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Home / Codes / Commentary on Article 28. Types of Accomplices in a Criminal Offense under the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Commentary on Article 28. Types of Accomplices in a Criminal Offense under the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan

АMANAT партиясы және Заң және Құқық адвокаттық кеңсесінің серіктестігі аясында елге тегін заң көмегі көрсетілді

Commentary on Article 28. Types of Accomplices in a Criminal Offense under the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan

In addition to the perpetrator, the accomplices to a criminal offense shall include the organizer, instigator and aider.

A perpetrator shall be recognized as a person who directly commits a criminal offense or directly participates in its commission jointly with other persons (co-perpetrators), as well as a person who commits a criminal offense by using other persons who are not subject to criminal liability by reason of age, insanity or other circumstances provided for by this Code, or by using persons who have committed an act through negligence.

An organizer shall be recognized as a person who organizes the commission of a criminal offense or directs its execution, as well as a person who establishes a criminal group or directs such a group.

An instigator shall be recognized as a person who induces another person to commit a criminal offense by persuasion, bribery, threats or by other means.

An aider shall be recognized as a person who facilitates the commission of a criminal offense through advice, instructions, provision of information, instruments or means of committing the offense, or by removing obstacles to its commission, as well as a person who has promised in advance to conceal the perpetrator, the instruments or other means of committing the criminal offense, the traces of the offense or items obtained by unlawful means, and also a person who has promised in advance to acquire or dispose of such items.

Criminal law does not make the determination of a person's degree of liability unconditionally dependent on the function performed by that person in a criminal offense committed jointly with other persons. The task of individualizing liability is resolved differently: by determining the types of accomplices, that is, by disclosing in general terms the characteristics of the unlawful activities of each accomplice, criminal law thereby provides the court with the opportunity to identify the nature of the activities of any accomplice and the degree of public danger posed by that person's conduct in the commission of a specific criminal offense.

Each accomplice makes a contribution to the common undertaking, that is, has a certain share of participation in it. Only the perpetrator carries out the objective elements of the composition of a specific criminal offense.

Depending on the nature and degree of participation of two or more persons in the commission of a criminal offense, the legislator identifies four types of accomplices: the perpetrator, organizer, instigator and aider. In this context, the nature of participation should be understood as the qualitative aspect of the actions performed by a particular person, that is, what specifically constituted that person's socially dangerous conduct. The degree of participation refers to the actual role of each accomplice in achieving the unlawful result they intended.

By establishing in Part 1 of Article 28 of the Criminal Code that, in addition to the perpetrator, the accomplices to a criminal offense include the organizer, instigator and aider, the legislator thereby enshrined the accessory nature of complicity. The substance of the accessory theory of complicity is that the central figure in complicity is the perpetrator. Without a perpetrator, complicity is impossible, whereas complicity may exist without an organizer, aider or instigator (for example, the commission of a criminal offense involving two or more perpetrators, by a group of persons without prior conspiracy).

Until the perpetrator begins to act, the socially dangerous acts of the organizer, instigator and aider cannot be classified as complicity.

Where the organizer, instigator or aider fails to induce the perpetrator to commit the criminal offense they intended, this does not constitute complicity in a criminal offense but rather falls under the institution of the stages of commission of an intentional criminal offense.

Determining the types of accomplices means establishing the individual role of each of them. Pursuant to Part 2 of Article 28 of the Criminal Code, a perpetrator shall be recognized as a person who directly commits a criminal offense or directly participates in its commission jointly with other persons (co-perpetrators), as well as a person who commits a criminal offense by using other persons who are not subject to criminal liability by reason of age, insanity or other circumstances provided for by the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, or by using persons who have committed an act through negligence.

In criminal law scholarship, the opinion has been expressed that the perpetrator is the most dangerous among the other accomplices to a group crime, including the organizer. It seems that although the perpetrator poses a serious danger in a group crime and the essence of the act committed depends on that person's actions, skill, sophistication and determination, it is hardly appropriate to assert that the perpetrator is more dangerous than the organizer of the crime.

A perpetrator of a criminal offense must satisfy both the general requirements of criminal law — be sane and have attained the age at which criminal liability may arise — and the special requirements of the specific offenses set out in the Special Part, that is, possess the necessary characteristics of a special subject of a criminal offense. In other words, a perpetrator participating in joint activity may only be a person possessing all the characteristics required of an individual perpetrator.

The actions of perpetrators are classified directly under the article of the Criminal Code that provides for the elements of the criminal offense carried out by the perpetrator. Exceptions to this rule may arise where there are several perpetrators. In such cases, it is not mandatory to classify their actions under the same provision or part of an article. For example, one perpetrator commits murder for the first time, without the aggravating circumstances specified in Parts 2 or 3 of Article 99 of the Criminal Code, while another commits murder for the second time. The actions of the first perpetrator shall be classified under Part 1 of Article 99 of the Criminal Code, whereas the actions of the second fall within the elements provided for in Subparagraph 13) of Part 2 of Article 99 of the Criminal Code, provided that the latter had previously been convicted of murder (with the exception of acts provided for in Articles 100–104 of the Criminal Code).

If one perpetrator participated in the commission of a criminal offense while the other persons participated as organizers, instigators or aiders, the actions of the perpetrator in such cases, depending on the existence of other qualifying circumstances, shall be classified directly under the relevant paragraphs and parts of the article providing for liability for the criminal offense in question, whereas the actions of the other accomplices shall be classified with reference to Article 28 of the Criminal Code.

Paragraph 5 of Clause 3 of the Regulatory Resolution of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On Certain Issues of the Application by Courts of Legislation on Liability for Banditry and Other Criminal Offenses Committed in Complicity” states: “The liability of an organizer, instigator or aider shall arise under the relevant article of the Criminal Code providing for liability for the specific criminal offense, with reference to Article 28 of the Criminal Code, except in cases where they simultaneously acted as co-perpetrators of the criminal offense.”

A person who was not involved in a prior conspiracy with the other accomplices to a criminal offense but joined them during its commission and took direct part in it shall be held liable as a co-perpetrator for the specific actions actually committed by that person.

In addition to direct perpetration and co-perpetration, the legislator identifies another type, known as indirect perpetration, in which a person uses the following to commit a criminal offense: 1) persons who are legally insane; 2) persons who have not attained the age of criminal responsibility; and 3) persons acting negligently. In this context, the commission of a criminal offense should be understood not only as the direct performance of actions constituting the elements of a criminal offense and not only as the use of various objects, devices, mechanisms and the like for this purpose, but also as the use of animals and even people in so-called indirect causation, that is, using people as instruments of a criminal offense.

Thus, an indirect perpetrator of a criminal offense shall be recognized as a person who uses legally insane persons to commit a criminal offense (persons who are unable to understand the nature of their actions or control them — Article 16 of the Criminal Code); who uses persons who have not attained the age at which criminal liability arises under Part 2 of Article 15 of the Criminal Code (for example, by using young children under the age of 14).

A person who commits a criminal offense jointly with a minor who has attained the age of criminal responsibility prescribed by Parts 1 and 2 of Article 15 of the Criminal Code but who, due to a developmental delay not associated with a mental disorder, was unable at the time of committing the criminal offense to fully understand the actual nature and social danger of their actions (omissions) or to control them (Part 3 of Article 15 of the Criminal Code) should also be recognized as an indirect perpetrator.

In this regard, it is irrelevant whether the guilty person was aware that, in committing the crime, they were using a minor who was not subject to criminal liability; a person suffering from a mental disorder that excludes sanity; or a minor who, although having knowingly attained the age at which criminal liability arises, lags behind in mental development and therefore does not fully understand the actual nature and social danger of their actions and cannot be held criminally liable for what they have done, or whether these objective and subjective circumstances were not within the person's awareness.

Any mistake made by the guilty person in this regard, whether reasonable or unreasonable, is irrelevant for recognizing that person as an indirect perpetrator. A different issue arises where an adult's mistake concerning the age of a minor whom that adult uses to commit a crime directly affects the additional attribution of the offense provided for in Article 132 of the Criminal Code: if the adult did not know that the person was a minor, that adult cannot be held liable under this article of the Criminal Code. Paragraph 23 of the Regulatory Resolution of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated April 11, 2002, “On Judicial Practice in Cases Involving Criminal Offenses Committed by Minors and Their Involvement in the Commission of Criminal Offenses and Other Antisocial Acts,” states: “When investigating and hearing cases involving the inducement of a minor to commit criminal offenses or antisocial acts, it must be borne in mind that these criminal offenses are committed with direct intent.

In this regard, it should be proceeded from the fact that criminal liability arises on the condition that the guilty person had reliable knowledge of the minor age of the person involved.”

An act intentionally committed jointly with a person who has not attained the age at which criminal liability arises for the relevant criminal offense, or with a person recognized as legally insane, cannot be regarded as an act committed by a group of persons pursuant to a prior conspiracy. For example, in the case of theft (Article 188 of the Criminal Code) committed jointly with a person who has not attained the age of criminal responsibility, the person recognized as a subject of the criminal offense must be regarded as the perpetrator of the theft and, in addition, where there are grounds for doing so, that person's actions must also be classified as involving a minor in the commission of a criminal offense under Article 132 of the Criminal Code.

Paragraph 27 of the Regulatory Resolution of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On Judicial Practice in Cases Involving Criminal Offenses Committed by Minors and Their Involvement in the Commission of Criminal Offenses and Other Antisocial Acts” states: “It is clarified that the actions of an adult who has involved a minor in the commission of a criminal offense and participated in its commission shall be classified cumulatively under the articles of the Criminal Code providing for liability both for the commission of the specific criminal offense in complicity with the minor and for involving the minor in the commission of criminal offenses. At the same time, a criminal offense committed jointly with a person who has not attained the age at which criminal liability arises cannot be classified as having been committed by a group of persons. In such cases, in accordance with Part 2 of Article 28 of the Criminal Code, the adult who involved the minor in the commission of criminal offenses shall be recognized as the perpetrator of the criminal offense.”

Indirect perpetration is impossible in criminal offenses for which the law provides for a special subject. This refers to situations in which a person cannot be held criminally liable as a perpetrator because that person does not possess the characteristics of a special subject of the criminal offense.

The acceptance of a bribe shall be recognized as having been committed by a group of persons pursuant to a prior conspiracy if two or more special subjects specified in Part 1 of Article 366 of the Criminal Code participated in the crime and had previously agreed to commit the crime jointly by using their official positions. Consequently, a person who is not a special subject (a person authorized to perform state functions, an official, etc.) cannot be held liable for accepting a bribe merely because that person, pursuant to a prior conspiracy with such a subject, actually participates jointly in accepting the bribe.

The use of a person acting negligently as a form of indirect perpetration should be understood only as a situation in which the guilty person involves another person in the commission of a criminal offense, while that other person acts innocently in the criminal-law sense, without understanding the social danger and unlawfulness of their actions and without foreseeing their harmful consequences. In this situation, neither a cumulative offense nor complicity involving a division of roles arises. The person who commits the criminal offense by using persons who have acted negligently shall be recognized as the perpetrator.

Physical or psychological coercion serves as grounds for classifying a person's actions as indirect perpetration where the person subjected to violence is unable to control their actions (omissions). The legislator also adheres to this position. Thus, pursuant to Part 1 of Article 37 of the Criminal Code: “Causing harm to interests protected by the Criminal Code as a result of physical or psychological coercion shall not constitute a criminal offense if, as a result of such coercion, the person was unable to control their actions (omissions).” The issue of criminal liability for causing harm to interests protected by the Criminal Code as a result of physical or psychological coercion, where the person retained the ability to control their actions, shall be resolved taking into account the provisions of Article 34, “Extreme Necessity” (Part 2 of Article 37 of the Criminal Code).

A person who uses animals capable of causing harm to human life or health shall be recognized as an indirect perpetrator of a criminal offense. In this case, animals are equated with instruments used to commit a criminal offense (for example, a dog used as an instrument in the theft of another person's property). As correctly emphasized in legal literature, it is precisely the “sentient nature” of animals, their belonging to living beings that understand and carry out commands, that enables a guilty person to use them as a controlled intermediary in committing a socially dangerous act and therefore (from a theoretical perspective) provides grounds for considering this situation as a whole to constitute indirect causation. Criminal liability of a person who uses an animal as an indirect instrument of perpetration may arise only if that person intended to act in this manner. In the absence of intent to use the animal for criminal purposes, the person to whom the animal belongs shall not be subject to criminal liability as an indirect perpetrator for harm caused by the animal, but shall be liable under civil or administrative law.

Indirect performance of the objective elements of a criminal offense (indirect causation) may also occur in certain other cases. Thus, where a person who actually conducts business activities through a nominal person (for example, an unemployed individual formally registered as an individual entrepreneur) evades payment of taxes and (or) other mandatory payments to the budget, that person's actions shall be classified under Article 244 of the Criminal Code as the actions of the perpetrator of that crime.

The management of the preparation of a specific criminal offense shall be regarded as the actions of an organizer. Legal literature identifies the following functions in carrying out such activities:

- identifying and recruiting participants for joint activities aimed at preparing to commit a crime;

- determining the object of the criminal encroachment;

- distributing functional duties (roles) among accomplices;

- developing a plan for committing the crime and instructing its participants;

- determining the place, time, instruments and methods of committing the crime;

- creating favorable conditions for its commission;

- providing participants with instruments and means of committing the crime;

- directing joint efforts toward its commission;

- managing the concealment of instruments and traces of the crime, as well as valuables obtained through criminal activity.

It should be borne in mind that the above and other possible types of activities cannot be considered mandatory in every case of organized commission of a crime. Their scope and combination may vary. In order to recognize a person as an organizer of a crime, it is sufficient that their actions contain signs of the performance of at least one of the functions listed above.

The form of organizational activity in the commission of a specific crime will be individual in each particular case. It may be said that the organizer, as it were, stands above the other accomplices, determining and directing their joint activities.

Directing the perpetrator of a criminal offense involves carrying out organizational functions during an already commenced criminal offense. Therefore, the leader of a crime should be understood as a person who heads the criminal encroachment, gives instructions to accomplices during its commission, coordinates their actions, monitors the performance of those actions, diverts the attention of law enforcement agencies, and so forth.

Under the criminal legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan, an organizer is recognized not only as a person who performs functions related to the preparation and commission of individual criminal offenses, but also as a person who establishes a criminal group or directs such a group.

In accordance with Subparagraph 24) of Article 3 of the Criminal Code, a criminal group means an organized group, criminal organization, criminal community, transnational organized group, transnational criminal organization, transnational criminal community, terrorist group, extremist group, gang, or illegal paramilitary formation.

An organized group is a stable group of two or more persons who have united in advance for the purpose of committing one or more criminal offenses (Subparagraph 36) of Article 3 of the Criminal Code).

A criminal organization is an organized group whose members are divided into organizationally, functionally and (or) territorially separate groups (structural subdivisions) (Subparagraph 25) of Article 3 of the Criminal Code).

A criminal community is an association of two or more criminal organizations that have entered into a conspiracy to jointly commit one or more criminal offenses, as well as to create conditions for the independent commission of one or more criminal offenses by any of those criminal organizations (Subparagraph 23) of Article 3 of the Criminal Code).

A transnational organized group is an organized group pursuing the purpose of committing one or more criminal offenses in the territory of two or more states, or in the territory of one state where the offense is organized or its execution directed from the territory of another state, as well as where citizens of another state participate (Subparagraph 35) of Article 3 of the Criminal Code).

A transnational criminal organization is a criminal organization pursuing the purpose of committing one or more criminal offenses in the territory of two or more states, or in the territory of one state where the offense is organized or its execution directed from the territory of another state, as well as where citizens of another state participate (Subparagraph 34) of Article 3 of the Criminal Code).

A transnational criminal community is an association of two or more transnational criminal organizations (Subparagraph 33) of Article 3 of the Criminal Code).

A terrorist group is an organized group pursuing the purpose of committing one or more terrorist crimes (Subparagraph 31) of Article 3 of the Criminal Code).

Terrorist crimes are acts provided for in Articles 170, 171, 173, 177, 178, 184, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 269 and 270 of the Criminal Code (Subparagraph 30) of Article 3 of the Criminal Code).

An extremist group is an organized group pursuing the purpose of committing one or more extremist crimes (Subparagraph 40) of Article 3 of the Criminal Code).

Extremist crimes are acts provided for in Articles 174, 179, 180, 181, 182, 184, 258, 259, 260, 267, 404 (Parts 2 and 3) and 405 of the Criminal Code (Subparagraph 39) of Article 3 of the Criminal Code).

A gang is an organized group pursuing the purpose of attacking citizens or organizations using weapons or objects used as weapons, or threatening to use such weapons or objects (Subparagraph 7) of Article 3 of the Criminal Code).

An illegal paramilitary formation is a formation (association, detachment, militia or other group consisting of three or more persons) not provided for by the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan, having a paramilitary organizational structure, unity of command, combat capability and strict discipline (Subparagraph 18) of Article 3 of the Criminal Code).

Clause 6 of the Regulatory Resolution of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On Certain Issues of the Application by Courts of Legislation on Liability for Banditry and Other Criminal Offenses Committed in Complicity” states: “In accordance with Part 3 of Article 31 of the Criminal Code, the term ‘criminal group’ should be understood to include not only an organized group, criminal organization, criminal community, transnational criminal organization, and transnational criminal community, the establishment of which is punishable under Part 1 of Articles 262, 263, 264 and 265 of the Criminal Code, but also a terrorist group, extremist group, stable armed group (gang) and illegal paramilitary formation, the establishment of which is punishable under Part 1 of Articles 257, 268 and 267 of the Criminal Code.”

An organizer shall be recognized as a person who organizes the commission of a criminal offense or directs its execution, as well as a person who establishes a criminal group or directs such a group (Part 3 of Article 28 of the Criminal Code). The organizer is the most dangerous participant in joint unlawful activity. The organizer is the driving force and initiator behind the commission of a criminal offense. The organizer of a crime is distinguished from other participants primarily by the initiative demonstrated in preparing the criminal offense, that is, recruiting other persons, actively participating in the development of a plan for joint activity and possibly taking an active part in the crime committed by the group.

Cases in which, for example, an official proposes to a subordinate employee, for the purpose of obtaining a desired action (omission) in the interests of their organization, that the employee give a bribe to an official should be regarded as organizing the commission of a criminal offense. In this case, the official shall be liable under the relevant part of Article 367 of the Criminal Code as the perpetrator of the crime, while the employee who carried out the instruction shall be liable as an accomplice in the giving of a bribe.

If a person does not directly or indirectly perform the objective elements of a criminal offense, that person cannot be recognized as its perpetrator. Thus, the actions of a person who did not directly participate in the theft of another person's property but facilitated the commission of that crime through advice or instructions, or who promised in advance to conceal traces of the crime, remove obstacles unrelated to providing assistance to the direct perpetrators of the crime, dispose of stolen property, and so forth, should be classified as complicity in the form of aiding, with reference to Part 5 of Article 28 of the Criminal Code.

The activities of an organizer of a criminal group are characterized by certain features. Acting as the initiator of the creation of a criminal group, the organizer primarily persuades people to participate in it, directs the efforts of other accomplices toward achieving a socially dangerous result, unites them while maintaining a certain corporate discipline through the force of their authority and other methods, and develops forms of communication between members of the organization. The organizer develops a plan for unlawful activity, determines the methods of its implementation, distributes roles among members of the criminal group, that is, directs the organization's activities in preparing the crime. Through their activities, the organizer increases the socially dangerous potential of the accomplices and the danger they pose. Finally, the organizer directly manages the members of the organization during the commission of unlawful acts.

Organizational activity is possible both within a criminal group and in the commission of individual criminal offenses. Organizational activity is always carried out with criminal intent. The organizer understands the group's objectives and the methods of achieving them, foresees that criminal offenses will be committed as a result of their activities, and desires this outcome.

The establishment of a gang or another criminal group should be understood as any active, purposeful actions resulting in the actual formation of the organized groups or communities in question. Such actions may include recruiting members, acquiring weapons, ammunition, communication equipment, documents, transport and other means, developing an organizational structure and criminal plans, and recruiting people.

The establishment of a gang or another criminal group constitutes a completed criminal offense regardless of whether any crimes have been planned. The process of forming such criminal organizations should be regarded as preparation for the commission of crimes.

If it is established that these formations were intended to be created for the commission of a specific serious or particularly serious crime (for example, murder), the actions of the persons involved should also be classified as preparation for the commission of that crime (Clause 12 of the Regulatory Resolution of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated June 21, 2001).

Directing a gang or another criminal group means making decisions related to the planning, material support and organization of the gang's criminal activities, as well as the preparation and commission of specific criminal offenses by it. A gang or another criminal group may be directed by one or several persons.

The failure to establish evidence that a particular person or persons directed a gang or another criminal group does not exclude the existence of such a gang or criminal group.

Not only the establishment of a criminal community (criminal organization) for the purpose of jointly committing one or more crimes or directing such a community (organization) is punishable as an independent crime (Article 263 of the Criminal Code), but also the establishment of an association of leaders or other members of organized groups (criminal organizations), or the coordination of criminal activities of independently operating organized groups (criminal organizations), the development of plans and creation of conditions for the commission of crimes by such groups, or the division of spheres of criminal influence and criminal proceeds between them, where such actions are committed by a person using their influence over members of organized groups, as well as participation in a meeting of leaders or other representatives of organized groups or criminal organizations for the purpose of coordinating criminal activities.

A special role in the hierarchy of a criminal community is assigned to a person occupying a leading position among the leaders of organized groups (criminal organizations) (Part 5 of Article 263 of the Criminal Code).

According to Subparagraph 22) of Article 3 of the Criminal Code, coordination of criminal activities means coordination between organized groups (criminal organizations) for the purpose of jointly committing crimes (establishing stable ties between the leaders or other members of organized groups (criminal organizations), developing plans and creating conditions for committing crimes, as well as dividing spheres of criminal influence and proceeds from criminal activities).

A person occupying a leading position, in accordance with Subparagraph 32) of Article 3 of the Criminal Code, is a person vested by the leaders of organized groups (criminal organizations) with powers to coordinate criminal activities, or a person whom the group members recognize as having the right to make the most important decisions affecting their interests and determining the direction and nature of their criminal activities.

An instigator shall be recognized as a person who induces another person to commit a criminal offense by persuasion, bribery, threats or by other means (Part 4 of Article 28 of the Criminal Code). Consequently, the role of the instigator consists in initiating a criminal act through direct influence on the consciousness and will of the intended perpetrator in order to create in that person the determination (intention) to commit a specific criminal act.

The law provides only an illustrative list of methods of instigation. It is impossible to enumerate all of them, since they are varied and are applied depending on the specific situation and the characteristics and individual qualities of the particular person being induced to commit a criminal offense. The most common methods of instigation are persuasion, bribery and threats. However, instigation may also be carried out through requests, proposals, flattery, or by arousing feelings of envy, jealousy or revenge. Coercive methods include orders and directives that are binding on a particular person, for example, a military servicemember.

Persuasion means convincing a person to commit a criminal offense. To persuade means to convince the person being induced. As a rule, repeated influence by the instigator is required.

Bribery is expressed in a promise to provide the person being induced with material benefits in the form of money, property, services of a material nature or release from material obligations.

A threat is an expressed intention to use physical violence, destroy property or engage in blackmail.

When inducing the perpetrator to commit a criminal offense, the instigator does not personally participate in its commission. A person who combines instigation to a criminal offense with participation in its direct commission (the initiator) shall be held liable as a perpetrator, while that person's actions in inducing another person to commit the criminal offense shall be assessed as factual circumstances characterizing the degree of their participation in the commission of the criminal offense.

Instigation is characterized primarily by the commission of an act objectively aimed at arousing in the perpetrator the determination to commit a specific criminal offense. Instigation always consists of an act. Omission, under certain conditions, may facilitate the commission of a criminal offense and therefore constitute aiding; however, it is impossible to induce another person to commit a criminal offense through omission. Even in cases where omission conceals authoritative approval of the perpetrator's determination and the socially dangerous act depends on the position of the person remaining inactive to such an extent that a single “no” from that person would constitute an insurmountable obstacle to the commission of the criminal offense, the issue may only concern intellectual aiding — strengthening the determination to commit a criminal offense — and not instigation.

Approval of a person's already formed desire to participate in a group criminal offense or to commit a criminal offense independently does not constitute instigation. However, if a person's hesitation regarding the possibility of committing a crime is dispelled under the influence of external pressure from a particular individual, that individual shall be considered an instigator.

A causal link between the instigator's actions and the final result of the joint activities of the participants in the criminal offense is a necessary condition for the objective elements of instigation. In instigation, the causal process originates in the instigator's actions; in other words, causation begins with the instigator's influence on the will and consciousness of the perpetrator. The first result of this influence is the perpetrator's newly formed determination to commit a specific criminal offense. The next link in the development of the causal process in instigation is the act committed by the perpetrator — an action or omission directly aimed at carrying out the criminal offense. In this way, a causal link is established between the instigator's actions and the specific socially dangerous result, forming the objective prerequisite for the instigator's liability for that result. The degree of the instigator's liability depends on how significant their role was in inducing another person to commit the criminal offense.

Instigation consists in inducing another person to commit a criminal offense. This means that, for instigation to exist, it is irrelevant whether the instigator was the author of the criminal plan or adopted it from a third party. The instigator's activity must be aimed at arousing in the perpetrator the determination to commit one or more specific criminal offenses. The negative influence of one person on another, the arousal of base feelings and aspirations, and similar conduct must, under certain conditions, entail criminal liability as an independent criminal offense.

Instigation is always committed intentionally. The instigator foresees the socially dangerous nature of their actions and their consequences. The instigator understands that they are inducing the perpetrator to commit a criminal offense and desires or consciously accepts that, under their influence, the perpetrator will resolve to do so.

In criminal law scholarship, the opinion has been expressed that negligent instigation is theoretically possible but does not constitute a criminal offense. Thus, if a person boasts that they have achieved material prosperity by committing a crime but has no intention of arousing a desire in another person to commit a specific crime, their actions may contribute to the formation of a desire to commit a crime, but they are not criminally punishable.

Calls and statements addressed to a person that do not constitute inducement to commit a specific criminal offense but merely express approval of people who know how to “circumvent” the law cannot be regarded as instigation. Nor does instigation exist where a person expresses an idea about the possibility and even desirability of committing a specific criminal offense if that idea is not directly addressed to a specific perpetrator.

A special case of instigation to commit a crime is the provocation of a crime, that is, inducing a person to commit a specific crime by an official of law enforcement or special agencies for the purpose of subsequently exposing the offender. Such actions by these officials constitute abuse of power or official authority (Article 362 of the Criminal Code); provocation of a crime (Article 412-1 of the Criminal Code); or provocation of commercial bribery or bribery (Article 417 of the Criminal Code). Under Article 417 of the Criminal Code, criminally punishable provocation consists of transferring an object of commercial bribery or a bribe without the consent of the receiving person for the purpose of artificially creating evidence of the commission of a crime or blackmail. Such actions create artificial evidence of a criminal act by a person committing corruption-related crimes specified in the disposition of Article 366 of the Criminal Code, or by a person performing managerial functions in a commercial or other organization (Parts 4, 5 and 6 of Article 253 of the Criminal Code).

Instigation should be distinguished from criminally punishable acts expressed in inducing another person to commit a specific crime: propaganda of terrorism or public calls to commit an act of terrorism (Article 256 of the Criminal Code); involving a minor in the commission of a criminal offense or antisocial acts (Articles 132 and 133 of the Criminal Code); involving a minor in prostitution (Article 134 of the Criminal Code); calls for active disobedience to the lawful demands of representatives of the authorities and for mass riots, or provocation of mass riots, as well as calls for violence against citizens (Part 3 of Article 272 of the Criminal Code). Whereas in instigation the inducement is always addressed to a specific person or persons and is aimed at arousing in them a desire to commit clearly defined criminal offenses, calls for mass riots are addressed to an indeterminate and broad circle of persons. As for the crimes provided for in Articles 132, 133 and 134 of the Criminal Code, taking into account their specific nature (the special category of persons being involved and the special nature of the intended offenses), such conduct is regarded not as complicity but as a special type of crime.

The difference between an instigator and an organizer is that the instigator plays a less active role in the commission of a criminal offense: the instigator merely involves the perpetrator in committing the criminal offense and does not otherwise contribute to its successful execution. Furthermore, unlike an organizer, an instigator does not plan the commission of the criminal offense, direct its preparation or commission, or lead the other accomplices. Where a person not only induces another person to commit a criminal offense but subsequently also performs organizational actions, the accomplice's actions should be classified solely as organizational, since by their nature they are more dangerous than instigating actions. The organization of a criminal offense includes actions aimed at inducing another person to commit the criminal offense.

The purposes for which the instigator and the perpetrator act may differ; their motives may also differ (for example, an instigator, motivated by jealousy, induces a person to commit murder by offering material remuneration). Nevertheless, the legal assessment of the instigator's actions will depend on the purposes and motives guiding the perpetrator of the criminal offense (if such purposes and motives are specified as elements of the composition of a particular criminal offense and were covered by the instigator's intent). This demonstrates the accessory nature of complicity.

In the case of unsuccessful instigation, where a person's actions aimed at inducing another person to commit an act prove unsuccessful, such conduct, insofar as it creates conditions for the commission of a criminal offense, constitutes preparation for a criminal offense. Paragraph 2 of Part 4 of Article 29 of the Criminal Code states: “Criminal liability for preparation for a crime shall also be borne by a person who, due to circumstances beyond their control, failed to induce other persons to commit that act.”

An aider shall be recognized as a person who facilitates the commission of a criminal offense through advice, instructions, provision of information, instruments or means of committing a criminal offense, or by removing obstacles to the commission of a criminal offense, as well as a person who has promised in advance to conceal the guilty person, the instruments or other means of committing the criminal offense, the traces of the criminal offense or items obtained through unlawful means, and also a person who has promised in advance to acquire or dispose of such items (Part 5 of Article 28 of the Criminal Code).

By assisting the perpetrator, the aider thereby encroaches upon specific public relations protected by criminal law, and it is precisely this circumstance that determines the public danger of the act committed by the aider. In each case, the degree of public danger of the aider's conduct depends, first, on the nature of the public relations subjected to the encroachment and, second, on the significance of the assistance provided in achieving the socially dangerous result.

Insignificant assistance in committing a criminal offense that does not pose a substantial danger does not constitute the elements of aiding. In this regard, it is appropriate to refer to the provision enshrined in Part 4 of Article 10 of the Criminal Code, which states that an act or omission that, although formally containing the elements of an act provided for by the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, does not pose a public danger due to its insignificance shall not constitute a criminal offense.

The list of methods of assistance contained in the legislative definition of aiding is exhaustive. Aiding may be carried out by providing advice; giving instructions; supplying means; removing obstacles; promising to conceal the person who committed the criminal offense, the instruments and means used to commit the criminal offense, the traces of the criminal offense or items obtained through criminal means; or promising to acquire or dispose of such items.

Thus, a promise made to the perpetrator in advance, before the commission of the criminal offense, not to obstruct the perpetrator and not to report the offense, or to acquire or dispose of items obtained through criminal means, strengthens the perpetrator's determination to commit the criminal offense. Such a promise should be regarded as aiding that effectively removes obstacles to the commission of the criminal offense.

Paragraph 12 of the Regulatory Resolution of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated December 22, 2016, “On Certain Issues of the Application by Courts of Legislation on Liability for Involvement in a Crime and Aiding in a Criminal Offense,” states: “For the purposes of aiding, advice and instructions should be understood as oral and written recommendations and explanations concerning how to prepare a criminal offense more effectively and safely, which method would be more appropriate for committing it, when it would be best to begin carrying out the intended plan, whom to involve as accomplices, and so forth.”

The removal of obstacles to the commission of a criminal offense should be understood as any actions by an aider aimed at creating the conditions necessary for the successful commission of a criminal offense (for example, disconnecting the power supply, disabling an alarm system, distracting security personnel, poisoning a guard dog, making a false emergency call, destroying accounting records, and so forth).

Depending on the method of assistance, aiding may be physical or intellectual. Physical aiding consists of providing the perpetrator with material means necessary to commit the criminal offense or removing obstacles to its commission, for example, providing a weapon for murder or robbery, providing vehicles for theft, and so forth. Intellectual aiding consists of giving the perpetrator advice and instructions that facilitate the criminal offense, for example, instructions on where to purchase a weapon for murder, how to enter a storage facility to commit theft, and so forth, as well as strengthening the perpetrator's determination to commit the criminal offense.

A promise made in advance, before the commission of a criminal offense, to conceal the person who committed the criminal offense or the traces of the criminal offense, not to report a criminal offense being prepared, or not to prevent its commission constitutes intellectual aiding.

According to Paragraph 13 of the above-mentioned Regulatory Resolution of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “On Certain Issues of the Application by Courts of Legislation on Liability for Involvement in a Crime and Aiding in a Criminal Offense”: “Concealment of a criminal offense may be recognized as complicity in the form of aiding if the actions committed by the guilty person were promised to the perpetrator before or during the commission of the criminal offense, or if, for other reasons, the perpetrator had grounds to knowingly and fully rely on such assistance (for example, due to repeated concealment, acquisition or disposal of property knowingly obtained through criminal means; previously committing another criminal offense in complicity with the perpetrator; knowingly approving or agreeing with the ideas and objectives of a criminal group, including a criminal organization, terrorist group, extremist group, gang or illegal paramilitary formation, and so forth).”

A person who carries out concealment promised in advance is an aider in complex complicity, and therefore that person's actions are subject to classification under the relevant article of the Special Part of the Criminal Code on the basis of the qualifying feature of commission of a criminal offense by a group of persons pursuant to a prior conspiracy, with reference to Part 5 of Article 28 of the Criminal Code (Paragraph 14 of the Regulatory Resolution of the Supreme Court).

The acquisition or disposal of property obtained through criminal means promised in advance, as well as concealment of a criminal offense promised in advance, shall be recognized as complicity in a criminal offense in the form of aiding.

A promise made in advance to acquire or dispose of property knowingly obtained through criminal means, where such promise creates criminal intent in the perpetrator and thereby induces that person to commit a criminal offense, should be recognized not as aiding but as instigation. The actions of the guilty person shall be classified under the relevant article of the Criminal Code providing for liability for the specific criminal offense, with reference to Part 4 of Article 28 of the Criminal Code.

Concealment of a criminal offense promised in advance must be distinguished from concealment of a crime that was not promised in advance.

Since assistance to the perpetrator in the case of concealment, failure to report and acquiescence promised in advance consists precisely in the promise that strengthens the perpetrator's determination, the substance of the activity of the person making the promise lies not in the actions or omissions following the promise but in the very fact that the promise was made. Failure to fulfill the promise — for example, refusing to conceal the person who committed the criminal offense after its commission — may be taken into account when determining the punishment but does not exclude complicity in the criminal offense.

Intellectual aiding may be expressed only through the commission of certain actions, whereas physical aiding may be carried out through both actions and omissions (this refers to cases where a person who is legally obligated to prevent the commission of a criminal offense, as provided for by that person's special legal duty, deliberately remains inactive and thereby, in essence, removes an obstacle to the commission of unlawful activity).

Aiding is always provided in relation to the unlawful activity of a specific person or group of persons. It is possible in relation not only to the activities of the perpetrator but also to those of other accomplices: organizers, instigators and aiders. Like instigation, aiding may only relate to a specific criminal offense. In this regard, it is sufficient that, in the aider's understanding, the criminal offense being facilitated is described not by specific elements but by general, relatively definite characteristics.

The aider assists the perpetrator in committing a criminal offense by creating, through their actions, a real possibility of its commission. In this way, the aider's conduct becomes part of the general causal sequence leading to the commission of a specific socially dangerous act. The aider's causation of a socially dangerous result constitutes the objective prerequisite for liability for that result. The requirement that a causal link exist between the aider's conduct and the socially dangerous result excludes from the scope of aiding, and consequently from complicity, all actions that are in one way or another connected with the commission of a criminal offense but do not constitute assistance in its commission. In particular, for this reason, concealment that was not promised in advance cannot be regarded as aiding.

In order to recognize a person as an aider, it is necessary to establish not only a causal link between that person's actions and the actions committed by the perpetrator of the criminal offense but also the existence of intent directed at providing such assistance. Negligent assistance to a perpetrator in committing a criminal offense does not constitute the elements of aiding.

According to Paragraph 18 of the above-mentioned Regulatory Resolution of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan: “Criminal law does not establish a lower degree of danger for aiding compared with other forms of complicity. The public danger of an aider's conduct is expressed in the fact that, although the aider does not directly participate in the commission of a criminal offense, their actions strengthen the perpetrator's determination to commit the criminal offense and substantially facilitate its commission. In this regard, an aider shall be held liable and punished on an equal basis with the other accomplices to the criminal offense, taking into account the provisions of Article 52 of the Criminal Code. At the same time, taking into account the circumstances of the case, the court may impose on the aider a punishment that is either less severe or more severe than that imposed on the other accomplices.”

Commentary on the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 2021, by Isidor Shamilovich Borchashvili, Honored Figure of Kazakhstan, Doctor of Law, Professor, Academician of the Kazakhstan National Academy of Natural Sciences, Member of the Scientific Advisory Councils under the Constitutional Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Member of the Working Group on Reform of the Law Enforcement System under the Security Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Honored Employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

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