Commentary on Article 21. Criminal Offence Committed Through Negligence of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan
A criminal offence committed through negligence is an act committed through self-confidence or carelessness.
A criminal offence shall be deemed to have been committed through self-confidence if a person foresaw the possibility of socially dangerous consequences resulting from their actions (omissions), but, without sufficient grounds, recklessly relied on preventing those consequences.
A criminal offence shall be deemed to have been committed through carelessness if a person did not foresee the possibility of socially dangerous consequences resulting from their actions (omissions), although, with due attention and foresight, they should and could have foreseen those consequences.
In the rapidly changing conditions of the modern world, with its new technologies and the problem of human social adaptation arising in connection therewith, increasingly higher requirements are imposed on people's conduct, discipline and organisation, which they are not always able to meet. Statistical data indicate a continuing trend towards an increase in the number of negligent criminally punishable acts committed in the field of the natural environment; in the area of the use and operation of vehicles; and in activities involving construction, industrial and agricultural work.
In most cases, negligent criminal offences are committed due to the carelessness, indiscipline and laxity of certain categories of persons, their dismissive attitude towards the requirements imposed in connection with the performance of their professional and other duties and functions, as well as the assumption by certain individuals of functions that they are unable to perform due to a lack of appropriate qualifications, experience, education or relevant special training, or for other reasons. It may be assumed that the issue of liability for negligence in criminal law will acquire increasingly greater theoretical and practical significance.
The Recommendations of the 12th Congress of the International Association of Penal Law (Hamburg, 1979) state: “When deciding whether a negligent offence should be criminalised or decriminalised, all aspects of the impact that such a decision may have on environmental, social and other factors in the specific context of social development must be taken into account (paragraph 3(a)). A case of gross negligence which, from a social perspective, causes harm to social and individual values and well-being should be regarded as a violation of criminal law (paragraph 3(b)). Criminal liability for negligent offences should arise in accordance with the principle of culpability for acts resulting in serious harm that the person foresaw or could have foreseen, as well as in cases where the law takes into account the degree of danger posed by the relevant violations of safety rules (paragraph 4(a)).”
In cases where criminal offences are committed through negligence, the social essence of guilt is expressed in the fact that a person displays recklessness, inattention and a negligent attitude towards compliance with the requirements imposed on their conduct, as a result of which socially dangerous consequences occur or may occur.
The definition of negligent guilt in Kazakhstani criminal law is based on such a feature as the person's attitude towards the socially dangerous consequences of their actions or omissions that have occurred.
Criminal legislation contains a significant number of different elements of criminal offences providing for liability for causing socially dangerous harm as a result of negligent guilt. Negligence as a form of guilt is regarded as less dangerous than intentional guilt. At the same time, the socially dangerous harm caused by negligent criminal offences may be substantial and, in certain categories of criminal offences, may exceed the harm caused by intentional criminal offences.
Part 1 of Article 21 of the Criminal Code legally establishes two types of negligence as a form of guilt: self-confidence and carelessness.
A criminal offence shall be deemed to have been committed through negligence if the person who committed it foresaw the possibility of socially dangerous consequences resulting from their actions or omissions, but, without sufficient grounds, recklessly relied on preventing those consequences, or did not foresee the possibility of such consequences occurring, although, with due attention and foresight, they should and could have foreseen them.
Unlike intentional criminal offences, negligent criminal offences do not contain a volitional orientation towards achieving the consequences that occurred, i.e. the consequences are not connected with the goals or aspirations of the subject of the criminal offence.
However, what intentional and negligent criminal offences have in common is the offender's negative attitude towards the requirements of society.
Negligence may take the form of self-confidence (recklessness) or carelessness. Under Part 2 of Article 21 of the Criminal Code, self-confidence is characterised by the fact that a person who commits a criminal offence through negligence foresaw the possibility of socially dangerous consequences resulting from their actions or omissions, but recklessly relied on preventing them without sufficient grounds.
As is evident from the wording of the law, when defining self-confidence, the legislator does not address the person's mental attitude towards the socially dangerous act or omission being committed, but limits the description to the person's attitude towards the consequences alone. In cases of self-confidence, the subject is aware of the negative significance of the possible consequences. If so, it may be assumed that the person is also aware of the social danger of the action or omission being committed, although such awareness is not a mandatory feature of self-confidence, since it does not follow from the law. However, this calculation proves to be insufficiently thought out, reckless and lacking sufficient grounds. For example, a motorcyclist, consciously travelling at high speed, believed that at any moment they could easily brake and avoid an accident. However, the brakes failed at the crucial moment, and the motorcyclist hit a pedestrian crossing the street, causing injury to the pedestrian's health. The motorcyclist foresaw the possibility of the aforementioned consequences but recklessly relied on preventing them without sufficient grounds. The motorcyclist acted with self-confidence.
Thus, self-confidence is characterised by:
the existence of foresight of the socially dangerous consequences of one's conduct;
the existence of a reckless reliance, without sufficient grounds, on preventing those consequences.
In terms of its intellectual element, self-confidence bears some similarity to the intellectual element of direct and, in particular, indirect intent, since in both cases the offender foresees the occurrence of socially dangerous consequences of their actions (omissions). However, the nature of foresight in these forms of guilt differs substantially.
When a criminal offence is committed intentionally, the person clearly foresees the specific consequences of their actions. In cases of self-confidence, socially dangerous consequences are foreseen in a general, abstract form. The offender foresees that the actions (omissions) being committed may, in general, entail socially dangerous consequences, but believes that such consequences will not occur in the particular case.
The volitional element of self-confidence is characterised by the fact that a person recklessly relies, without sufficient grounds, on preventing the socially dangerous consequences of their actions (omissions).
The offender's reliance on preventing the harmful consequences of their conduct always presupposes reliance on specific, concrete circumstances which, in the person's opinion, should prevent the consequences from occurring. Therefore, self-confidence differs from indirect intent in terms of its volitional feature as well. In cases of self-confidence, a person seeks to prevent socially dangerous consequences, relying on specific circumstances. In cases of indirect intent, the person, at best, hopes for a fortunate coincidence of circumstances as a result of which socially dangerous consequences will not occur, and takes no action to prevent them.
Some Russian scholars believe that “recklessness (referred to as self-confidence in our legislation) does not fit within the criteria of negligence as a form of guilt.” This position cannot be accepted, since it contradicts not only the statutory classification of recklessness (self-confidence — author's emphasis, I. B.) as a type of negligent guilt, but also its traditional assessment in this capacity by domestic criminal law doctrine.
Under Part 3 of Article 21 of the Criminal Code, carelessness is defined by the fact that a person did not foresee the possibility of socially dangerous consequences resulting from their actions (omissions), although, with due attention and foresight, they should and could have foreseen those consequences. The following case may serve as an example of a criminal offence committed through carelessness. R. was returning from a hunting trip with D. A loaded double-barrelled shotgun was in the car. When the car braked sharply, R. caught the trigger of the shotgun with a mitten, causing a shot to be fired, as a result of which D., who was sitting behind the steering wheel, was shot in the heart. The court classified R.'s actions as negligent infliction of grievous bodily harm. Although R. did not foresee the consequences of their actions, they should and could have foreseen them had they been more attentive and prudent. Their mental attitude towards the consequence that occurred is expressed in the form of carelessness.
The legislative definition of carelessness reveals the following principal features:
the person's failure to foresee the possibility of socially dangerous consequences resulting from their actions or omissions;
the existence of an obligation and the ability of the person to foresee those consequences.
Consequently, in cases of criminal carelessness, the person's actions (omissions) are not directly aimed at causing harm to an object protected by criminal law. However, despite having a real opportunity to foresee the socially dangerous consequences of their conduct, the person fails to exercise the necessary attention and foresight in order to take the necessary volitional actions to prevent criminal consequences, failing to turn a real possibility into reality.
The intellectual factor of carelessness is revealed through two principal elements of carelessness: 1) a positive (exculpatory) element and 2) a negative (reproachable, inexcusable) element. The positive feature of carelessness is based on the fact that the person should and could have foreseen the development of events in such a direction that they would actually result in the infliction of harmful consequences. The negative, blameworthy element of carelessness consists in the failure to foresee the possibility of socially dangerous consequences and the failure to recognise the social danger and unlawfulness of the act being committed.
The volitional factor of criminal carelessness consists in the fact that a person fails to prevent the harmful criminal consequences of their conduct, although they have real opportunities to do so. The person is reproached for failing to mobilise their technical capabilities and abilities to perform specifically defined volitional actions aimed at preventing harmful and undesirable consequences, thereby influencing the development of events in such a way as to prevent the possibility of criminal consequences from becoming an actual, physical occurrence in reality.
The social essence of criminally careless conduct lies in the fact that such conduct is always associated with a person's violation of the duty to exercise caution and prudence. The social meaning of criminally careless conduct as a volitional act is revealed by the statutory formula: “the person did not foresee the possibility of socially dangerous consequences resulting from their actions (omissions), although, with due attention and foresight, they should and could have foreseen those consequences.” The term “should” emphasises the nature of the actions committed in cases of criminal carelessness, namely, that such actions are associated with a breach of duties incumbent upon the person.
A person's obligation to perform a particular action or refrain from performing it may arise from various circumstances: by virtue of law (for example, the duty to provide assistance to a sick person or a person in a life-threatening condition (Articles 320 and 118 of the Criminal Code); as a result of a contract (for example, an obligation related to official duties (Article 371 of the Criminal Code), and others. When determining liability for negligent guilt, it is necessary in each specific case to establish which duty was breached by the person and how that breach was manifested. If it is established that performing the particular action was not within the scope of the person's duties, the socially dangerous consequences resulting from it cannot be imputed to that person as guilt.
The content of carelessness is not limited solely to the obligation to foresee socially dangerous consequences. For criminal carelessness to exist, it must be established that the person not only should have foreseen, but also could have foreseen, in the given situation, the occurrence of socially dangerous consequences resulting from their actions. The possibility of foreseeing the consequences is determined by the specific circumstances of the situation in which the act is committed and the individual qualities of the offender (level of development, education, experience, etc.).
It should be noted that problems of a similar nature, inherent in direct and indirect intent in crimes with a formal composition, also arise when analysing Article 21 of the Criminal Code, which discloses the content of negligence as a form of guilt. The definitions of self-confidence and carelessness set out in Parts 2 and 3 of the aforementioned Article may be applied only to criminal offences with a material composition.
In criminal law theory, the prevailing view is that all negligent crimes are, by their construction, material offences. Nevertheless, the possibility of committing a crime with a formal composition through negligence is not entirely excluded. This follows from an analysis of the content of a number of criminal offence provisions, for example, Part 1 of Article 285, Part 1 of Article 324, Part 1 of Article 325, Part 1 of Article 326, Part 1 of Article 328, Part 1 of Article 332, Part 1 of Article 333, and Article 336 of the Criminal Code. This concerns elements providing for liability for creating a danger, criminal liability for which is conditional upon the non-occurrence of consequences (Part 1 of Article 285 of the Criminal Code) or the creation of a real possibility of those consequences occurring.
In my view, creating a threat of causing significant or large-scale damage to the ecological environment or harm to human health presupposes the creation of a situation or circumstances that would have resulted in the harmful consequences provided for by law, had they not been interrupted by timely measures or other circumstances beyond the will of the person causing the danger. In this regard, a threat presupposes the existence of a specific danger of actual harm being caused to human health or the environment.
Unfortunately, the Regulatory Resolution of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 18 June 2004, “On the Application by Courts of Legislation on Liability for Certain Environmental Criminal Offences”, does not clarify the concept of “could have resulted in”, provided for in the first parts of Articles 285, 324, 325, 326, 328, 332, 333 and 336 of the Criminal Code. The subjective element of the aforementioned crimes, as formulated by the legislator, has considerable distinctive features and may give rise to differing interpretations by courts and law enforcement authorities.
If we proceed from the assumption that the commission of such crimes exclusively through negligence (as required by Part 4 of Article 19 of the Criminal Code) is not expressly stipulated, then the attitude towards possible consequences may be either intentional or negligent.
Problems arise in determining the form of guilt in similar types of offences whose legislative descriptions do not make it clear which form of guilt may be involved.
It should not be forgotten that many crimes may be committed either intentionally or through negligence, while some may be committed only intentionally. The distinction between these types is not specified in the Criminal Code, which creates unjustified difficulties in understanding the law and, even more so, in its application. The Special Part has not been brought into conformity with Part 4 of Article 19 of the Criminal Code. As a result, most environmental crimes, a number of crimes against health and morality, and others have come to be regarded as intentional.
The absence in most provisions on environmental crimes of an indication that harmful consequences are caused exclusively through negligence constitutes a gap in the law.
When deciding whether a subject acted with intent and determining the legal classification of the conduct, a problem relating to the legal assessment of mistake (subjective mistake) sometimes arises in practice.
A mistake is a person's misconception regarding the nature and degree of social danger of the act being committed and its unlawfulness. Mistakes are of two types: legal and factual.
A legal mistake is a person's misconception regarding the criminal nature of the act committed, its classification under the Articles of the Criminal Code, and its punishability. Criminal law theory distinguishes the following types of legal mistakes:
an erroneous belief that the act committed is criminal, whereas the law does not, in fact, classify it as a crime (“putative crime”). In such cases, criminal liability is excluded because no criminal act has been committed (for example, an employer who hires foreigners and stateless persons without the appropriate permit for the first time believes that this is a criminally punishable act, whereas, in fact, such actions are criminally punishable only when committed repeatedly; in this case, the employer may be held administratively liable);
an incorrect assessment of the act committed as non-criminal, whereas in reality it is provided for by law as a crime.
Such a mistake does not exclude intentional guilt, since ignorance of the law does not exempt a person from criminal liability;
a person's misconception regarding the legal consequences of the act being committed: its classification, and the type and amount of punishment that may be imposed for committing that act. These circumstances do not form part of the substantive content of guilt and are not necessarily required to be within the offender's awareness. Therefore, an erroneous assessment of them excludes neither intent nor criminal liability.
A legal mistake by a person who is mistaken about the legal characteristics or legal consequences of the act being committed does not affect the form of guilt, the classification of the crime, or the amount of the punishment imposed.
A factual mistake is a person's misconception or incorrect understanding of the factual circumstances of the act committed that relate to the elements of a criminal offence. In criminal law theory and practice, the following types of factual mistakes are distinguished: a mistake regarding the social danger of the act being committed, the object, the identity of the victim, the subject matter, the means, the method, the consequences caused, the causal relationship, qualifying circumstances, and the number of objects targeted.
A mistake regarding the social danger of the act being committed may take the following forms. First, a person incorrectly assesses their actions as socially dangerous, whereas the act is, in fact, devoid of the quality of social danger, for example, the theft of food products that are subject to destruction because they are unfit for consumption. Such a mistake preserves the intentional nature of the act committed, but liability arises not for a completed crime, but for an attempt, since the criminal intention was not realised and no actual harm was caused to the selected object of the offence — property relations. Second, a person mistakenly considers their actions lawful, failing to recognise their social danger. As a rule, such a misconception is caused by ignorance of important factual circumstances relating to the objective element of the criminal offence and giving the act its socially dangerous character. Such a mistake excludes intent, and if the act is criminal only when committed intentionally, criminal liability is also excluded. For example, the sale of counterfeit money by a person who honestly believes that the money is genuine does not constitute a crime due to the absence of guilt.
A mistake regarding the object is an incorrect understanding by a person of the social and legal nature of the object of the offence and the number of objects actually harmed. Two varieties of such a mistake are possible.
First, a mistake involving the substitution of the object in the mind of the person acting: mistakenly believing that the act infringes upon one object, the subject actually causes harm to another object that is not homogeneous with the one covered by the offender's intent. For example, a person attempting to steal narcotic-containing medicines from a pharmacy actually steals medicines that do not contain narcotic substances. The offender's actions should be classified according to the direction of their intent, i.e. as an attempt to steal narcotic drugs (Part 3 of Article 24 and Article 298 of the Criminal Code). Second, a mistake regarding the object consists in ignorance of circumstances that alter the social and legal assessment of the object under the criminal law provision. If the subject mistakenly believes that they are infringing upon an object protected more strictly, whereas in fact they cause harm to an object protected less strictly, they are liable for an attempt against the object protected more strictly. Thus, pregnancy of the victim in a murder significantly increases the danger of the crime and constitutes a particularly qualifying circumstance (paragraph 4 of Part 2 of Article 99). This type of mistake regarding the object may affect the classification of the crime in two ways. If the offender is unaware that the victim is pregnant, the crime should be classified under Part 1 of Article 99 of the Criminal Code, without this aggravating circumstance. If, however, the person proceeds from the mistaken assumption that the relevant aggravating circumstance exists, the act should be classified as an attempt to commit a crime with that aggravating circumstance, namely under Part 3 of Article 24 and paragraph 4 of Part 2 of Article 99 of the Criminal Code.
A mistake regarding the identity of the victim consists in the fact that, while intending to take the life of a particular person, the offender mistakenly identifies another person as that individual and commits an offence against that other person, where the substitution does not constitute an element of the criminal offence. In both cases, the nature of the object correctly reflects the offender's intent; therefore, the mistake has no effect on the form of guilt, the classification of the crime or criminal liability. For example, if a person intended to kill their neighbour but killed a random passer-by, the act is classified under Part 1 of Article 99 of the Criminal Code. However, if the substitution of the victim's identity also changes the object of the crime, the social and legal characteristics of the act change. For example, if the offender intended to kill a judge or an investigator but mistakenly killed another person, they are liable, in accordance with the rule discussed above, for an offence against the life of a person administering justice or conducting a pre-trial investigation (Article 408 of the Criminal Code).
In certain cases, where special conditions associated with the victim's identity affect the criminal law assessment of the act, a mistake concerning those conditions excludes guilt and criminal liability. For example, if the offender is mistaken regarding the age of an accomplice involved in the commission of a criminal offence, Article 132 of the Criminal Code, which provides for criminal liability for involving a minor in the commission of criminal offences, cannot be imputed to that offender.
A mistake regarding the subject matter may be of two types. If a person is mistaken about the qualitative characteristics of the subject matter, such misconceptions do not affect the form of guilt, the classification of the crime or criminal liability. For example, a thief intended to steal a tape recorder but confused the boxes and stole a radio receiver. If the offence is directed against a non-existent subject matter (when a burglar opens a safe and discovers that it is empty and that the money they intended to steal is absent), the act is classified as an attempt against that subject matter. However, it should be borne in mind that an incorrect understanding of the subject matter of the offence sometimes also entails a mistake regarding the object of the crime. Thus, stealing a gas lighter from a citizen, mistakenly believing it to be a pistol, involves an incorrect assessment not only of the subject matter of the offence but also of the object of the crime. Therefore, it is classified according to the direction of intent (in this example, as an attempt to steal a firearm, Part 3 of Article 24 and Article 291 of the Criminal Code).
A mistake regarding the means of committing a criminal offence occurs when a person selects as a means a device that, for one reason or another, is incapable of causing harm to the object being targeted. For example, a person mistakenly fires at another person using a pistol loaded with a blank cartridge. In this case, the person must be held liable for an attempt to commit a crime (in the example given, an attempt to commit murder, Part 3 of Article 24 and Article 99 of the Criminal Code).
If, however, an insignificant means is used, by which it is entirely impossible ever to commit a criminal offence, and which is based on the person's ignorance and superstition, their low level of literacy, in the form of fortune-telling, whispering, incantations, spells and the like, then actions based on such means have no criminal law significance. They have only criminological significance, since, in essence, they constitute a stage in the formation or manifestation of intent, and the manifestation of intent is not criminally punishable.
A mistake regarding the method of committing a crime affects the classification of the act when the method serves as a distinguishing feature between independent elements of crimes. Thus, theft and robbery differ in the method of taking property (secret and open, respectively). Since the principal criterion determining the classification of theft is the offender's subjective understanding of the nature of the act being committed, the act must be classified in accordance with the direction of the offender's intent.
For example, if a person believed that they were taking property secretly, whereas in fact those present saw the property being stolen, the offender's actions must be classified on the basis of the method of taking the property that was within the offender's awareness. In our example, the person believed that they were acting secretly; therefore, they should be charged with theft of another person's property.
A mistake regarding the method of committing a criminal offence also affects classification in cases where the method constitutes a distinguishing feature between the basic and qualifying elements of a crime. Thus, murder committed by a method dangerous to the lives of other people is classified under paragraph 6 of Part 2 of Article 99 of the Criminal Code, whereas murder committed by other methods that have no qualifying significance is classified under Part 1 of Article 99 of the Criminal Code. For correct classification, it is particularly important here to establish whether the offender realised that the method of murder they had chosen was dangerous to the lives of other people. If the person was unaware of this dangerous nature of the method of murder, the crime is classified as having been committed without this aggravating circumstance. If the offender mistakenly believed that the method of murder they had chosen was dangerous to the lives of other people, their act must be classified as an attempt to commit murder by precisely such a method dangerous to the lives of other people.
A mistake regarding the causal relationship consists in a person's incorrect understanding or misconception concerning the causal relationship between the act being committed and the consequence. If the subject knows precisely what consequences may occur as a result of their conduct, then their mistake regarding the causal relationship is irrelevant to the determination of liability, i.e. this type of mistake does not affect the form of guilt or the classification of the criminal offence. Thus, for the classification of the act, it is irrelevant that the subject intended to kill the victim by stabbing them in the heart, whereas the victim died from substantial blood loss as a result of an injury to the carotid artery. If the subject does not know what consequences their actions may lead to, liability for intentionally causing harm is excluded. In this case, negligent infliction of socially dangerous consequences may be at issue if the subject should and could have foreseen the actual course of the causal process.
A mistake regarding the qualifying features of a criminal offence exists when a person believes that they are committing an act in the absence of qualifying circumstances. Two situations are possible here. The first is when the subject did not know that the circumstances under which the act was committed are classified by law as qualifying circumstances (for example, a person does not know that robbery committed by a criminal group entails liability under Part 4 of Article 191 of the Criminal Code). In this case, the mistake is disregarded and the rules governing legal mistakes apply. The second is when the subject does not know that their actions are, in fact, being committed under qualifying circumstances. In this case, imputing such circumstances to them is impermissible. For example, an accomplice may not know that they are assisting precisely a criminal group in committing the robbery of another person's property; therefore, they will be liable for complicity in simple robbery.
A mistake regarding the consequences of a criminal act is a misconception concerning the presence or absence of criminal consequences, or a mistake regarding the quality and quantity of those consequences. An example of the first type of mistake is a situation in which a person believes that their actions are destroying or damaging another person's property, whereas in fact this does not occur. Such actions must be classified as an attempt to intentionally destroy or damage another person's property under Part 3 of Article 24 and Article 202 of the Criminal Code.
A mistake regarding the quality, i.e. the nature of socially dangerous consequences, may consist in foreseeing consequences that actually occur. Where consequences not covered by the person's foresight occur, the mistake excludes liability for intentionally causing the consequences that actually occurred, but may entail liability for causing them through negligence if this is provided for by law. An act resulting in consequences other than those intended is classified as an attempt to cause the consequences covered by the person's foresight and, in addition, as negligent infliction of the consequences that actually occurred.
A mistake regarding the severity of socially dangerous consequences means a misconception concerning their quantitative characteristics. In this regard, the consequences actually caused may prove to be either less severe or more severe than those anticipated. If criminal liability under the law is not differentiated depending on the severity of the consequences caused (for example, sabotage), the mistake does not affect the classification of the crime.
If, however, the legislator makes liability dependent on the severity of the consequences, determined within specific limits expressly established by law, a mistake regarding this feature entails classification of the criminal offence according to the direction of the offender's intent. For example, if the person's intention was to cause harm to health, but death occurred, this mistake excludes criminal liability for murder. If the infliction of the more serious consequence was covered by negligent guilt and such an act is criminally punishable under the law, then, alongside liability for intentionally causing (or attempting to cause) the intended consequence, liability also arises for the negligent consequence and for the negligent infliction of the more serious consequence.
At the same time, the following must be borne in mind: if, in a criminal law provision establishing liability for intentionally causing certain consequences, the legislator provides for the negligent infliction of more serious consequences as a qualifying feature, the acts are classified under a single criminal law provision. For example, intentionally inflicting grievous bodily harm which results in the victim's death through negligence must be classified under Part 3 of Article 106 of the Criminal Code.
If no such provision exists in the law, as well as in cases of an actual concurrence of criminal offences, the act must be classified under the Articles of the Criminal Code concerning the intentional infliction (or attempted infliction) of the intended consequence and the negligent infliction of the more serious consequence that actually occurred. For example, while attempting to inflict grievous bodily harm on a person, the offender also causes the death of another person through negligence. The act must be classified under Part 1 of Article 106 and Article 104 of the Criminal Code as the intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm and causing death through negligence.
A mistake regarding the number of objects targeted may be of two types: a) a person believes that they are targeting only one object, whereas in fact several objects are affected; b) a person believes that their actions are directed against two or more objects, whereas in reality harm is caused to only one of them.
In the first type of mistake: if the offender should and could have realised the fact that other objects were being targeted (in addition to the principal, main object), they are subject to liability both for intentionally causing harm to the intended object and for negligently targeting an object that was not covered by their awareness, provided that negligent infringement upon that object is criminally punishable by law. If, under the circumstances of the case, the person should not and could not have realised the fact that other objects were being targeted, the harm caused by them cannot entail criminal liability. For example, in the course of hooligan acts, a person delivers a powerful blow to the victim's face with a brass knuckle, as a result of which the victim falls and sustains a fatal injury when their head strikes stones. Under these circumstances, the offender should and could have foreseen the possibility of the victim falling and death occurring; therefore, they must be held liable for hooliganism and causing death through negligence (Articles 293 and 104 of the Criminal Code). If, under similar circumstances, death occurs as a result of a light punch to the face but is connected with the exacerbation of pathological internal processes in the victim's body, causing death cannot be imputed to the subject, since they could not have foreseen such consequences. Therefore, their actions must be classified only as hooliganism.
In the second type, the act must be classified according to the concurrence of criminal offences. Thus, for setting fire to a house with the intention of killing its owner, who was not at home, the offender must be held liable for intentionally destroying or damaging another person's property by arson and for attempted murder (paragraph 1 of Part 2 of Article 202 and Part 3 of Article 24, Article 99 of the Criminal Code).
The first element (the person's failure to foresee the possibility of socially dangerous consequences resulting from their actions or omissions) distinguishes carelessness from intent (direct and indirect) and self-confidence. The second element (the existence of an obligation and the ability of the person to foresee those consequences) distinguishes carelessness from any form of innocent infliction of harmful consequences for which the person is not subject to criminal liability.
A person's obligation to foresee the consequences of their conduct arises from generally known written and unwritten norms of ordinary prudence and caution (for example, it is common knowledge that it is dangerous to engage in games on the carriageway, cliffs, slopes, stair landings, rooftops, construction sites, etc.).
In the formula of carelessness, the legislator includes not only the person's obligation to foresee the occurrence of socially dangerous consequences, but also the person's ability to foresee them. If either of these features is absent, there can be no question of the person's guilt. The ability to foresee the occurrence of socially dangerous consequences characterises an individual's personal characteristics: their age, life experience, professional knowledge, education and qualifications.
Commentary on the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 2021, by Isidor Shamilovich Borchashvili, Honoured Figure of Kazakhstan, Doctor of Law, Professor, Academician of the Kazakhstan National Academy of Natural Sciences, Member of the Scientific Advisory Councils under the Constitutional Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Member of the Working Group on Reform of the Law Enforcement System under the Security Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Honoured Employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
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