards for the protection of NATO classified information. Detailed information can be found in the relevant information security instructions. 2. NATO's classified information requires protection throughout its existence. Information must be handled in such a way as to ensure its appropriate secrecy, clear identification as classified information and its retention as such only for the required period. Information security measures should be complemented by personnel, physical protection, and information security protection in order to ensure a balanced range of measures to protect NATO classified information.

CLASSIFICATION OF SECRECY AND LABELING

The general part

3. The compiler is responsible for determining the classification of secrecy and the initial dissemination of information. The security level of NATO information should not be changed, lowered or canceled without the consent of the compiler. When preparing information, the compiler should indicate, where possible, a specific date or event at which the information may be downgraded or declassified. 4. The assigned security classification defines the physical security of storing and transmitting information, its circulation and destruction, and the requirements for verifying the reliability of personnel in order to obtain access to information. As a result, in the interests of efficiency and effectiveness of security, it is equally necessary to avoid both overestimating and underestimating the classification of secrecy. 5. NATO member States and NATO military and civilian authorities should implement measures to ensure that information compiled by NATO or intended for NATO is properly classified and protected in accordance with the requirements of the relevant information security instructions. 6. Each NATO military and civilian body must install a system that ensures that its information classified as "TOP SECRET" (CTS) is reviewed at least once every five years to determine whether it is appropriate to maintain the "TOP SECRET" (CTS) label. Such a review is not necessary for those instances in which the compiler of the information has predetermined that special information classified as "TOP SECRET" (CTS) should be automatically lowered in the classification of secrecy after two years, and such information is appropriately labeled. 7. The overall security level of the document should be at least the same as that of the most secret component. Parts of the document classified as "NATO CONFIDENTIAL" (NC) or higher should, where possible, be classified by the compiler (including the paragraph) to simplify the decision on further dissemination of the relevant part. The accompanying documents must be marked with the classification of the information contained in them, when it is separated from the information they accompany. 8. When comparing information obtained from different sources, the overall level of secrecy of the document should be checked, as it may require a higher security rating than its individual components. When using information to prepare a composite document, explanations of the general level of secrecy should be recalled.

Category markings

9. The designations "COSMIC" and "NATO" are category labels that apply to classified information, indicating that information must be protected in accordance with NATO's Security Policy.

Special category pointers

10. The designation "ATOMIC" is a marking applied to information of a special category, indicating that information must be protected in accordance with Appendix "B", paragraph 5.11. The designation "SIOP" is a marking applied to information of a special category, indicating that the information must be protected in accordance with the reference mentioned in Appendix "B", paragraph 6.12. The designation "CRYPTO" is a marking and an index of a special category that defines all key COMSEC materials used to protect or authenticate communications equipment transmitting security-related information to NATO; it determines that information must be protected in accordance with cryptographic security instructions.

Distribution restriction pointers

13. As an additional pointer to further restrictions on the dissemination of classified NATO information, the compiler may use a distribution restriction pointer.

CONTROL AND HANDLING

Reporting tasks

14. The primary objective of reporting is to provide sufficient information to investigate intentional or accidental compromise of reporting information and assess the resulting damage. Reporting requirements serve to establish discipline in handling accountable information and to control access to it. 15. Secondary objectives are: (a) to monitor access to accountable information, who has, or potentially has, had access to accountable information; and who has attempted to have access to accountable information; (b) know the location of the reporting information; and (c) monitor the circulation of the reporting information within the NATO territories of the countries. 16. Information marked "COSMIC", "NC" and "ATOMIC" must be accountable, controlled and handled in accordance with the requirements of this Application and the relevant information security instructions. Where national rules and regulations require, information bearing a different security classification or with special category indexes may be considered accountable information.

Registration system

17. There should be a registration system responsible for receiving, maintaining records, handling and destroying accountable information. Such an obligation can be fulfilled either within a single registration system, in which information with a stamp (CTS) must be constantly strictly categorized, or separate registration and control points must be established for it. 18. Each NATO member country and NATO military and civilian organizations must establish a Central Office(s) for Information marked "CTS", acting as the main national authority or authority within which it is established, receiving and sending information. The Central Office may also act as a registration point(s) for other accountable information. 19. The offices and registration offices should act as responsible organizations for the internal dissemination of classified information classified as "TOP SECRET" (CTS) and "NATO CLASSIFIED" (NS) and for keeping records of all accountable documents under the control of these registration offices; they can be organized at the ministry, department or command level. Information marked "NATO CONFIDENTIAL" (NS) and "NATO FOR LIMITED USE" (NR) is not required to be processed through the registration system, except in cases stipulated by national rules and regulations. 20. Offices and registration offices should be able to locate NATO reporting information at any time. Infrequent and temporary access to such information does not require the mandatory establishment of an office or registration office, provided that on-site procedures ensure that the information remains under the control of the registration system. 21. The dissemination of classified information marked "TOP SECRET" (CTS) must be carried out through COSMIC registration channels. At least once a year, each registration office (office) must make an inventory of all classified information marked "CTS", which is accountable in accordance with the requirements of the relevant information security instructions. Regardless of the type of registry organization, personnel working with information marked "CTS" must be authorized by a Top Secret Information Control Officer (CCO). 22. The relevant information security instructions, among other things, establish the duties of the COSMIC Control Officer (CCO), the detailed processes for handling classified information classified as "TOP SECRET" (CTS) and "NATO CLASSIFIED" (NS), the registration system, procedures for reproduction, translation and extracts, requirements for the dissemination or transmission of information, and requirements for the elimination and destruction of information. 23. The NATO Military Committee has established separate systems for reporting, monitoring, and distributing classified materials. Materials distributed through these systems do not require accountability in the registration system.

CONTINGENCY PLANNING

24. NATO member States and NATO military and civilian organizations should prepare an emergency plan to protect or destroy NATO classified information during emergencies in order to prevent unauthorized access and disclosure and loss of availability. The highest priority in these plans should be given to the most sensitive, timely and time-limited information.

BREACH OF SECURITY, UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS AND UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

25. The protection of NATO classified information depends on the underlying relevant security instructions, which enforce approved policies, directives and guidelines, and on the effective implementation of these instructions through training and monitoring, together with disciplinary action and legal sanctions in extreme cases. 26. All security breaches should be reported immediately to the relevant security management. Every case of a security breach should be investigated by persons with relevant experience in security, investigative and counterintelligence activities, as well as independent from those involved in the breach. 27. The main purpose of the report on unauthorized access to NATO classified information is to assist the NATO component that compiled the information, assess the results of the damage caused by NATO and take any necessary or practical actions to mitigate such damage. A report on damage assessment and mitigation measures should be submitted to the NATO Security Office (NOS). 28. After the report on unauthorized access to classified NATO information to the NATO Security Office (NOS), the report must be submitted to the National Security Authority (NSA) and the Head of the NATO military and Civilian authority in relation to them. Whenever possible, the management to whom the report is being made should simultaneously inform the NATO component that compiled the information and the NATO Security Office (NOS), but the latter of these authorities may require this in cases where it is difficult to identify the originator. The time for submitting reports depends on the nature of the information and circumstances. 29. The NATO Secretary General may request the relevant authorities to conduct further investigation and report on its results. 30. The relevant security instructions set out detailed actions, records, and requirements regarding reports of violations and unauthorized access. 31. Separate regulations related to unauthorized access to cryptographic materials are issued by the NATO Military Command, the leadership on communications security and NATO member countries, and NATO military and civilian organizations.

SECURITY MEASURES TO AUTHORIZE THE TRANSFER OF CLASSIFIED NATO INFORMATION TO NON-NATO COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Introduction

32. Classified information entrusted to or compiled by NATO in order to facilitate the fulfillment of NATO objectives is disseminated and protected in accordance with NATO Security Policies, directives and procedures. This paragraph sets out the policy for authorizing the transfer of classified NATO information to non-NATO countries and international organizations, including such countries (hereinafter referred to as non-NATO recipients). The paragraph also affects information contained in documents issued by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) or any other NATO committee or military or civilian body (hereinafter referred to as NATO bodies). 33. The transfer of classified NATO information to non-NATO recipients should be carried out in the context of NATO cooperation approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC). 34. Information of any classification regarding ATOMIC nuclear weapons cannot be shared with any country/organization that is not a party to the existing versions of C-M(64)39 and C-M(68)41.

PRINCIPLES FOR AUTHORIZING THE TRANSFER OF CLASSIFIED NATO INFORMATION TO NON-NATO COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

35. The authorization of the transmission of information must always be subject to the consent of the originator of the information. In addition, the following requirements must be met: (a) for classified information disseminated within the framework of NATO cooperation activities approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC): (i) the subject of discussion must be included in the general work plan of events or in practical established cooperation measures; (ii) the transfer of classified information to NATO should be requested in order to initiate cooperation on a specific topic or to continue and further develop cooperation within an approved framework; and (iii) a Security Agreement should be concluded, signed by the Secretary General on behalf of NATO and an authorized representative of a non-NATO recipient country.; (b) for classified NATO information specifically requested by either NATO or a NATO member country or NATO authorities (the Initiator) to a non-NATO country outside the framework of NATO cooperation activities approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC): (i) The Initiator is responsible for providing NATO with a written guarantee from the recipient of the information, who is not a NATO member, that the information received will be protected in accordance with the minimum standards of NATO. (ii) The initiator should transmit this signed guarantee to the relevant committees along with the request for information; and (iii) the request should demonstrate the advantages that can be acquired by NATO in this regard. The justification for admission must be precise, avoiding general formulations. 36. Authorizations made in accordance with paragraph 35 (a) above may relate either to clearly defined information or to information of a general category. Authorizations made in accordance with paragraph 35 (b) may only relate to clearly defined information.

Safety Guide

37. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the highest authority authorizing the transmission of classified NATO information to non-NATO recipients. Such authority must comply with the principle of approval of the originator of the information and is delegated to: (a) the relevant committees for information classified as "NATO CONFESSIONAL" (NC) and above. (b) The NATO Military Committee (NAMILCOM) for information classified as "NATO CLASSIFIED" (NS) or higher, compiled by the NATO Military Committee (NAMILCOM) and its subordinate bodies. (c) NATO Production and Logistics Organizations (NPLOS) for classified NATO information compiled or owned by one (or more) a member country of the NATO Production and Logistics Organization (NPLO). 38. The authority to transmit information should be vested only in the committee whose representative compiled the information. If the originator cannot be identified, the relevant committee must assume the responsibilities of the originator. The authority to transmit information may be given to the lowest level of the committee, which is better suited to assess the importance of classified information. 39. Those authorized to transfer cannot, in turn, betray this right, despite the fact that they can entrust subordinate authorities with the execution of the transfer decision.

ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY AGREEMENT

40. The completion of administrative measures must be confirmed by the result of a security check conducted by the NATO Security Office of the relevant departments of the recipient of information that is not a NATO member. The security check should establish the ability of a non-NATO recipient of information to meet the requirements of the Security Agreement and minimum standards. 41. The NATO Security Office must compile a security verification report and provide a copy to the Security Management of the recipient of the information who is not a NATO member. The original report must be kept at the NATO Security Office and made available to NATO member countries. Conclusions drawn from the report regarding the ability of a non-NATO recipient to protect classified NATO information should be communicated by the NATO Security Office to the relevant NATO authorities and NATO member countries. 42. The relevant information security instructions contain, among other things: (a) procedures for the transfer of classified NATO information to non-NATO recipients; (b) specific dissemination procedures for the NATO Production and Logistics Organization (NPLO), international organizations, and Multinational Joint Task Forces (CJTF); (c) minimum standards required for the handling and protection of classified NATO information communicated to non-NATO recipients. Minimum standards applicable to any non-NATO recipients of information, regardless of the conclusion of a Security Agreement with NATO or the provision of a security guarantee by NATO; (d) Detailed administrative arrangements to be carried out by all non-NATO recipients of information; and (e) samples of a Security Guarantee, a personnel security certificate, and a security clearance certificate.

APPENDIX "F" INFORMATION SECURITY

introduction

1. This Annex clearly sets out the policy and minimum standards for the protection of classified NATO information and supporting system services and resources in communications, information and other electronic systems (hereinafter referred to in this Annex as systems) used to store, process or transmit (hereinafter referred to in this Annex as processing) classified NATO information. 2. The "General Information Security Instruction", published by the National Security Council and the NATO Advisory, Command and Control Council (NC3B) in support of this policy, examines information security activities in the information security lifecycle and responsibilities of NATO committees and civilian and military authorities. The "Main Information Security Service Instruction" is supported by information security management instructions (including security risk management, security certificate, security-related documentation, and security review/verification), technical aspects, and information security implementation aspects (including computer and LAN security, network security interconnection, cryptographic protection, communication secrecy, and confidentiality data transmission).

Security objectives

3. In order to achieve adequate security protection for classified NATO information processed in the systems, it is necessary to identify and implement a balanced set of security measures (physical, personnel, information and information security measures) to create a secure environment in which the system operates and to fulfill the following security objectives: (a) to ensure the confidentiality of information by controlling disclosure and access access to NATO classified information and supporting system services and resources; (b) to ensure the integrity of NATO classified information and supporting system services and resources; and (c) to ensure the availability of NATO classified information and supporting system services and resources. 4. The integrity and accessibility of classified NATO information and supporting system services and resources should be protected by minimal measures aimed at providing common protection against common problems (both accidental and intentional) that are known to affect all systems and supporting system services and resources. Additional measures should be taken appropriate to the circumstances in which a risk assessment has determined that classified NATO information and/or supporting system services and resources are at increased risk of specific threats and vulnerabilities.

SAFETY CERTIFICATE

5. The degree of implementation of security objectives and the reliability of information security measures to protect classified NATO information and supporting system services and resources is determined during the process of establishing security requirements. The safety assessment process should determine whether an adequate level of protection has been achieved and is being maintained. 6. All systems that process classified NATO information must undergo a security assessment process that addresses security concerns about confidentiality, integrity, and accessibility.

STAFF SAFETY

7. Persons who have received access to classified NATO information of any form must undergo security checks at an appropriate level, taking into account their general responsibilities to respect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information and supporting system services and resources. This category also includes people who have gained access to supporting system services and resources, or those who are responsible for protecting them, even if they do not have access to information processed by the system.

PHYSICAL SECURITY

8. The areas in which classified NATO information is presented and processed using information technology or where potential access to such information is possible should be established in such a way that basic requirements for confidentiality, integrity and accessibility are respected.

SECURITY OF COMPUTER STORAGE MEDIA

9. All classified computer storage media must be properly identified, stored, and protected in a manner consistent with the highest classification of information storage. 10. Classified NATO information recorded on reusable computer media should only be erased in accordance with procedures approved by the security authority.

responsibility

11. It is necessary to have a means of providing sufficient information to investigate intentional or accidental compromise of information confidentiality and, in accordance with the possible damage caused, intentional or accidental compromise of the integrity and/or availability of classified NATO information and supporting system services and resources.

SECURITY MEASURES

12. For all systems processing classified NATO information, it is necessary to apply a consistent set of security measures in order to meet the security and protection objectives of information and supporting system services and resources. Security measures should include the following: (a) a way to reliably identify and authenticate authorized accessors. Information and material controlling access to the system should be checked and protected by measures appropriate to the information that can be accessed.; (b) a way to control the disclosure and access to information and supporting system services and resources based on the principle of service compliance; (c) a way to verify the integrity and source of information and supporting system services and resources; (d) a way to maintain the integrity of classified NATO information and supporting system services and resources; (e) a way to maintain the availability of classified NATO information and supporting system services and resources; (f) a method for monitoring the communication of systems processing classified NATO information; (g) determining confidence in information security safeguards; (h) a method for evaluating and verifying the proper functioning of information security safeguards during the system lifecycle; and (i) a method for investigating the activities of the system and the user. 13. Security management mechanisms and procedures should be in place to deter, prevent, detect, and recover from incidents affecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of classified NATO information and supporting system services and resources, including security incident reporting. 14. Security measures should be regulated and implemented in accordance with the instructions supporting this policy.

SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT

15. Systems that process classified NATO information in NATO civilian and military authorities should be subject to risk assessment and risk management in accordance with the requirements of the instructions supporting this policy.

ELECTROMAGNETIC TRANSMISSION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO NATO

16. When NATO classified information is transmitted by electromagnetic means, special measures must be taken to protect the confidentiality, integrity and accessibility of such transmission. NATO authorities should define requirements to protect the transmission from detection, interception or use. Information transmitted in communication systems must be protected based on confidentiality, integrity, and accessibility requirements. 17. When cryptographic methods are required to protect confidentiality, integrity, and accessibility, such methods or related products must be specifically approved for this purpose. 18. During transmission, the confidentiality of information classified as "NATO CLASSIFIED" (NS) or higher must be protected by cryptographic methods or products approved by the NATO Military Committee (NAMILCOM). 19. During the transfer, the confidentiality of information classified as "NATO - confidential" or "NATO - for restricted use" must be protected by cryptographic methods or products approved by the NATO Military Committee or a NATO member State, except in the case where the method or product is funded by NATO, when approval is obtained by the HATO Military Committee (NAMILCOM). 20. During transmission, the integrity and accessibility of classified information must be verified in accordance with the operational requirements of the communication system. The evaluation requirements and the approval body should be defined and agreed upon in accordance with the specification of such mechanisms in the operational requirements as specified in the technical instructions. 21. In exceptional operational circumstances, information classified as "NATO - confidential", "NATO - for limited use" and "NATO SECRET" may be transmitted in plain text, provided that each such case is resolved. Exceptional circumstances may be as follows: a) during an impending or actual crisis, conflict or military situation; and (b) when the speed of delivery is of great importance or encryption tools are unavailable, and it has been determined that the transmitted information cannot be used on time and will adversely affect the operation. 22. During transmission within the systems of non-NATO member States/Of international organizations, the confidentiality of information classified by NATO SECRET and above must be protected by cryptographic methods or products approved by the NATO Military Committee. During transmission within the systems of non-NATO member States/Of international organizations, the confidentiality of information classified as "NATO - confidential" or "NATO - for limited use" should be ensured by cryptographic methods or products evaluated or approved by the relevant authority. The relevant body may be the NATO Military Committee, the National Communications Security Authority of a NATO member state, or an equivalent body of non-NATO member States./International organizations, provided that the latter have structures, rules, and procedures for evaluating, selecting, approving, and controlling such methods or products. Structures, rules and procedures should be agreed upon between NATO and non-NATO member States./International organizations.

SECURITY OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRODUCTS, MECHANISMS, AND INFORMATION

23. The sensitive nature of cryptographic products, mechanisms, and information used to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and accessibility of classified NATO information requires special precautions beyond those necessary to protect other classified NATO information. 24. The protection of cryptographic products, mechanisms, and information must be commensurate with the damage in the event of a security failure. A realistic way is needed to evaluate and verify the protection and proper functioning of cryptographic products and mechanisms, as well as the protection and control of cryptographic information. 25. In recognition of the special sensitivity of cryptographic information, special rules and authorities are needed within NATO and each member State to manage the receipt, control, and dissemination of NATO cryptographic information to specially authorized individuals. 26. It is also necessary to follow special procedures that regulate the exchange of technical information, as well as the selection, production and purchase of cryptographic products and mechanisms.

CONFIDENTIALITY OF DATA TRANSMISSION

27. Security measures should be implemented to protect against compromising information classified as "NATO - Confidential" or higher by unintentional electromagnetic radiation. Measures should be appropriate to the risk of using and sensitivity of the information.

SPECIAL INFORMATION SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES

The NATO Advisory, Command and Control Manual

28. As the Main Political Strategy Committee, the NATO Advisory, Command and Control (C3) Leadership supports the NATO Military Committee and the NATO political authorities in the process of ratifying C3 capabilities and projects by verifying C3 operational requirements. The NATO Advisory, Command and Control Leadership is responsible for ensuring safe and compatible C3 systems in NATO.

National Communications Security Authority (NCSA)

29. Each NATO state must define an NCSA. The main tasks of the NCSA are as follows: (a) to control cryptographic technical information related to the protection of NATO information within their countries; (b) to ensure that NATO cryptographic systems, products and information protection mechanisms are effectively and efficiently selected, operated and maintained.; and (c) liaison support on NATO communications security and related technical information security issues, both civilian and military, with relevant national and NATO authorities.

National Distribution Authority (NDA)

30. Each country should identify a NOR that is responsible for managing NATO cryptocurrencies within its countries, as well as ensure that appropriate procedures and channels established for comprehensive accounting protect the processing, storage and distribution of all cryptocurrencies.

APPENDIX "G" MEASURES AGAINST THE LEAKAGE OF GOVERNMENT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION HELD BY INDUSTRY

introduction

1. This Annex examines the security aspects of industrial operations that are exclusive to the negotiation and conclusion of secret NATO contracts and their execution in industry, including the disclosure of classified NATO information during negotiations prior to the conclusion of the contract. This Annex sets out the security policy for: (a) negotiation and conclusion of secret NATO contracts; (b) security requirements for secret NATO contracts; (c) disclosure of secret NATO information at the conclusion of the contract; (d) security clearances for NATO contracts; (e) international transportation of NATO classified material; (f) international visits; and (g) temporary personnel under a NATO project/program. 2. This Appendix is accompanied by an industrial safety instruction that contains detailed requirements and procedures. The instruction includes requirements for the negotiation and conclusion of secret NATO contracts, security requirements for secret NATO contracts, national authorities for granting access to classified information at the facility and for personnel, international transportation and visiting authorities, a list of various organizations involved in secret NATO contracts and their responsibilities, as well as a list of programs/projects NATO, participating countries and NATO agencies.

NEGOTIATION AND CONCLUSION OF SECRET NATO CONTRACTS

3. The main contract of the NATO program/project must be agreed upon and concluded by the NATO Program/Project Agency/Office (NPA/NPO). All contractors working under the contract require access to classified information under the heading "NATO - confidential" and higher. For contracts marked "NATO - for limited use", admission is not required, unless otherwise agreed by national security rules and regulations. 4. The NPA/NPO concluding the contract must ensure that the contractor's representatives involved in contract negotiations under the heading "NATO - confidential" and above have the appropriate security clearance category and will only have access to classified NATO information necessary for the conclusion of the contract. 5. After the main contract has been concluded, the main contractor can subcontract with other contractors, i.e. subcontractors. Subcontractors may also subcontract with other subcontractors. If a potential subcontractor is located and works in a non-NATO member State, permission to conclude a subcontract must be obtained from the NPA/NPO (see Appendix E, paragraphs 29-33). If the NPA/NPO has established restrictions on the conclusion of a contract for NATO states that do not participate in the program/project, the NPA/NPO must issue a permit before discussing the contract with contractors from these countries. 6. Upon conclusion of the main contract, the NPA/NPO must notify the National Security Authorities/Designated Security Authorities (NSA/DSA) of the main contractor and ensure that the security letter and/or project security instructions are provided to the main contractor along with the contract (see paragraphs 8 and 9 below).

SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR SECRET NATO CONTRACTS

7. The lead contractor and subcontractors must, upon threat of termination, take all measures prescribed by the NSA/DSA to protect and preserve all classified NATO information entrusted to the contractor or included in articles developed by the contractor. 8. Secret NATO contracts for major programs/projects should contain program security instructions as an appendix; part of the program security instructions should be a "Project Security Classification Guide." All other secret NATO contracts should include, at a minimum, a letter on the security aspect, which may be a security instruction for a scaled-down program. In the latter case, the Project Security Classification Guide can be referred to as the "Security Classification List". The program security instructions and/or the security aspect letter, depending on the scope of the program/project, should be the only source document for the program/project and be used to standardize program/project security procedures among participating countries and NATO agencies and their contractors. 9. The responsibility for applying the safety classification in the program/project elements related to the product, in which all the elements are precisely defined and their classification is predetermined, lies with the NPA/NPO under a contract operating in cooperation with the NSA/DSA of the participating NATO Member States. 10. The classification of program/project information elements related to possible subcontracts is based on the Project/Program Security Classification Guidelines.

DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED NATO INFORMATION IN CONTRACTS

11. Disclosure of classified NATO information must be made with the consent of the source and in accordance with other applicable annexes to the NATO Security Policy and the supporting Industrial Safety Instructions.

ACCESS TO INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFIED INFORMATION FOR NATO CONTRACTS

The general part

12. The policy described in the following paragraphs for facilities and individuals is applied in contracts and subcontracts.

Access to classified information at the facility

13. The NSA/DSA (National Security Agencies/Designated Security Agencies) of each NATO Member State is responsible for ensuring that any facility located and part of that country that requires access to information classified as "NATO - confidential" or higher in order to enter into pre-contractual negotiations or apply for a secret contract NATO has taken the protective security measures necessary to obtain access to classified information at the facility. Moreover, employees of the facility who require access to classified NATO information must undergo appropriate screening and be instructed before providing a certificate of access to classified information. Admission should be based on the level of classification of information, its volume and nature, and the number of individuals who will need access to it during the preparation of applications or negotiations. 14. The contractor may participate in pre-contract negotiations, submit applications, or execute a secret NATO contract, provided that the NSA/DSA of the State in which the contractor is located and operates has assigned the contractor's facility the required security clearance level at the facility. 15. The assessment carried out before the approval category is assigned must comply with the requirements and criteria set out in the supporting industrial safety instructions. 16. The lack of access to classified information for the facility's employees should not prevent the contractor from applying for a contract or subcontract under the heading "NATO - for limited use". A country that, based on its national security rules and regulations, requires access to classified information for a "NATO - restricted use" contract or subcontract should not discriminate against a contractor from a country that does not require access, but should ensure that the contractor has been notified of its information security responsibilities and recognizes the data. obligations.

Access to classified information for facility employees

17. Security clearance must be granted in accordance with Annex C (Personnel Security), the NATO Security Policy, and the supporting personnel and Industrial safety instructions. 18. Requests for verification of employees of the contractor's facilities for access to classified information must be submitted to the NSA/DSA, who are responsible for the facility. When applying for verification or initiation of security clearance, the subject must include the following: (a) the authenticity and security classification of the NATO contract or subcontractor, and (b) the level of NATO classified information to which the employee will have access. 19. If a facility wishes to hire a non-NATO national for a position that requires access to classified NATO information, it is the responsibility of the NSA/DSA of the country in which the employing facility is located and operates to follow the procedures for assigning the security clearance prescribed here and determine that the individual can be granted security clearance in accordance with the requirements Applications With and supporting instructions on personnel safety and industrial safety.

INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION OF CLASSIFIED NATO MATERIAL

Safety principles applicable to all forms of transportation

20. The following principles should be applied when verifying proposed security measures for international shipments of classified material: (a) safety should be guaranteed at all stages of transportation and in all circumstances from the point of dispatch to the final destination; (b) the degree of protection of the shipment should be determined by the highest classification level of the material contained therein; (c) admission Access to classified information must be obtained according to the circumstances for the companies providing transportation. In such cases, the personnel involved in the transportation of the consignment should be checked in accordance with the terms of this Annex: (d) transportation should be carried out, as far as possible, from point to point, and should be completed as soon as circumstances permit; and (e) supervision should be carried out only when organizing transportation through the territory of the NATO states. Transportation through the territories of non-NATO member States must be carried out upon receipt of permission from the NSA/DSA (National Security Authorities/Designated Security authorities) of the shipping country and in accordance with the supporting information security instruction. 21. Activities related to shipments of classified material should be specified for each program/project. However, such measures should ensure that there is no possibility of unauthorized access to classified materials. 22. The security standards for international transportation of NATO classified material are listed in the supporting Information Security Manual. Detailed requirements for the transportation of NATO classified material in hand luggage, the transportation of classified material by commercial airlines as cargo, security and escort, and the transportation of explosive substances, propellant explosives, and other dangerous substances are set out in the supporting Industrial safety instructions.

INTERNATIONAL VISITS

The general part

23. The activities described in this section relate to international visits by military and civilian representatives of NATO States, NATO civilian and military authorities, and NATO contractors and subcontractors who need to visit the following locations for approved NATO activities: (a) a government department or agency of another NATO Member State; (b) a contractor's facility or a subcontractor of another NATO Member State; or (c) a NATO civilian or military authority. 24. The visits referred to in paragraph 23 (a) and (b) above must be approved by the NSA/DSA of the NATO State in which the visit(s) will take place, taking into account the following: (a) the visit has an official purpose related to the NATO program or project; and (b) all Visitors have the appropriate security clearance category and an official need for information related to a NATO project or program or NATO activities. 25. Government departments and agencies, contractors and subcontractors, and NATO civilian and military authorities hosting visitors must ensure that: (a) visits comply with the requirements set out in paragraph 24 above; (b) visitors are provided access only to classified NATO information relevant to the purpose of the visit; and (c) data is retained. about all visitors, including their names, the organizations they represent, the date(s) of the visit(s), and the name(s) of the visitors. Such data should be maintained in accordance with national requirements. 26. Government departments and agencies, contractors and subcontractors intending to send personnel on an international visit must submit to the NSA/DSA of the visited facility, through their NSA/DSA or agreed official channels, an application for an international visit in accordance with the procedures set out in the industrial safety instructions. The application for an international visit must ensure that each visitor has a valid relevant admission category. 27. If permitted by national security rules and regulations, visits marked "NATO - for limited use" and "NATO - unclassified" can be organized directly between the Visitor's Security Office and the Security Office of the visited facility.

TEMPORARY STAFF WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NATO PROJECT/PROGRAM

28. When an individual who has been granted access to classified NATO information is temporarily transferred from one facility to another under the same NATO program/project, but to another NATO member State, the individual's original facility must apply to its NSA/DSA for a Certificate of Admission for the individual to the NSA/DSA the object to which it is temporarily being sent. A temporary employee must be appointed to the position in accordance with the procedures for applying for an international visit, which are set out in the industrial safety instructions, and in accordance with national safety rules and regulations.

dictionary

Accountable information

All information is classified as "Top Secret" (CTS) and "NATO - Classified" (NS) and all special category information (such as ATOMIC).

Availability

The property of information and material to be accessible and used at the request of authorized persons or organizations.

Security breach

Deliberate or accidental action or omission contrary to the NATO security Policy and supporting directives, which leads to the accomplished or possible compromise of classified information NATO or supporting services and resources (including, for example, classified information lost during transportation; left in an unsecured area where unauthorized persons may have unauthorized access; inability to find an accountable document; classified information has been subject to unauthorized changes; it was destroyed in an unauthorized way or a denial of service was received for communication information systems).

Classified information

Any information (namely, information that can be transmitted in any form) or material that requires protection from unauthorized disclosure, and which has been characterized as such by the security classification.

Competent authority

An authority designated by the National Security Authority of a NATO State (NSA), which is authorized to carry out procedures for assigning its citizens a category of access to classified NATO information.

Compromise

Compromise refers to a situation in which, as a result of security breaches or hostile actions (such as espionage, acts of terrorism, sabotage, or theft), classified NATO information has lost its confidentiality, integrity, or accessibility, or supporting services and resources have lost their integrity or accessibility. This includes loss, disclosure to unauthorized persons (for example, through espionage or the media), unauthorized modification, unauthorized destruction, or denial of service.

Confidentiality

The property of information not being accessible or disclosed by unauthorized persons or organizations.

Access to classified information at the facility (FSC)

The NSA/DSA administrative definition, which states from a security perspective that a facility can provide security protection for classified NATO information of a special classification or lower, and that personnel who require access to classified NATO information have been appropriately vetted and instructed regarding NATO security requirements necessary to comply with secret NATO treaties.

The guards

Civilian (government or participating contractor employees) or military personnel, who may be armed or unarmed. They can only perform security duties or combine these duties with others.

Country of residence

General term: A country in which a military or civilian NATO body is located Industrial security: a country elected by an official NATO body to act as a government agency and committed to fulfilling a basic NATO contract. The countries where subcontracts are performed are not referred to as host countries.

Information

Information transmitted in various forms.

Information Security (INFOSEC)

The application of security measures to protect available information stored or transmitted through communications, information service systems and other electronic systems against loss of confidentiality, integrity or accessibility, both accidental and intentional, and to prevent loss of integrity or accessibility of the systems themselves. Notes. 1. Information security measures include computer security, ensuring the secrecy of communication, confidentiality of data transmission, and cryptographic protection. 2. Such measures also include detecting, documenting, and countering threats to information and systems.

Violation

A security breach is an act or omission, intentional or accidental, contrary to the NATO security policy and supporting directives, which does not lead to the consummation or possible compromise of NATO classified information (for example, classified information left unprotected at a secure facility where all persons have the appropriate security clearance category; classified information was left in the clear, etc.).

Integrity

A property indicating that information (including encrypted text) has not been altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner.

International visits

Visits by persons subordinate to one NSA/DSA (national security authority of a NATO State/designated security authority) or belonging to a NATO body to a facility or bodies controlled by another NSA/DSA or NATO that will require or cause access to classified information, or where, regardless of the level of secrecy, the visit is subject to A NATO-supported institution or body under national jurisdiction requires the approval of the relevant NSA/DSA. All NATO civilian and military authorities fall under the jurisdiction of NATO security.

Life cycle

The information lifecycle includes the stages of planning, collecting, creating, or shaping information; its organization, restoration, use, accessibility, and transmission; its storage and protection; and, finally, its placement through archiving or destruction.

Main program/ project

A program or project of great importance, usually involving more than two countries and security measures that exceed the usual basic requirements described in the NATO security policy.

Material

The material includes documents, as well as any elements of machinery, equipment/components, weapons or tools produced or in the process of production.

Citizens

Citizens include "subjects of the Kingdom," "citizens of the States," and "settled immigrants in Canada." "Settled immigrants in Canada" are individuals who have passed a national background check, including residency, criminal record, and security checks, and who are about to obtain a legal permanent residence permit in the country.

National Security Agency (NSA)

The authority of a NATO member State that is responsible for maintaining the security of classified NATO information in national agencies and elements, military or civilian, within its own country and beyond.

NATO

NATO Production and Logistics Organization (NPLO)

A subsidiary body established within the framework of NATO to carry out tasks arising from the treaty, to which the North Atlantic Council grants clearly defined organizational, administrative and financial independence. It should consist of a board of directors and an executive body, which in turn consists of the general manager and staff.

The NATO Program

A program approved by the Council, which is monitored by the NATO Office/office in accordance with NATO regulations.

The NATO Project

A project approved by the Council, which is supervised by the NATO Directorate/office in accordance with NATO regulations.

NATO Project Management Agency

The executive Body of the NATO Organization for Production and Logistics.

Official necessity

See the "Principle of Service Necessity" below.

Conversation

The term covers all aspects of contracting or subcontracting, from the initial "notification of intent to apply for participation" to the final decision to conclude a contract or subcontract.

Open storage area

A zone created in accordance with security requirements and used with the permission of the head of a civilian or military authority for the open storage of classified information.

A source

The country or international organization under whose leadership the information was created or introduced into NATO.

Country of citizenship

The Kingdom of which the individual is a subject or the State of which the individual is a citizen.

National Security Agency (NSA)

The national security agency of the Kingdom or State of which the individual is a subject or citizen.

Verification of the well-being of personnel (personnel) for admission to secret work

The definition according to which an individual is suitable for gaining access to classified information.

The main contract

Initial contract led by the NATO Project Management Office/Agency/The office for the program/project.

The main contractor

An industrial, commercial, or other organization of a Member State that has entered into a contract with a NATO project management agency/office to provide services or produce products within the framework of a NATO project, and which in turn may enter into an agreed sub-agreement with potential subcontractors.

The principle of official necessity

The principle according to which it was positively established, that the intended recipient requires access, knowledge, and knowledge of information to perform official tasks and duties.

Guidelines for classifying the safety of a program/project

A part of the program (project) security instructions that defines the program elements that are classified with the designation of security classification levels. The security classification guidelines may increase in volume over the life cycle of the program, and information items may be declassified or classified in a lower security category.

Program/Project Safety Manual (PSI)

A set of security regulations/procedures based on the NATO Security policy and supporting directives that are applied in special projects/programs in order to standardize security procedures. The instructions also form an Appendix to the main contract and are subject to change during the life cycle of the program. For the sub-agreements concluded within the framework of the program, the program's security instructions form the basis of the letter on the security aspect.

Risk

The likelihood of a vulnerability being successfully exploited by a threat, leading to a compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and/or accessibility, and lasting damage.

Risk management

A systematic approach to identifying security countermeasures necessary to protect information and support services and resources based on an assessment of threats and vulnerabilities. Risk management involves planning, organizing, directing, and controlling resources to ensure that risk remains within acceptable limits.

Security Aspect Letter (SAL)

A document issued by the relevant authority as part of any secret agreement or sub-agreement other than the main program/project and defining security requirements or elements arising from it that require security.

Security guarantee

A guarantee provided by NATO directly or through a NATO state or a NATO civilian/military body.

List of safety classifications

The part of the letter on the security aspect that describes the secret elements of the contract, with the designation of secrecy labels. When contracts are concluded within the framework of a program/project, such information elements are extracted from the program/project security instructions issued for this program.

Special category information

Information such as information on nuclear weapons (ATOMAL) or the Unified Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), to which additional processing/protection procedures are applied.

Subcontract/ subcontracting

A contract concluded by the main contractor with another contractor (i.e. subcontractor) for the provision of goods or services.

Subcontractor

The contractor with whom the main contractor enters into a sub-agreement.

Threat

The possibility of compromising, losing, or stealing classified information from NATO or supporting services and resources. A threat can be determined by its source, motive, or outcome, it can be intentional or accidental, explicit or covert, external or internal.

Vulnerability

A flaw, attribute, or lack of control that contributes to putting a threat into action against classified NATO information or supporting services and resources.

The text has been translated into Russian in accordance with the original.

Head of the Main Department of International Programs Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Colonel V. Reichel

NATO IS UNCLASSIFIED

June 17, 2002 DOCUMENT C-M(2002)50

MEASURES TO PROTECT NATO CIVILIAN AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES OF DEPLOYED NATO FORCES AND FACILITIES AGAINST THE THREAT TERRORISM Note by the Secretary-General

1. This document is the result of the task set by the Council for the Development of directives for "NATO deployed forces and facilities against the threat of terrorism." The draft document was compiled by a group of Experts under the auspices of the NATO Security Committee (NSC), consisting of relevant national experts and military representatives. It also includes an amended version of one of the parts of the "Protection of the security of NATO Commands and Agencies", Appendix E to C-M/(55)15 (final). It was approved by the Board of Default Procedure on March 26, 2002 (C-M(2002)22-REV1 and a list of its activities). 2. This document cancels all previous versions of Appendix "E" to C-M(55)15(final), which must be destroyed. 3. A copy of this document will be included in a compendium containing 2 security policy documents and supporting directives, which will be distributed to all current holders of C-M(55)15(final) in the near future.

(signed) George Robertson

Applications: 3 Original: English

MEASURES TO PROTECT NATO CIVILIAN AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES OF DEPLOYED NATO FORCES AND FACILITIES (ASSETS) AGAINST THE THREAT TERRORISM

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 This C-M document sets out a policy on counterterrorism and anti-sabotage measures for: - PART 1: NATO civilian and military authorities and forces within the territory of NATO Member States. These measures must comply with the laws of the host country in which NATO civilian or military authorities are located or NATO forces are deployed. - PART 2: Forces and objects (means) NATO, deployed outside the territory of member States (operations outside Article 5). These measures are applied in the locations of NATO personnel and facilities with limited or no support from the host country, which can be counted on to ensure an adequate response to threats of terrorism or sabotage. 1.2 This C-M document forms part of the NATO security policy.

2. PART 1: PROTECTION MEASURES FOR NATO CIVILIAN AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES, DEPLOYED FORCES AND FACILITIES NATO AGAINST THE THREAT OF TERRORISM WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF NATO MEMBER STATES

2.1 THREATS AND RISKS 2.1.1 The risks to NATO civilian and military authorities arising from the threat of terrorism can be of 6 types: (a) general safety of personnel; (b) denial of necessary resources and services that would hinder or reduce the ability to complete the task; (c) physical damage; (d) disruption of performance tasks; (c) violation of freedom of movement, or (d) violation of general security and stability within the territory of NATO member States. 2.1.2 A potential threat to NATO civilian and military authorities and individuals from terrorist activities may come from: (i) terrorist organizations (which may include groups and individuals) that may choose NATO as a target; (ii) subversive activities that damage property, limit the abilities of individuals and/or cause loss of necessary resources and services; (iii) organized crime; (iv) public disorder.

2.1.3 Threats of violence to NATO civilian and military authorities may include: (a) bomb attacks or small arms attacks, car bombings, hand luggage bombs, mail bombs and explosive incendiary devices, (b) murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking or intimidation of NATO personnel and their families, ((c) Demonstrations that may be organized for the purpose of violence may lead to violence/damage through confrontation, (d) direct attacks and illegal occupation of NATO premises or property, as has happened with embassies and international missions, (e) false alarms, namely warnings about an allegedly planted bomb with the intent to annoy, (f) operations against essential/vital information technology systems, including attacks on the integrity and/or accessibility of these systems, (g) the neutralization by force of weapons, weapons and equipment necessary to achieve the task, and (h weapons of mass destruction (WMD), namely chemical and biological attacks.

2.2 RESPONSIBILITIES Host countries 2.2.1 Host countries are responsible for providing external protection to NATO civilian and military authorities. The host country decides whether this protection is provided by State counterintelligence services, law enforcement agencies, or State defense forces. Upon request, the host country must indicate to the head of a NATO civilian or military body the agency with which the security protection plans should be coordinated and at what level. The host country is also responsible for informing the heads of NATO's civil and military authorities about the assessment of threats posed by hostile intelligence services, subversive organizations, terrorist groups and similar elements, as circumstances require. (a) The host country must ensure, unless otherwise agreed, that information regarding threats related to NATO civilian and military authorities and their personnel located outside the respective territories is transmitted through bilateral channels from country to country.; (b) the host country should provide recommendations to NATO civilian and military authorities regarding specific additional counter-terrorism measures for various threat levels; (c) the host country is responsible for providing such security personnel and equipment to protect NATO personnel from the threat of terrorism outside the premises of NATO civilian and military authorities in accordance with state protection standards; and security procedures of the host country. The designation of personnel at risk of terrorism, as well as the security measures used to protect them, are determined by the security agency of the host country, taking into account proposals from interested civilian and military authorities of NATO (among others). These proposals should be justified; (d) for each civilian and military NATO body in its territory, the host country should determine a channel of contact for transmitting information about threats and coordinating internal security plans.

Sending countries 2.2.2 Sending countries should ensure the following: (a) When choosing places of residence for their personnel, a security analysis based on the experience of the security agencies of the host country should be taken into account. The costs incurred by the host country to improve physical security should be limited to the places of residence officially funded by them.; (b) The deployment of security personnel and the provision of protective security equipment by the sending country to combat any terrorist or subversive threats is coordinated with the security agencies of the host country and the relevant civilian or military authority of NATO; (c) informing the security agency of the host country and the relevant civilian or military authority of NATO of any existing threat to any of their citizens at NATO headquarters or national delegations, military missions or liaison missions located in conjunction with a civilian or military authority of NATO.

NATO Security Office 2.2.3 The NATO Security Office should provide assistance on counter-terrorism and counter-subversion issues and procedures. The NATO Security Office should provide a technical assessment/justification to the relevant budget committee regarding construction works and equipment/materials for counter-terrorism and anti-sabotage purposes. 2.2.4 The NATO Security Office should review the counter-terrorism programs of the NATO facility/unit when conducting its periodic security checks within the mandatory 18-month inspection cycle. The NATO Security Office Inspection Team will verify and advise on the adequacy of the counter-terrorism sections of the facility/unit's internal security plan and the facility/unit's ability to implement these counter-terrorism sections. Where appropriate, the NATO Security Office inspection team will also advise on the adequacy of counter-terrorism training and the exercise program of the facility/unit that supports the internal security plan.

NATO civil and military authorities 2.2.5 The head of a NATO military or civilian body should identify, in consultation with NATO and government authorities, as appropriate, key institutions and facilities under his jurisdiction that are important for continuing the function necessary to fulfill the core mission of NATO, taking into account the overall objectives of NATO. He is also responsible for planning and implementing the following additional counter-terrorism and anti-sabotage measures to protect facilities, including NATO-provided accommodation and personnel stationed in these premises. Senior NATO personnel should be represented by NATO civilian or military authorities in the host and sending country. In order to achieve satisfactory and beneficial arrangements in accordance with the risk management approach, the heads of NATO civil and military authorities undertake to: (a) appoint their contact persons for official communication with the relevant security authorities of the host country through channels approved by NATO: (i) obtain an overall assessment of the terrorist threat; (ii) carry out measures to (iii) coordinate counter-terrorism measures commensurate with the assessed threat.; and (iv) to submit proposals as indicated in paragraph 2.3.1 below; (b) to maintain official communication between senior NATO personnel or government personnel with the security authorities of the host country through channels approved by NATO to coordinate counter-terrorism measures in the event of a specific threat to: (i) personnel from terrorist organizations operating in their host countries countries; or (ii) citizens of a particular country; (c) establish an alert system, as described in paragraph 2.4.9 below, and define responsibilities for implementing pre-planned threat management measures; (d) establish procedures, as described in paragraphs 2.3.1 to 2.3.2 below, for reporting and reporting to host countries, sending countries, the NATO Security Office, and other civilian and military authorities NATO regarding terrorist threats and incidents.

2.3 REPORTS ON TERRORIST OR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

2.3.1 Reports by various military or civilian authorities on terrorist/subversive activities or incidents should reflect: (a) the authority from which the information originates; (b) the nature and consequences of the threat or incident; (c) the actions taken. 2.3.2 In order to avoid duplication of reports and to ensure that adequate information is provided to the authorities concerned, cases of threats or actual terrorist or subversive incidents should be reported as follows: (a) when information has been received from the security authorities of the host country: (i) the NATO military authorities should report a specific threat or incident to the authority responsible for from which the information originates (the "source") and the measures to be taken, to the next higher authority with a copy to the NATO Security Office; (ii) the commanders of national contingents (including non-NATO troop-contributing countries) should report to the command authorities in their capitals; (iii) NATO civilian authorities should report in accordance with paragraph (i) above directly to the NATO Security Office.; (b) when the information is obtained within the framework of a civilian or Military authority of NATO: (i) the NATO military authorities must report the specific threat or incident and the source, together with the measures to be taken, to the security authorities of the host country and, in accordance with the measures referred to in paragraph 2.2.5 above, to the appropriate superior or subordinate NATO headquarters in the vertical of control, with a copy to the NATO Security Office; (ii) civilian authorities NATO must report in accordance with paragraph (i) above to the security authorities of the host country and to the NATO Security Office.

2.4 SECURITY PLANNING 2.4.1 The design of NATO facilities should take into account a security analysis; and include the protection of materials and backup equipment necessary to: (a) continue to perform necessary operational functions; (b) protect NATO assets; and (c) the overall safety of all personnel.

2.4.2 Internal Security Plan The commanders of NATO facilities/units should prepare an internal security plan in order to ensure that the security of the facility/unit is protected from terrorist attacks. The Internal Security Plan is used to protect NATO personnel, their family members, and other assets. 2.4.3 The purpose of the internal security plan is to reduce vulnerability by deterring or detecting an attack or mitigating the consequences of a terrorist attack or acts of sabotage. The security plan should be developed using methodologies that would include the following requirements: (a) identification of the facilities of the facility or institution; (b) assessment of the consequences of the loss of such facilities affecting the continuation of the function necessary to fulfill the main task of NATO; (c) a detailed analysis of the facility's vulnerabilities, which includes an assessment of methods attacks to which they are vulnerable. 2.4.4 Based on these requirements, it is necessary to develop a set of security measures that will reduce the vulnerability of important assets. Measures may include physical measures (fences, gates, doors, grilles), electronic measures (cable TV, internal or external alarms), or human resources (security and response forces). The security plan should also identify the possibilities of additional security measures or procedures (for example, searching visitors), the use of which increases with increased vigilance and is canceled with reduced vigilance. 2.4.5 The security plan should be developed in close cooperation with the relevant authorities of the host country in order to ensure full protection. Many internal protective measures depend on the strength or weakness of additional external measures taken by the host country. The best protection is provided to a greater extent by a certain number of coordinated and additional measures than by the full hope of one type of protection. 2.4.6 The internal security plan should include: (a) an assessment of the terrorist/subversive threat; (b) an assessment of risk management. It should include, at a minimum, an assessment of severity and vulnerability; (c) security measures, including physical security; (d) an incident response plan, which should include: (i) the identification of the authority responsible for ordering the implementation of one of the stages of the plan; and officials responsible for the implementation of specific measures listed in the plan; (ii) allocation of command and control responsibilities; (iii) contingency arrangements for support and reserve forces; (iv) a description of the actions of NATO security forces in and outside NATO premises in accordance with the laws of the host country; (v) alternative means of communication for security forces; (vi) special actions and responsibilities related to the application of each of the vigilance measures; (e) A contingency plan, including: (i) Appropriate "first responder" personnel, whose function is to mitigate loss/injury of personnel and damage to structures/facilities. Rapid response personnel include, but are not limited to: medical personnel, fire and rescue teams, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) decontamination units, and security personnel. (ii) Appropriate planning for the investigation of the crime scene by law enforcement agencies, as well as responding to personnel losses/property damage.

2.4.7 NATO civilian and military authorities should take counter-terrorism and anti-sabotage analysis into account when establishing or verifying security measures for their institutions. The protection personnel of senior NATO officials should be kept separate from other security forces, and their deployment should be coordinated with the security authorities of the host country. 2.4.8 The civilian and military authorities of NATO should train their personnel to perform their functions in various circumstances through official instructions and exercises with the authorities of the host country. The exercises should include alerting staff after hours. In order to ensure the effective implementation of the safety plan in the event of such a need, it is extremely important to carry out preparations well in advance of the predicted emergency situation.

Standard warning System 2.4.9 A standard warning system should be installed at all headquarters of NATO civilian and military authorities. This notification system should consist of four separate stages, in addition to the standard ones, and contain the basic minimum measures applied in all civilian and military bodies of NATO. Detailed information on the warning system and the corresponding communication system and the basic minimum measures for each stage, as well as other necessary or recommended measures, will be developed under the auspices of the NATO Security Committee (see Appendix 1, "States of the NATO Alert System" and Appendix 2, "States of the NATO Alert System - minimum measures").

2.4.10 Budgeting for physical protection and other protective materials (a) NATO civilian and military authorities should apply for funds from the NATO military or civilian budget to provide physical protection for their facilities (including official NATO residences). Budget requests should be accompanied by a threat assessment conducted by the security authorities of the host country in cooperation with the civilian and military authorities of NATO.; (b) Requests for the allocation of NATO funds to provide special communications systems used outside NATO facilities as part of counter-terrorism or anti-sabotage measures require justification reflecting full cooperation with the security authorities of the host country; (c) The allocation of armored vehicles from the NATO budget should be limited by the Secretary General and the Supreme Commander of the NATO Joint Armed Forces in Europe. For emergencies, when there is a proven threat that, in the opinion of the security authorities of the host country, requires an armored vehicle, and when it cannot be provided by the host country or the sending country, an armored vehicle may be leased from NATO funds in accordance with procedures established in advance by the relevant finance committees for the entire period of its existence. threats; (d) Other personal protective equipment, such as bulletproof clothing and special weapons, may be obtained from NATO funds in reasonable quantities for use by NATO security personnel. The justification for the application for such equipment should include a description of the nature of the equipment's use. NATO funds should not be used to purchase personal protective equipment for use by personnel outside NATO-designated positions, and only in exceptional cases can funds be approved for the purchase of such equipment for use by personnel other than NATO security personnel. 2.4.11 Counter-terrorism and anti-sabotage activities and activities related to NATO civilian and military authorities should be monitored by the NATO Security Office. In this regard, the NATO Security Office should receive a copy of the general threat assessment applicable to each headquarters or group of headquarters. NATO civilian and military authorities should send two copies of their counter-terrorism plans to the NATO Security Office. The NATO Security Office should be informed about specific activities through the reporting system described in paragraphs 2.3.1 - 2.3.2 above. 2.4.12 Counter-terrorism and counter-sabotage measures, including the operation of the internal security plan, should be reviewed during the security review program for NATO civilian and military authorities. The data obtained during these inspections must be attached to the inspection report.

3. PART 2: MEASURES TO PROTECT NATO CIVILIAN AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES, DEPLOYED NATO FORCES AND FACILITIES AGAINST THREATS OF TERRORISM OUTSIDE THE TERRITORY OF NATO MEMBER STATES

3.0 This Section establishes a policy of counter-terrorism measures for NATO forces and facilities deployed outside the territory of NATO member States (an operation outside Article 5). These measures are applied in areas where personnel and facilities are deployed NATO, with insufficient support that can be relied upon to ensure an adequate response to the terrorist/subversive threat.

3.1 APPLICATION OF COUNTER-TERRORISM PROTECTION MEASURES OUTSIDE THE TERRITORY OF NATO MEMBER STATES

3.1.1 The counter-terrorism protection measures described in Part 2 are applicable only to NATO operations conducted outside of Article 5, and where the host country's structure, if any, falls outside the jurisdiction of a NATO member State. 3.1.2 The measures outlined in this section are applied when a terrorist threat arises that could endanger NATO forces and facilities.

3.2 THREATS AND RISKS 3.2.1 The risks to NATO civilian and military authorities arising from the threat of terrorism can be of 6 types: (a) general safety of personnel; (b) denial of necessary resources and services that would hinder or reduce the ability to complete the task; (c) physical damage; (d) disruption of performance tasks; (e) violation of freedom of movement, or (f) violation of overall security and stability outside the territory of NATO member States. 3.2.2 Threat of terrorism to NATO forces and facilities deployed outside the territory of NATO member States from organizations, groups and individuals who may choose personnel and facilities NATO's targets for carrying out its intentions, both within and outside NATO member States, include: (a) bombing or small arms attacks, car bombings, hand luggage bombs, mail bombs and explosive incendiary devices, (b) murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking or the intimidation of NATO personnel and their families, (c) demonstrations that may be organized for the purpose of violence may lead to violence/damage through confrontation, (d) direct attacks and illegal occupation of NATO premises or property, as has happened with embassies and international missions, (e) false alarms, namely a warning about an alleged bomb planted with the intent to annoy, (f) operations against essential/vital information technology systems, including attacks on the integrity and/or accessibility of these systems, (g) weapons of mass destruction (WMD), namely, chemical and biological attacks, (h) the neutralization by force of weapons, weapons and equipment necessary to achieve the task.

Threat assessment 3.2.3 The potential threat of terrorist activity against NATO forces and personnel performing NATO operations outside the territory of NATO member States is subject to assessment before taking countermeasures. Although circumstances and conditions depend on the operation, the assessment process should, at a minimum, ensure that: (a) Sources of threat information are assessed for reliability as far as possible, (b) Analysis of threat information justifies the use of counter-terrorism measures, (c) Threat assessment is timely and ongoing, and (d) A local risk management strategy is being developed.

3.3 RESPONSIBILITIES

3.3.1 General The distribution of counter-terrorism responsibilities and tasks is determined by 4 different conditions in which NATO forces can operate outside the territory of NATO member States: (a) Tolerant, with full support from the host country; (b) Semi-tolerant, in which the authorities of the host country generally cooperate, but without allocating sufficient funds or monitoring to ensure effective support; (c) Intolerant when local authorities and the population are hostile or do not provide support; (d) In international waters and/or airspace.

3.3.2 Non-NATO host countries (a) In a tolerant environment, NATO aims to reach an agreement with the host country providing for the external protection of NATO civilian and military authorities. This agreement will include the same conditions and support agreed with the host country in the NATO area of responsibility, as described in the first part of this document. (b) In a semi-tolerant environment, it is necessary to conclude similar agreements with the host country. However, the host country may need the means and facilities to provide/create conditions/support, as agreed. (c) In an intolerant environment, one should not expect support from the host country.

3.3.3 NATO Military Leaders NATO military leaders are responsible for: (a) Planning, including threat assessment, decision-making, coordination, and implementation of counterterrorism measures. (b) Verification by command authorities of the absence of a threat to NATO forces and assets from local employees. (c) Taking into account the safety principles set out in Parts 1 and 2 of this C-M in the planning process of each operational plan. (d) In a tolerant or semi-tolerant environment, NATO chiefs should fully take into account the above-mentioned agreements with the host country, as well as the respective responsibilities of the host and troop-contributing countries. (e) In an intolerant environment, the support of the host country goes to the NATO chiefs. However, they must ensure that they function within their mandate in accordance with the approved operational plan. (f) In all circumstances, the NATO Chiefs ensure that coordination and information exchange will be carried out with the involvement of all parties, for example by establishing communication with the host country, as appropriate, and through command authorities with all countries that have contributed troops, and taking into account existing security regulations. (g) NATO military commanders may, if necessary, strengthen the minimum measures, as specified in Annex 2, for the declared state of alert, as specified in Annex 1. A strategic military commander may, as appropriate, establish procedures to eliminate the minimum measures of a state of anxiety.

3.3.4 Contributing countries (a) Contributing countries along with NATO are responsible for providing security support to their national forces. This includes checks to ensure that local personnel employed do not pose a threat to NATO forces. (b) In a tolerant or semi-tolerant environment, the countries that have deployed troops are responsible for exchanging information about a terrorist/subversive threat/incident through NATO communications based on circumstances. (c) NATO forces will operate using authorized rules of engagement. The countries that have allocated troops may limit the rules of the use of force for execution by their national forces. The NATO Commander will be informed of such national restrictions.

3.3.5 NATO Security Office The NATO Security Office must verify the counter-terrorism programs of NATO facilities/facilities during its periodic inspections within the mandatory 18-month inspection cycle. The NATO Security Office Inspection Team will verify and advise on the adequacy of the counter-terrorism sections of the facility/unit's internal security plan and the facility/facility's ability to implement these counter-terrorism sections. Where appropriate, the NATO Security Office inspection team will also advise on the adequacy of counter-terrorism training and the exercise program of the facility/unit that supports the internal security plan.

3.3.6 NATO Civilian Authorities The heads of civilian authorities are responsible for developing a security plan prior to the deployment of personnel. The heads of civilian authorities ensure that a security plan is developed in cooperation with the NATO Security Office and the relevant NATO Chief prior to any deployment. Personnel deployed from civilian bodies should be deployed with NATO military forces whenever possible. When this is not possible, the security plan should address all aspects of protection described in paragraph 3.4.1.

3.4 REPORT ON TERRORIST OR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES 3.4.1 Reports on a terrorist/subversive threat or incident by various civilian or military authorities should contain the following: (a) The authority from which the information originates; (b) The nature of the consequences of the threat or incident; (c) The actions taken. 3.4.2 In order to ensure adequate information to the relevant authorities about terrorist/subversive threats or actual incidents, it is necessary to report as follows: (a) NATO Chiefs should report to the higher headquarters in the vertical of command and to their subordinate commanders; (b) In order to ensure similar security measures, the forces of non-NATO countries in operations conducted by NATO should participate in the reporting system in accordance with existing security agreements.; (c) All contributing countries will be informed of a particular threat/incident through their national contingent commanders in the theater of operations at the following levels of command and/or at NATO headquarters; (d) As appropriate, the host country authorities should inform the NATO commanders and/or be informed of the threat/incident through a designated a NATO liaison officer by prior agreement with the country in question and in accordance with existing security regulations; (e) NATO civilian authorities should report on their counter-terrorism and counter-sabotage measures with a general threat assessment through their capitals to the NATO Security Office.

3.5 PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION 3.5.1 The NATO Chiefs are responsible for planning and implementing measures to combat terrorism and threats of sabotage. 3.5.2 The heads of facilities, NATO civilian authorities, and the commanders of permanent security headquarters should develop an internal security plan. 3.5.3 The internal Security plan includes: (a) An assessment of the threat of terrorism/sabotage; (b) An assessment of risk management. It should include, at a minimum, an assessment of severity and vulnerability; (c) security measures, including physical security; (d) An incident response plan that should include: (i) the identification of the authority responsible for ordering the implementation of one of the phases of the plan and the officials responsible for implementing the special measures listed in the plan; (ii) the allocation of command and control responsibilities; (iii) contingency arrangements emergency situations for support and reserve forces; (iv) a description of the actions of NATO security forces in and outside NATO premises in accordance with the laws of the host country; (v) Alternative means of communication for security forces; (vi) special actions and responsibilities related to the application of each of the vigilance measures; (e) a contingency plan that includes: (i) appropriate "first responders" whose function is to mitigate personnel loss/injury and damage to structures/funds. Rapid response personnel include, but are not limited to: medical personnel, fire and rescue teams, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) decontamination units, and security personnel. (ii) Appropriate planning for the inspection of the crime scene by law enforcement agencies, as well as responding to personnel losses/property damage.

3.5.4 NATO civilian and military authorities should take counter-terrorism and anti-sabotage considerations into account when establishing or verifying security measures for their institutions. The protection personnel of senior NATO officials should be kept separate from other security forces, and their deployment should be coordinated with the security authorities of the host country. 3.5.5 The civilian and military authorities of NATO should train their personnel to perform their functions in various circumstances through official instructions and exercises with the authorities of the host country. The exercises should include alerting staff after hours. In order to ensure the effective implementation of the safety plan, if necessary, it is extremely important to carry out preparations well in advance of the predicted emergency situation.

Standard Notification System 3.5.6 A standard notification system should be installed at all headquarters of NATO civilian and military authorities. This notification system should consist of four separate stages, in addition to the usual ones, and contain the basic minimum measures applied in all civilian and military bodies of NATO. Detailed information on the warning system and the corresponding communication system and the basic minimum measures for each stage, as well as other necessary or recommended measures, will be developed under the auspices of the NATO Security Committee (see Appendix 1, "States of the NATO Alert System") and Appendix 2, "States of the NATO Alert System - minimum measures").

NATO SECURITY ALERT STATES

1. Information and warnings about terrorist and subversive activities directed against facilities and personnel of NATO civilian and military authorities may be received upon alert by NATO or through the security authorities of the host country concerned. Information can also come from local police and be directly received by NATO civilian and military authorities in the form of a threat or warning from a terrorist organization and, finally, as an attack on a NATO facility or NATO personnel.

2. PURPOSE The purpose of the instructions is to develop a common counter-terrorism alert system for NATO civilian and military authorities and appropriate implementation measures for each alert condition.

3. ALARM STATES The usual security measures to protect NATO facilities, units and bases (including official residences, clubs, canteens and business areas, i.e. non-closed areas) are carried out in accordance with local regulations. The introduction of the minimum measures outlined in the Alert States (APPENDIX) will reflect a higher degree of security protection needed to combat the increasing terrorist threat. Additional measures for each standard alarm condition can be determined by the host country.

4. DEFINITIONS OF ALARM STATUS 4.1 The four states of increased alarm are defined as follows: (a) Alarm status ALPHA. It is used when there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity directed against NATO facilities and personnel, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and the circumstances do not justify the full application of measures for the BRAVO alert. However, it may be necessary to apply certain measures based on the state of "BRAVO" in accordance with the result of the intelligence received or as a means of warning. Measures of this alarm condition should be supported indefinitely. (b) BRAVO alarm status. It is used when there is an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity. This condition should be maintained for several weeks, without causing untimely difficulties, without affecting operational capabilities and without worsening relations with local authorities. (c) CHARLIE's state of anxiety. It is used in the event of an incident or when intelligence has been received indicating that some form of terrorist activity directed against NATO facilities and personnel is imminent. The implementation of this measure for a longer period may create difficulties and affect the activities of the unit and personnel in peacetime. (d) DELTA alarm status. It is used in the territory where a terrorist attack has occurred or intelligence has been received stating that a terrorist attack is likely against a certain area or person. This alarm condition is usually announced as a localized warning.

5. 5.1 The declaration of states OF alarm and the implementation of measures is decided by the host country in the NATO area of responsibility, a civilian or military body of NATO as a result of intelligence received, or by the local chief or head of the agency after receiving intelligence through official sources or an anonymous threat message. 5.2 Alarm states can be supplemented by a geographical risk zone. All unofficial information should always be sent, as appropriate, to the security authorities of the host country for authentication.

6. WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION Local orders should include specific instructions regarding the issue of weapons and live ammunition for the protection of premises and posts. These orders must comply with the policies of the host country and the civilian or military authority of NATO.

7. IMPLEMENTATION IN INTEGRATED UNITS The detailed measures that are being taken by NATO headquarters in certain territories where they share premises with national formations will be coordinated with the latter.

8. CLASSIFICATION OF ANXIETY STATES Full definitions of alarm states are classified as "NATO UNCLASSIFIED" and can be used over unsecured telephone lines and through the transmission of alarm messages "NATO UNCLASSIFIED" (for example, "Accept CHARLIE's condition"). This is a fast way of transmitting initial information, which can be followed by a clarifying message, the secrecy of which depends on its content (for example, the source of protection).

NATO SECURITY ALERT STATES - MINIMUM MEASURES

1. ALPHA ALARM STATUS

It is announced as a general warning of possible terrorist activities, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and the circumstances do not justify the full application of measures for the BRAVO alert. However, it may be necessary to apply certain measures due to the state of BRAVO.

MEASURE 1. All personnel, including family members, should be suspicious of strangers at regular intervals, especially if they are carrying suitcases or other items of luggage; unidentified vehicles at or near NATO facilities; abandoned packages or suitcases or other unusual activities.

MEASURE 2. The security officer on duty or other designated officers should always be in touch with the availability of access to the evacuation plan for buildings and territories in use and the lockdown of areas where an attack or explosion occurred. Key personnel who may be needed to implement the security plan should always be in touch.

MEASURE 3. Buildings, rooms, and cabinets that are not regularly used must be guarded.

MEASURE 4. Conducting enhanced spot checks of vehicles and people entering the territory of facilities and unclassified zones controlled by a civilian or military authority of NATO.

MEASURE 5. Limit access points for vehicles and personnel to a minimum commensurate with a reasonable flow of traffic.

MEASURE 6. One of the following measures from the BRAVO state should be individually and irregularly applied as a deterrent: (a) all buildings, rooms and cabinets of irregular use should be guarded and regularly checked. (measure 14). (b) The exterior and interior of buildings in regular use should be regularly and frequently checked for suspicious activity or packaging (measure 15). (c) All deliveries to clubs/canteens must be checked. (family members will be advised to do the same with home deliveries) (measure 17). (d) To the extent resources permit, surveillance of places of residence, cafes, schools, clubs, and other accessible targets should be strengthened to improve deterrence, defense, and confidence among staff and family members (measure 18).

MEASURE 7. View all plans, orders, personnel data, and logistical requirements related to the introduction of higher alert levels.

MEASURES 8-9. Backup ones.

2. BRAVO ALARM STATUS It is announced when the threat of terrorist activity increases and becomes more predictable, despite the fact that no specific goal has been set.

MEASURE 10. Measure 1 should be repeated and staff should be warned about any other form of attack used by terrorists.

MEASURE 11. All officers involved in the implementation of counter-terrorism plans should be in touch.

MEASURE 12. Plans for the implementation of measures contained in the following alarm conditions should be reviewed.

MEASURE 13. Wherever possible, cars and objects such as crates, trash cans, etc. should be moved at least 25 meters away from buildings, especially secret ones. Consider the use of centralized parking.

MEASURE 14. All buildings, rooms and cabinets of irregular use must be guarded and regularly checked.

MEASURE 15. The exterior and interior of buildings in regular use must be constantly and frequently checked for suspicious containers, always at the beginning and at the end of the working day.

MEASURE 16. All mail should definitely be checked for bombs in the letter/parcel (strengthen the checks).

MEASURE 17. All deliveries to canteens, clubs, etc. must be checked. (family members will be advised to do the same with home deliveries).

MEASURE 18. To the extent resources allow, surveillance of residential areas, cafes, schools, clubs, and other accessible targets should be strengthened to improve deterrence, defense, and confidence among staff and family members.

MEASURE 19. Staff and family members should be aware of the general situation to stop rumors and prevent alarms.

MEASURE 20. Members of local safety committees should be informed at an early stage about any actions being taken and the reasons.

MEASURE 21. Visitors to the unit and a certain percentage of their bags, parcels, and other types of luggage must be selectively checked at the entrance.

MEASURE 22. Wherever possible, selective patrols should operate to check vehicles, people and buildings.

MEASURE 23. Personnel and official vehicles located outside the base must be guarded in accordance with prepared plans. Drivers should be reminded to close parked cars and enter the established verification system before they get in the car and start driving.

MEASURES 24-28. Backup ones.

3. CHARLIE'S STATE OF ANXIETY It is used in the event of an incident or when receiving intelligence indicating that some form of terrorist activity is imminent.

MEASURE 29. Security needs to be reinforced as needed.

MEASURE 30. The adoption of all measures for the state of BRAVO must be continued or additional measures must be introduced.

MEASURE 31. All officers responsible for the implementation of counter-terrorism plans must be on duty.

MEASURE 32. Limiting access points to an absolute minimum.

MEASURE 33. Strengthen entrance control and conduct spot checks of vehicles.

MEASURE 34. Introduce centralized parking of vehicles away from important buildings.

MEASURE 35. Handing out weapons to guards. (Local orders should include specific instructions for issuing ammunition).

MEASURE 36. It is necessary to introduce enhanced patrolling of the facility.

MEASURE 37. All marked vulnerable sites should be protected, and special attention should be paid to vulnerable sites not installed on military bases.

MEASURE 38. Install speed bumps to control vehicles.

MEASURE 39. Minimize the presence of local staff.

MEASURE 40. Strengthen security as needed.

4. DELTA ALERT STATUS These measures are applied in the territory where a terrorist attack has occurred or intelligence has been received, according to which there is a possibility of a terrorist attack against a certain area or person. This alarm condition is usually announced as a localized warning.

MEASURE 41. Taking all the measures listed in BRAVO and CHARLIE's anxiety states is ongoing or beginning.

MEASURE 42. All vehicles located at the base are identified.

MEASURE 43. All vehicles and their contents entering the territory of the complex or facility are searched.

MEASURE 44. Access is fully controlled.

MEASURE 45. All bags, briefcases, packages, etc., brought into the territory of the complex or facility, are searched.

MEASURE 46. Measures should be taken to control access to all areas controlled by the relevant civilian or military authority of NATO.

MEASURE 47. It is necessary to carry out frequent inspections of the exterior of buildings and parking lots.

MEASURE 48. Minimize all administrative trips and visits.

MEASURE 49. Consult with local authorities regarding the closure of public (and military) roads, which may make facilities vulnerable to a terrorist attack.

MEASURE 50. The backup.

dictionary

Anti-sabotage/ anti- explosive

The action taken to detect and counter sabotage (source: AAP-6).

Counterterrorism

Measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism in order to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and the means to a terrorist attack.

NATO Facility/Asset

NATO assets are those assets, structures, equipment, and other items, including systems and resources, that play an important role in fulfilling the NATO mission.

Sabotage

Actions aimed at hampering the NATO mission by intentionally damaging or destroying NATO assets.

Terrorism

The unlawful use or threat of the use of force or violent acts against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate Governments or societies in order to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives. (Source: AAP-6)

The text has been translated into Russian in accordance with the original.

Head of the Main Department of International Programs The Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan Colonel V. Reichel

SECURITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

SECURITY AGREEMENT

The Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, represented by Ambassador Aueskhan Kirbasov, Permanent Representative at NATO Headquarters

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, represented by Javier Solana, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Recognizing that the Republic of Kazakhstan is a partner country in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NCC)/Partnership for Peace (PIM);

Having agreed to hold consultations on political and security issues, and to expand and strengthen political and military cooperation in Europe;

Realizing that effective cooperation in this area requires the exchange of sensitive and/or privileged information between the parties;

Agreed on the following:

Article 1

The Parties will: (i) protect and safeguard the information and information of the other Party; (ii) do everything necessary to ensure that classified information and information contain the conditions of admission determined by either Party, taking into account the information and information of the other Party, and protect such information and information according to agreed common standards; (iii) do not use the exchanged information and information for purposes not provided for by the relevant programs, as well as decisions and resolutions related to these programs.; (iv) not to provide such information and information to third parties without the consent of the information source.

Article 2

(i) The Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan undertakes to properly issue admission to all its citizens who have access to information and information obtained under the CCAS or PIM in accordance with their professional duties before they have access to such information and information. (ii) Security clearance procedures should be conducted in such a way as to determine whether a person, taking into account his loyalty and reliability, can have access to such information without risking its secrecy.

Article 3

The NATO Security Office (NOS), under the direction and on behalf of the Secretary General and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, acting on behalf of the North Atlantic Council and the NATO Military Committee and in accordance with their instructions, is responsible for the security and protection of classified information exchanged within the framework of the CCAS/PIM.

Article 4

The Republic of Kazakhstan will inform NOS about national security agencies with similar functions. Separate Administrative Conditions will be developed between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and NATO, which will include, among other things, standards for mutual protection of the security of exchanged information and communication between the authorities of the Republic of Kazakhstan and NOS.

Article 5

Before exchanging any classified information between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and NATO, the responsible security authorities must mutually ensure that the receiving party is ready to ensure the protection of the information it receives, according to the sender's requirements.

In witness whereof, the Representatives mentioned above have signed this Agreement.

Signed in duplicate in Brussels on July 31, 1996, in English and French, which are equally authentic.

For the Government For the Organization of the Republic of Kazakhstan The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Aueskhan Kirbasov Javier Solana

I hereby certify that this text is an unofficial translation into Russian of the Security Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, signed in Brussels on July 31, 1996.

Head of the Main Department of International Programs The Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan Colonel V. Reichel

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT

1. In addition to the invitation extended by the Heads of State and Government of the NATO member States at their meeting on January 10-11, 1994, the member States of the Alliance and other signatories of this document who expressed their determination to deepen political and military ties and further strengthen security in the Euro-Atlantic region hereby establish, on the basis of the Council North Atlantic Cooperation is a "Partnership for Peace." 2. This partnership is an expression of the shared conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic region can be achieved only through cooperation and joint actions. The protection and support of fundamental freedoms and human rights and ensuring freedom, justice and peace based on the principles of democracy are common values fundamental to this partnership. By joining this partnership, the member States of the Alliance and other signatory States recall that they are committed to preserving democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and upholding the principles of international law. They reaffirm their commitment to the faithful observance of obligations arising from the UN Charter and the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.; and specifically the obligations to refrain from the threat of the use of force and from the use of force to the detriment of the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, as well as to respect existing borders and seek the settlement of disputes by peaceful means. They also reaffirm their commitment to the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent CSCE documents, as well as to respect for the commitments they have undertaken in the field of disarmament and arms control. 3. Other signatory States will cooperate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to achieve the following objectives: (a) to promote transparency in national defense planning and budgeting; (b) to ensure democratic control of the defense forces; (c) to maintain the ability and willingness to contribute, taking into account the provisions of national constitutions, to operations under the auspices of The UN and/or CSCE; (d) establishing cooperative military relations with NATO for the purpose of joint planning, combat training and exercises to enhance their readiness to conduct operations in the areas of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian and other operations, which may subsequently be agreed upon; (e) forming forces in the long term, We are more ready to cooperate with the armed forces of the member states of the Alliance. 4. The other signatory States will submit presentation documents to the NATO leadership outlining the measures they plan to achieve the political goals of the partnership, as well as military and other assets that can be used for activities under the partnership program, NATO will propose a program of exercises based on the principle of partnership and other activities that meet the goals of the partnership. Based on this program and its presentation document, each signatory State will develop an individual partnership program with NATO. 5. During the preparation and implementation of individual partnership programmes, other signatory States may, at their own expense and on the basis of an agreement with the Alliance and, if necessary, the relevant Belgian authorities, establish their liaison offices with NATO headquarters in Brussels. This will make it easier for them to participate in meetings and activities of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace, as well as some others on an invitation basis. In addition, they will allocate and provide the personnel, assets, equipment, and capabilities necessary to fulfill the agreed partnership program. NATO will provide them with appropriate assistance in developing and implementing their individual partnership programmes. 6. The other signatory States agree on the following: - Those who expect to participate in the operations referred to in paragraph H (d) will, whenever possible, participate in NATO exercises in the relevant areas.; - They will finance their own participation in the Partnership for Peace program and will make other efforts to shoulder some of the burden of conducting the exercises in which they will participate; - They may, after reaching an appropriate agreement, send permanent liaison officers to a separate Partnership Coordination Group in Mons (Belgium), which, under the leadership of the North Atlantic Council, will be engaged in military planning necessary for the implementation of partnership programs.; - Those who will participate in planning and military exercises will have access to some NATO technical data necessary for cooperation; - Based on the measures provided for by the CSCE in the field of military planning, other signatory States and NATO countries will exchange information on steps taken or being taken to promote transparency in military planning and budget preparation, as well as ensuring democratic control over the armed forces; - They can participate in the mutual exchange of information in the field of military planning and budget preparation, which will be carried out within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council./Partnerships in the name of. 7. Based on their commitment to the goals of this Partnership for Peace, the Alliance members will: Develop, together with other signatory States, a planning and research process in order to lay the foundation for identifying and evaluating the forces and capacities that they can provide for international combat training, exercises and operations in cooperation with the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. the Union; To facilitate military and political coordination at NATO headquarters to provide leadership and management of relevant activities based on partnership with other signatory States, including planning, combat training, exercises and doctrine development. 8. NATO will consult with any active partner in the partnership if that partner considers that there is a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security. I hereby certify that this text is an unofficial translation into Russian of the Framework Document "Partnership for Peace" dated May 27, 1994, published in the Collection of Documents on International Law, edited by K.K. Tokayev. Almaty: Publishing house. JSC "Sak", T.I, pp. 300-302.

Head of the Main Department of International Programs The Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan Colonel V. Reichel

Unofficial translation

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: AN INVITATION

Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the North Atlantic Council Meeting held at NATO Headquarters on January 10-11, 1994 in Brussels

Based on the close and long-term partnership between the North Atlantic and European Allies, we, the heads of State and Government of the member States of the Alliance, are fulfilling our obligations to strengthen security and stability throughout Europe. Therefore, we intend to strengthen ties with the democratic States in the East. We reaffirm that the Alliance, as stipulated in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to the membership of other European States in promoting the principles of the Treaty and achieving security in the North Atlantic region. We expect and welcome the expansion of NATO, which would reach democratic states in the East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security achievements throughout Europe. Today, we have initiated an urgent and practical program that will transform the relationship between NATO and the participating countries. This new program goes beyond dialogue and interaction, promoting true partnership - Partnership for Peace. Therefore, we invite other States that are members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, as well as countries participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), which are ready and willing to contribute to this program, to join us in this partnership. Active participation in the Partnership for Peace program will play a huge role in the evolutionary process of NATO expansion. The Partnership for Peace program, which will operate under the leadership of the Alliance, will create a new security relationship between the Alliance and its partners for peace. Partner countries will be invited by the North Atlantic Council to serve on political and military bodies at NATO headquarters in accordance with the Partnership's activities. The partnership will help expand and strengthen political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, reduce threats to peace, and build strong relationships by enhancing the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to the democratic principles that underpin our Alliance. NATO will advise any active participant in the Partnership in the event of a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or its security. At a pace and scale determined by the capabilities and desires of each participating State, we will implement specific measures to achieve transparency in military financing, expand the framework of democratic control over the activities of military departments, jointly plan and conduct joint military exercises in order to cooperate with NATO forces in peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations. and other events by appropriate agreement. In order to achieve closer cooperation and mutual understanding, we propose, as part of the Partnership program, to begin conducting peacekeeping field exercises in 1994. To coordinate joint military actions within the framework of the Partnership, we will invite participating States to send permanent liaison officers to NATO headquarters, as well as to a separate Partnership Coordination Center in Mons (Belgium), who will, under the leadership of the North Atlantic Council, carry out military planning necessary for the implementation of Partnership programs. Since its establishment two years ago, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council has significantly expanded the scope of its activities. We intend to continue working with all the States that are members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council to create mutually beneficial cooperation in all the activities carried out by the Alliance. With the expansion of the activities of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, as well as the creation of the Partnership for Peace program, we decided to allocate permanent premises at NATO headquarters for the staff of the member countries of the CCC and other participants in the Partnership for Peace program, in order to improve working relations and establish closer cooperation. In accordance with the invitation to participate in the Partnership for Peace, approved and signed by the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization participating in the North Atlantic Council meeting held at NATO Headquarters in Brussels on January 10 and 11, 1994, I, the undersigned, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, hereby accept the invitation to participate in the Partnership for Peace and sign the Partnership for Peace framework document.

Signed in Brussels, on May 27, 1994.

(signed) Kanat Saudabayev Hereby certify that this text is an unofficial translation into Russian of the Invitation to Partnership for Peace signed on May 27, 1994.

Head of the Main Directorate of International Programs of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Colonel V. Reichel

RCPI note: The following is the text of the Memorandum of Understanding between Kazakhstan and the NATO Maintenance and Support Organization (NAMSO) on Logistics Cooperation in English.

President

Republic of Kazakhstan

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